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 In practice, various ad hoc approaches for designing reliability test programs have 
been observed. Many of these approaches rely on previously established rules of thumb 
for which the underlying rationale is indefensible. As a consequence, those who use such 
approaches are unlikely to maintain a firm resource commitment for the conduct of 
reliability test program activities. Furthermore, it is difficult to ascertain the impact that 
budgetary cuts will have on the adequacy of the reliability test program with any degree 
of accuracy. 
The contributions of this research are as follows. This dissertation presents a 
novel 7-step planning process to aid practitioners in designing adequate reliability test 
programs. This planning process serves as a tool to systematically identify, quantify, and 
mitigate evaluation risks subject to resource constraints. By performing the 7 steps 
associated with this planning process, practitioners will be able to logically justify 
reliability test program requirements and more effectively articulate the significance of 
 
 
evaluation risks associated with a particular reliability test program design. Additionally, 
it is a straightforward process to assess the impact of a reduction in reliability test 
program resources.  
This planning process includes a step for assessing the level of risk associated 
with key aspects of the reliability test program. One such consideration that is of 
paramount importance is the adequacy of the test configuration of the system. Hence, we 
present a simulation-based approach for assessing the adequacy of the test configuration 
of a complex system-of-systems. For the purpose of demonstration, an application of this 
approach to air defense systems is included; however, the approach is valid for any type 
of system. 
As well, this dissertation presents an evaluation risk assessment process for 
reliability test programs—adapted from the traditional failure mode and effects analysis 
(FMEA) process. This process can be applied to any reliability test program, irrespective 
of the manner in which the plan was formulated. Just as a FMEA facilitates the 
identification of potential weaknesses in a system architecture, this evaluation risk 
assessment process is designed to surface reliability test program weaknesses and gauge 
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1.1  Purpose of this Dissertation 
Evaluation risk is defined as a measure of the residual uncertainty associated with 
the characterization of a given system’s expected behavior in its intended operational 
environment. This dissertation will present risk management techniques to identify, 
assess, and mitigate —subject to resource constraints—the evaluation risks associated 
with a given system’s reliability test program. Reliability test planners can use the 
guidance presented herein to logically justify reliability test program activities and more 
effectively articulate the significance of evaluation risks associated with a particular 
reliability test program design to funding decision authorities. If reliability test program 
resources are reduced, these techniques are a means to assess the impact that such a 
reduction in reliability test program resources will have on the adequacy of the system 
reliability evaluation for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs1). In this context, 
adequacy is defined as the condition achieved when the evaluation risk associated with a 
given reliability test program plan is within the acceptable tolerance threshold of the 
decision authority. 
  
                                                 
1 An acquisition program that is designated by the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) (USD(AT&L)) as an MDAP, or estimated by 
the USD(AT&L) to require an eventual total expenditure for Research, Development, 
Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) of more than $365 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 





1.2  Overview of Dissertation and Its Contributions 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 The purpose of Chapter 1 is to provide the reader with a synopsis of the focus of 
this dissertation as well as the organizational structure and material contained herein.  
 
Chapter 2: Background and Motivation 
 In Chapter 2, we discuss current practices with respect to reliability test program 
planning and reliability evaluation for Army systems, and we highlight heretofore 
unresolved challenges. Most notably, it is the case that no logically-defensible approach 
to address the adequacy of a given reliability test program currently exists. Based on the 
diminishing amount of resources available for the conduct of reliability test programs, 
there is a keen interest in designing and executing efficient reliability test programs. 
However, it is critical to first recognize that there is a tipping point at which a further 
reduction in resources would preclude an adequate evaluation of system reliability. The 
research goal was to develop innovative techniques that can serve to identify the tipping 
point as an aid in the planning process during which time there is a fierce competition for 
a firm commitment of resources. To that end, 5 minimum requirements for reliability test 
programs are introduced. These 5 minimum requirements will be used to establish an 
evaluation risk assessment process for reliability test programs in Chapter 4 as well as a 






Chapter 3: Literature Review 
 In Chapter 3, we document the findings from our review of relevant work 
associated with the design of adequate reliability test programs. The material in this 
chapter is organized according to the 5 minimum requirements for reliability test 
programs outlined in Chapter 2.  
 
Chapter 4: Evaluation Risk Assessment Process for Reliability Test Programs 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, a range of flaws has been observed in reliability test 
programs for military systems. Therefore, it is desirable to formulate a structured 
approach to designing reliability test programs that enables the identification, assessment, 
and mitigation of such flaws. In order to formulate an appropriate process for designing 
reliability test programs, a systematic examination of actual reliability test programs must 
be performed to document these flaws (or “failure modes”).  
Chapter 4 presents a novel evaluation risk assessment process for reliability test 
programs.  This process, which was adapted from the traditional failure mode and effects 
analysis (FMEA) process, can be applied to any reliability test program, irrespective of 
the manner in which the plan was formulated. Just as a FMEA facilitates the 
identification of potential weaknesses in a system architecture, our evaluation risk 
assessment process is designed to surface reliability test program weaknesses and gauge 
the potential impact of each weakness to the system reliability evaluation. As well, the 
reliability test program evaluation risk assessment process includes steps to postulate 




The 5 minimum requirements for reliability test programs introduced in Chapter 2 
are used to develop reliability evaluation risk indicators to be considered during the 
application of the evaluation risk assessment process. In Chapter 5, this evaluation risk 
assessment process is applied to the reliability test programs for 10 Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs. 
 
Chapter 5: Findings from the Application of the Evaluation Risk Assessment Process to 
10 Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
 Based on the application of the evaluation risk assessment process defined in 
Chapter 4 to 10 Major Defense Acquisition Programs, a summary of poor design 
practices for reliability test programs is presented. The systems considered form 
representative cross-section of the types of systems in the US Department of Defense’s 
portfolio, specifically—1 networked communications system-of-systems, 1 system 
comprised of networked sensors, 3 wheeled combat vehicles, 1 wheeled tactical vehicle, 
1 tracked combat vehicle, 1 dismounted battle-space awareness system, and 1 missile 
defense system. Recommendations regarding risk mitigation strategies, contingency 
plans, and alternate approaches are included. The findings discussed in Chapter 5 are 
used to inform the development of the reliability test program planning process in 
Chapter 6. 
 
Chapter 6: Proposed Process for Reliability Test Program Planning 
 Bearing in mind (i) the 5 minimum requirements for reliability test programs 
specified in Chapter 2 and (ii) the findings contained in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 presents a 




military and commercial systems. This tailorable planning process serves as a tool to 
systematically identify, assess, and mitigate evaluation risk subject to resource constraints 
(e.g., amount of funding, time available for test conduct, quantity of test assets). As the 
considerations of the evaluation risk assessment process defined in Chapter 4 are also, 
necessarily, important considerations in the design of RTPs, the steps of the planning 
process presented in Chapter 6 reflect these same considerations. 
By performing the 7 steps associated with this planning process, it is possible to 
logically justify reliability test program requirements and more effectively articulate the 
significance of evaluation risks associated with a particular reliability test program 
design. Additionally, it is a straightforward process to assess the impact of a reduction in 
reliability test program resources and determine whether or not there is a need to 
reformulate the reliability test program. This planning process was used to generate lower 
risk reliability test programs for two real systems in order to demonstrate its usefulness. 
 
Chapter 7: A Simulation-Based Risk Assessment Methodology to Determine the 
Evaluation Adequacy of System-Of-Systems Operational Test Configurations 
 The reliability test program planning process from Chapter 6 includes steps to 
establish and assess the level of risk associated with essential evaluation risk areas 
(planning steps 4 and 6, respectively). Chapter 7 presents a simulation-based method for 
assessing the risk associated with a particular essential evaluation risk area that may be 
established during the reliability test program planning process—the disparity that exists 
between the field/production configuration of the system-of-systems and the test 




system-of-systems is defined as “a set or arrangement of systems that results from 
independent systems integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities.” 
Given practical reliability test program resource constraints, it is rare that the full 
field configuration of a system-of-systems can be exercised during an operational test 
event. As a consequence, an incomplete configuration of the system-of-systems is 
exercised, and those test results are used to make an assessment of the full field 
configuration. However, as we consider various (incomplete) operational test 
configurations for a given system-of-systems, it is critical to acknowledge that there is a 
threshold at which a further reduction in the scale and scope of the test configuration will 
yield results that are not representative of how the full field configuration will behave. 
Conceptually, only test configurations that lie above such a threshold are deemed to be 
adequate, from a system-of-systems reliability evaluation standpoint. 
The simulation-based approach presented in this chapter can be employed to 
assess the adequacy of a given test configuration for any type of military or commercial 
system-of-systems. As discussed above, this simulation-based assessment of the 
adequacy of the planned system-of-systems test configuration is a supporting activity for 
step 6 of the reliability test program planning process from Chapter 6. To illustrate how 
this simulation-based approach can be used to aid in the identification of the best 
alternative from among a group of potential operational test configuration alternatives, 






Chapter 8: Summary and Conclusions 
 In Chapter 8, we summarize the findings of this dissertation research. 
Specifically, we concentrate on insights in the following 4 major areas: (1) the reliability 
test program evaluation risk assessment process described in Chapter 4, (2) findings from 
examination of reliability test programs for 10 Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
documented in Chapter 5, (3) the reliability test program planning process defined in 
Chapter 6, and (4) the simulation-based approach for assessing the evaluation adequacy 
of system-of-systems operational test configurations provided in Chapter 7. We revisit 
the topic of applicability for the techniques presented in Chapters 4 through 7 along with 
implementation recommendations for practitioners. Finally, we discuss opportunities for 





2 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
2.1  Limitations with the Current Reliability Test Program Planning Paradigm 
In practice, we have observed various ad hoc approaches for designing reliability 
test programs (RTPs). Many of these approaches rely on previously established rules of 
thumb for which the underlying rationale is indefensible. As a consequence, it is unlikely 
to maintain a firm resource commitment from program managers for the conduct of RTP 
activities. Furthermore, it has proven difficult to ascertain the impact that budgetary cuts 
will have on the adequacy of the RTP with any degree of accuracy. 
For systems that have at least one reliability requirement, Army evaluators 
collaborate with the system’s program management office to plan and execute a series of 
developmental and operational test events in order to sufficiently characterize the 
reliability behavior of the system. Such a characterization should not be limited to a 
single value such as a point estimate of the mean time between system abort (MTBSA); it 
must include a comprehensive list of all observed reliability failure modes as well as the 
conditions under which those failures occurred during testing. The motivation for 
conducting a robust reliability test and evaluation program is to inform the final decision 
regarding whether the demonstrated system reliability will enable or inhibit mission 
accomplishment. As well, operation and support costs associated with the fleet of systems 





2.2  Shortfalls in the Reliability of Army Systems 
Between 2004 and 2007, the success rate associated with the demonstration of US 
Army materiel system reliability requirements was approximately 26% [4]. In December 
of 2007, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology (ASA[ALT]) issued the first Army-level reliability policy, aimed at 
improving the success rate for the demonstration of Army materiel system reliability 
requirements [1]. From 2008 through 2011, the success rate improved to approximately 
37%, and if we consider only results from 2010 through 2011, the success rate was 
approximately 53%  for the Army [4]. Across all of the Services (Army, Navy, and Air 
Force) in the US Department of Defense (DoD), 54% of the systems evaluated in 2012 
met their reliability thresholds [6]. 
Despite the observed increase in the reliability demonstration success rate, the 
majority of system developers are still failing to conduct effective design-for-reliability 
activities prior to the start of the formal reliability growth program [4]. As a result, 
programs are encountering many more failure modes than can be effectively addressed 
and mitigated prior to the reliability demonstration event [4]. Therefore, in 2011, 
ASA(ALT) issued a reliability policy update [3] augmented with early detection 
mechanisms (engineering-based reviews and reliability assessments) for significant 
departures from system reliability growth program plans. The intent of the additional 
elements of the 2011 Army reliability policy is to identify issues early enough in the 
reliability growth program to have the potential to make course corrections before it is 





2.3  System Reliability Requirements 
Irrespective of the particular RTP planning approach adopted, the initial activity 
should be to ensure a shared interpretation of the system’s reliability requirement(s) 
among all stakeholders. Reliability requirements for an Army system are specified in the 
system’s associated Capability Development Document (CDD). Given the system 
reliability requirements, the test and evaluation community must achieve consensus 
regarding the interpretation of the requirements in order to devise a sufficient RTP. 
Within the CDD, a system-level reliability requirement is typically specified as a lower 
bound on the probability of completing a mission within a certain duration.  For example, 
a requirement might be written as “the system shall have at least a 90% probability of 
completing a 24-hour mission.” Often, an associated reliability metric, such as the mean 
time between system abort (MTBSA) is derived from the CDD requirement, and that 
serves as the focus of the reliability test and evaluation program in such cases. Further, 
per Department of the Army Pamphlets 70-3 [7] and 73-1 [8], the system reliability 
requirement must be demonstrated with high statistical confidence (typically 80% is the 
level adopted). 
In the context of the system evaluation, the level of statistical confidence refers to 
the one-sided lower confidence bound on the adopted system-level reliability metric 
(such as MTBSA). Although a system’s reliability evaluator will use the adopted metric 
to assess reliability subsequent to each test event in the system’s overall test and 
evaluation program, the stipulation regarding confidence primarily applies to the failure 
data captured during the single test event designated as the reliability demonstration test 




statistical confidence relative to the system reliability requirement is motivated by the 
government’s desire to temper the risk of accepting a system for which the inherent 
design does not meet the reliability requirement.  Such a risk is traditionally referred to as 
the consumer’s risk. Similarly, a reasonable RTP plan will balance the producer’s risk, 
i.e., the risk that the government does not accept a system that actually meets the 
reliability requirement. Given the current reliability test and evaluation paradigm—a 
single reliability demonstration event of finite length—it is possible for either risk to 
become the reality due to random chance.  After all, it is possible that the observed 
reliability behavior of the system during the demonstration test will not be representative 
of its true tendency in the field. This possibility is the primary motivation to demand the 
demonstration of system reliability requirements with high statistical confidence. 
Along with the aforementioned RTP planning considerations, it is pivotal to 
conduct analyses to identify potential unreliability drivers prior to the commencement of 
the RTP. We wish to develop intuition as to where we should anticipate the bulk of the 
failure intensity to be concentrated. For analysis purposes, one may decompose the 
system in terms of its subsystems or functions, and make an effort to map failure modes 
to each aspect. The insights derived from such activities can enable the planners to 
construct an RTP that includes particular events designed to exercise the system in such a 
way as to induce important failure modes and facilitate a representative characterization 




2.4  Areas of Uncertainty Encountered in the Evaluation of System Reliability 
Despite the concerted effort to investigate and quantify the reliability behavior of 
systems, it is clear that uncertainty regarding the true underlying nature of the system will 
persist. Further, the uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact that, for most complex systems-
of-systems (SoS), it is infeasible to test the full configuration that the Army intends to 
field. In the event that a representative configuration of the SoS is indeed available for 
testing, it is often the case that the duration of testing is insufficient to demonstrate the 
reliability requirement with statistical confidence. Hence, it is pivotal to the Army that 
the plan for evaluating the system under test hedge against the introduction of 
unmitigated uncertainty and improve our knowledge of the system. 
As a direct result of the language used to specify system reliability requirements, 
historically, the evaluation of system reliability has emphasized the estimation of metrics 
such as MTBSA.  Inherently, there is aleatory uncertainty associated with the estimation 
of MTBSA or other similarly defined system reliability metrics via finite developmental 
and/or operational testing activities. There is also epistemic uncertainty associated with 
the underlying behavior of system reliability; although, the standard assumption is that 
reliability failures occur according to a homogeneous Poisson process. Depending on the 
system design, this may not be a good model to use to characterize system reliability. The 
validity of such an assumption should, in practice, be assessed given a reliability block 
diagram of the system along with system-level failure data. In reality, even if the 
assumption of a homogeneous Poisson process is not correct, resource constraints may 




Notwithstanding the emphasis on estimation of system reliability metrics such as 
MTBSA, it is incumbent on system reliability evaluators to capture and analyze 
additional pertinent information. In 2 reports [9, 10] published by a National Academy of 
Sciences panel regarding the operational test and evaluation of the Stryker family of 
systems, the panel recommended that evaluators should (1) track system failure modes 
and maintenance information across developmental and operational testing and (2) assess 
system reliability by specific failure modes as well as across failure modes instead of 
assigning a particular exponential model for all failures.  Additionally, the panel asserted 
that system reliability behavior should be assessed within the context of environmental 
and operational conditions [10]. After all, a holistic evaluation of system reliability (as a 
component of operational suitability) should explicitly address 
• system failure modes and their estimated recurrence rates 
• the unreliability drivers (based on recurrence rate) 
• the major subsystems that are associated with the bulk of the failure intensity 
• the cost to repair the system (in terms of maintenance man-hours and parts), 
• the down-time associated with each failure mode (including diagnostic time, 
active maintenance time, administrative and logistic delay time, etc.), and 
• special tools or training required for maintainers. 
There may be other areas of interest, depending on the given system. The ability to 
address each area at a high level of fidelity is inexorably linked to the availability of 
reliability test program resources. Intuitively, as the availability of resources increases, it 
is possible to reduce the epistemic uncertainty in our characterization of system 




2.5  Minimum Requirements for the Characterization of System Reliability 
Because test and evaluation resources are limited, it is impractical to set forth to 
design risk-free RTPs.  Instead, the goal of practitioners should be to identify essential 
evaluation risk areas associated with each RTP and mitigate those evaluation risks to the 
extent that available resources will support. As the goal is to characterize the reliability 
behavior of each system, we assert that it is imperative to address 5 major areas during 
the design of an RTP. Hereafter, we will refer to these 5 areas as our minimum 
requirements for RTPs. Below, we briefly discuss the 5 minimum requirements along 
with the reasoning behind the inclusion of each requirement. 
 
Requirement 1: Evaluate the Reliability of the Field Configuration of the System 
Although this requirement may seem obvious, a single, clear definition of the 
field configuration of the system cannot always be specified. For some complex systems-
of-systems (SoS), there may be such a large number of possible configurations that the 
field configuration definition established by the user only represents one potential 
realization of the SoS. From the perspective of the reliability evaluator, this is not an 
ideal situation; however, the RTP is constructed to evaluate the configuration that the 
user specifies in the system requirements document. Where appropriate, it may be 
desirable to identify multiple field configurations that will be evaluated. 
 
Requirement 2: Test all Elements of the System 
The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that all distinct elements of the 




have an SoS with a number of identical, redundant systems (active parallel, standby, etc.). 
We want to ensure that each type of system will be physically present during the RTP. 
Moreover, in order to confirm that the redundancy actually works as intended (e.g., a user 
can switch from a failed terminal to an operational terminal to perform essential mission 
tasks) multiple test assets of each type must be present during the reliability 
demonstration event. As well, all software must be exercised. No elements of the SoS 
should be purely simulation-based. Moreover, the use of system surrogates (similar 
systems) should be considered as a last resort because using system surrogates introduces 
additional uncertainty in the characterization of system reliability behavior that may not 
be well-understood.  
 
Requirement 3: Exercise all Anticipated Unreliability Drivers 
The system developer should perform engineering-based analyses early in the 
RTP planning process in order to identify anticipated system unreliability drivers—the 
vital few failure modes that constitute the largest proportion of the system failure 
intensity. More precisely, the system developer should strive to determine which failure 
modes should have the greatest contribution to system unreliability in the actual 
operational environment, not in the lab or test chamber. Such an effort is essential, and it 
would ensure that appropriate test events (and test durations) are incorporated into the 
RTP to sufficiently exercise the anticipated unreliability drivers. For the Army, the design 
of a given system’s RTP must conform to the Operational Mode Summary/Mission 




Command (TRADOC). The OMS/MP specifies TRADOC’s assumptions regarding the 
system’s missions, annual usage rate, load cycles, and operating environment. 
 
Requirement 4: Evaluate the Reliability of the System Correctly 
Due to the ever-increasing scale and complexity of systems, the evaluation 
methodology employed must be tailored for each system. For example, it may be 
necessary to build-up SoS reliability estimates from system-level data when testing the 
full field configuration is infeasible. In such a case, it is critically important to exercise an 
appropriate test configuration in order to identify failure modes such as those due to 
scale, integration, and interaction among constituent systems of the SoS. 
 
Requirement 5: Identify and Manage the Evaluation Risks of the RTP 
Clearly, the objective behind conducting an RTP is to evaluate system reliability. 
Therefore, it is desirable to assess the evaluation risks associated with an RTP plan before 
implementing it. If the evaluation risks are unacceptable, the plan must be revised to 
mitigate such risks—provided sufficient resources are available to do so. In addition, if 
any of the planning assumptions are determined to be invalid during the course of the 
RTP, a follow-on risk assessment that addresses the new information should be 
performed and the results should be shared with all stakeholders. 
2.6  RTP Efficiency versus RTP Adequacy 
 Now that the key system reliability policies discussed in Section 2.2 are in effect, 




across the DoD. The objective is to identify methods to streamline T&E activities and 
promote innovation—not to compromise the adequacy of system reliability evaluations. 
However, it is critical to first recognize that there exists the tipping point at which a 
further reduction in resources would preclude an adequate evaluation of system 
reliability. Much to the dismay of many members of the community of practice, there is 
no simple closed-form solution to this problem. Instead, RTP adequacy must be assessed 
via more complex analytical activities.  
The primary motivation underpinning this dissertation is to develop techniques 
that can serve to identify the RTP evaluation adequacy tipping point during the RTP 
planning process. After all, it is during the planning process that a fierce competition for 
a firm commitment of resources erupts, and practitioners need to construct logical and 
compelling arguments in order to secure critical resources. It is important for all 
stakeholders to realize that an RTP can be deemed as efficient only if the RTP is adequate 
because efficiency implies that all evaluation requirements are satisfied using the 
minimum amount of resources. In Chapter 6, we directly address the subject of RTP 
adequacy as the foundation of the RTP planning process. In Chapter 7, we delve further 
into a simulation-based method to assess the evaluation adequacy of test configurations 





3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1  Overview 
In Chapter 2, we discussed the challenges facing the reliability T&E community, 
and we presented a set of minimum RTP requirements to address those challenges. We 
will now discuss relevant methodology, tools, and guidance found in the existing 
literature . Given our discussion in the previous chapter, we have organized our literature 
review in terms of the 5 minimum requirements for RTPs. For the most part, 
Requirements 1 and 2 are straightforward, and we submit that these requirements do not 
demand further embellishment here. In contrast, Requirements 3, 4, and 5 are non-trivial.  
More importantly, there is no established standard guidance for the fulfillment of 
Requirements 4 and 5. Therefore, our literature review will only address methodology, 
tools, and guidance applicable to Requirements 3, 4, and 5. 
3.2  Identify all Anticipated System Unreliability Drivers 
Although the associated minimum requirement previously appears in Chapter 2 as 
“Exercise all Anticipated Unreliability Drivers,” we must first understand how to identify 
system unreliability drivers—generally before system-level testing has been conducted. 
First applied by nuclear and defense industries in the 1940s, and later formalized by 
NASA in the 1960s, the traditional failure mode effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) 
methodology [24] has been widely employed to identify system failure modes. The long-
standing FMECA guides utilized by practitioners, Military Standard 1629A [11] and 




consulted. The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) established 2 new standards for 
FMECAs: (1) SAE-J1739 [26], which is intended for automotive systems, and (2) SAE-
ARP-5580 [27], which is intended for non-automotive systems. 
For the majority of Army acquisition programs, system developers are 
contractually obligated to generate and deliver a FMECA report to the government, but 
the FMECA report does not automatically translate into an improvement in the reliability 
of the system. One problem with this interpretation of how to perform a FMECA is that it 
is inherently task-based; however, it should be a continuous process. Fortunately, the 
updated SAE-ARP-5580 promotes this notion of a FMECA as a process, not a one-time 
deliverable [25].  
In practice, the system developer’s team responsible for the synthesis of the 
FMECA may not interact with the system engineering team [4]. As a consequence, the 
potential insights gained from the FMECA process are not shared. Furthermore, guidance 
regarding FMECAs contained in Military Standard 785B features the activity of 
postulating all potential failure modes for the system [28].  Yet, this is not truly practical, 
nor is it a useful activity. The goal is not to postulate thousands of potential system 
failure modes; rather, the goal is to conduct up-front analyses to identify those potential 
failure modes that will provide the greatest “contribution” to the initial failure intensity of 
the system under operationally-realistic loads and stresses. 
The “hard part” of the FMECA effort concerns the identification of operationally 
important failure modes—the vital few as opposed to the trivial many. There are a 
number of reasonable approaches to employ in the pursuit of identifying the potential 




of America (ITAA) released GEIA-STD-0009: Reliability Program Standard for Systems 
Design, Development, and Manufacturing [12]. Approved by the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI) and written by members from DoD, industry, and academia, 
GEIA-STD-0009—along with its companion handbook [13]—offers practitioners the 
following guidance regarding the failure mode identification process: 
• Contract for closed-loop, continuous-improvement effort to identify and mitigate 
failure modes likely to occur under operationally-realistic loads and stresses 
• In advance of system/subsystem testing, apply techniques such as: 
– Engineering- and physics-based failure mechanism modeling 
– Accelerated and low-level testing of components and assemblies 
– MANPRINT analytical methods (for failure modes that may be charged to 
operators, maintainers, or software) 
– Lean Six Sigma methods (for failure modes that may be induced by 
manufacturing variation or errors) 
– Execution of system/subsystem-level reliability growth testing to surface 
and mitigate the modeling-resistant failure modes that remain 
As well, commercial software tools such as Raptor (developed and licensed by ARINC) 
and BlockSim (developed and licensed by ReliaSoft) have become popular among certain 
organizations within the community of practice. These and other software-based tools 
may be employed as a means to aid in the identification of subsystems that will have the 
greatest impact on system-level reliability. Murphy et al. [14] assert that the underlying 
Raptor simulation methodology consistently yields more accurate results, in terms of the 




ranking methods [14]. However, for the example discussed, the Raptor ranking of 
subsystems is not compared to actual test results or field data for the V-22 Osprey tilt-
rotor aircraft; hence, the authors do not provide compelling evidence that their assertions 
regarding accuracy are valid. This assertion of enhanced accuracy requires further study. 
For complex systems-of-systems, the utilization of software-based modeling and 
simulation (M&S) tools can be highly beneficial, provided that the underlying models 
have gone through a formal validation, verification, and accreditation (VV&A) process. 
Army policy mandates that the VV&A process must be completed for before any M&S 
tools may be used in the evaluation of a system.  For commercial (i.e., proprietary) 
software-based tools, it may not be possible for the government to perform an 
independent VV&A.  Thus, the employment of commercial products may be at the user’s 
own risk. 
Alternatively, Yadav et al. [15, 16] offer another systematic approach to identify 
weak links within the system. By executing this approach, one decomposes the system 
into three dimensions: physical, functional, and temporal. Intermediate outputs of the 
methodology include two- and three-dimensional matrices that cleanly delineate 
relationships between subsystems/components, functions, and failure mechanisms. By 
inspection, one can quickly identify those subsystems/components, functions, and failure 
mechanisms that contribute to the largest portions of the initial system-level failure 
intensity. The discussion by Yadav et al. [15, 16] is based on the assumption that the 
system is a series-only configuration of subsystems; therefore, we would need to modify 




3.3  Evaluate the Reliability of the System Correctly 
Recall from Chapter 2 that, for the majority of complex Army systems, it is 
unlikely that we will be able to exercise the full-up field configuration of the system 
during the reliability demonstration event. However, under these circumstances, it is 
likely that we will have at least a single system of each type from the SoS under test 
during the reliability demonstration event. As a notional example, let us say that our SoS 
is an air defense battery. The reliability block diagram associated with the notional SoS 
air defense battery is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Notional Air Defense System-of-Systems Reliability Block Diagram 
 
Without loss of generality, let us say that during the SoS reliability demonstration 
event, we will have 2 control stations, 2 radars, and 2 launchers. By inspection of the SoS 
reliability block diagram in Figure 1, it is easy to see that we will not have the 




the apparent disparity, we still have an SoS-level reliability requirement, and we must use 
the information obtained during the operational test in which the “2-2-2” SoS 
configuration is exercised. Under these circumstances, we must use the system-level data 
to build-up our SoS-level reliability estimate. Nelson and Hall [17] recommend using the 
system-level reliability estimates to build-up the SoS-level reliability estimate. The basic 
steps in the approach by Nelson and Hall are as follows. 
1. Estimate the failure recurrence rate for each type of system on test (from our 
example, the 3 types are: control station, radar, and launcher). 
2. Take the failure recurrence rate estimate for each type of system and apply it to all 
systems within each k-out-of-n structure (all systems of the same type are 
assumed to behave identically).  Use the standard reliability block diagram 
method to develop the reliability expression for each k-out-of-n structure.  For 
computational convenience, Nelson and Hall recommend the use of the beta 
cumulative distribution function to calculate the k-out-of-n structure reliability 
estimate based on k, n, and the estimated failure recurrence rate for the type of 
system in the structure (e.g., launcher). 
3. As each k-out-of-n structure is in series, the SoS-level reliability expression is 
simply the product of the k-out-of-n structures. 
4. Compute the lower one-sided likelihood ratio limit on the SoS-level reliability. 
Based on work by Jeng and Meeker [45], the likelihood ratio limit has been found 
to provide a result for which the true confidence is expected to be closer to the 




For systems consisting of multiple non-repairable components in configured 
series, one may wish to consider using the Lloyd-Lipow (Lindstrom-Madden) 
methodology for developing system-level reliability estimates [18]. Effectively, the 
Lloyd-Lipow method randomly combines test results for individual system components 
in order to obtain a system-level reliability estimate. One may think of the result as a 
vector of length n, where n is equal to the number of components in the system. Each 
element in the reliability vector will either be 0 (component did not fail during its 
associated test) or 1 (component did fail during its associated test). As the methodology 
applies for series-only systems, a single occurrence of the value of 1 in the reliability 
vector is interpreted as a system-level failure. For series-parallel systems, the Maximus 
method can be used to generate point estimates and confidence bounds on system-level 
reliability [19]. Coit also provides a method for calculating confidence intervals for 
systems with active redundancy by using component-level failure data [34], and no 
assumption regarding the time-to-failure distributions for the components is required. 
In certain cases, it may be appropriate and desirable to pool failure data from 
multiple test events from a given RTP. There are various reasons one may wish to follow 
such an approach, e.g., to reduce the overall length of the RTP, or improve the robustness 
of the characterization of the reliability behavior of a given system. Practitioners may 
wish to combine subsystem- or system-level failure data from a mix of developmental 
and operational test events in order to generate a system-level reliability estimate. In [10], 
a National Academy of Sciences (NAS) panel suggests that, in addition to using 
information from developmental and operational testing, it may be constructive to 




information previously acquired on similar systems with similar components. Further, the 
NAS panel cautions that underlying model assumptions must be dutifully confirmed, and 
that the process by which information is combined (potentially involving subjective 
judgment) must be completely transparent to all stakeholders [10]. 
There are numerous approaches discussed in the literature that follow a Bayesian 
framework for combining failure data from disparate sources. Martz and Waller provide a 
comprehensive treatment of the subject of Bayesian reliability analysis techniques in 
[31]. One particular approach is provided by Reese et al. [20], in which the authors 
discuss the application of a hierarchical Bayesian reliability model for an anti-aircraft 
missile system. The strengths of the Bayesian approach discussed in [20] include the 
capability to include diverse sources of information (failure data and subject matter 
expert opinion) from different test events at different levels of fidelity (component, 
subsystem, system, etc.). 
Arguably, the most important consideration associated with the application of 
Bayesian methods is the selection process for prior distributions. Wayne and Modarres 
[29] have developed a method for the generation of prior distributions based on the 
premise of maximum entropy—a subject previously discussed by E.T. Jaynes [21, 22]. 
Essentially, the concept of maximum entropy is related to Claude Shannon’s theory of 
information [30], and the goal of the approach, in the context of generating prior 
distributions, is to give no more credit than is due to each source of information. I.e., the 
outcome is a minimally-biased result for the system-level reliability estimate [29]. 
Despite the well-known analytical robustness and flexibility offered by Bayesian-




evaluation has not been widely achieved within the DoD. Typically, the major area of 
concern with Bayesian-based methods is the appropriateness of leveraging data from 
sources other than the system’s reliability demonstration event. In a 2013 memorandum 
[33], the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), Dr. J. Michael Gilmore, 
asserted that he is “amenable to the potential of using Bayesian methodologies as well the 
potential assimilation of OT and relevant DT reliability data but only after observation of 
the subject tests and confirmatory analyses have been performed to verify it makes sense 
do to so.” In general, the evaluation of a given system’s operational reliability must be 
based on observed performance under operationally realistic conditions. According to a 
paper by Hall et al. [32] from DOT&E, such conditions include, but are by no means 
limited to 
• who the system operators are (e.g., Soldiers, contractors, or government testers),  
• who the maintainers are (e.g., Soldiers, Field Support Representatives, 
government maintainers, or a combination thereof), 
• what the environmental conditions of the tests may be (e.g., blowing dust, 
blowing sand, solar loading, rain, dense fog, snow, ambient temperature, relative 
humidity, day/night, etc.), and 
• what operational aspects that the tests may or may not include (e.g., operational 
tempo, force-on-force missions with a credible opposing force, mission durations, 
mission types to be executed, electronic warfare, information assurance, threat 
computer network operations). 
If a data source does not conform to the above conditions that are fitting for the system 




appropriate by the DoD oversight community. As it is quite rare, in practice, that events 
other than the operational test (reliability demonstration event) will be conducted in a 
manner consistent with the actual operational test, it is uncommon for reliability 
evaluators in the DoD to apply Bayesian-based methods to analyze system reliability. 
This lack of homogeneity in testing can be mitigated by designing additional system test 
events to mirror the conditions of the operational test. Yet, until supporting evidence 
exists indicating that it is appropriate to leverage system reliability information from 
alternative sources, it is preferred to conservatively plan for the evaluation of system 
reliability to be based solely on the stand-alone results from the single reliability 
demonstration event. 
3.4  Identify and Manage the Evaluation Risks of the RTP 
Based on the search for existing tools and techniques in the literature, it is 
apparent that no documented approach currently exists that is geared toward assessing the 
evaluation risk associated with a given RTP. The appendix of this dissertation includes a 
questionnaire that we administered to reliability evaluators for 10 Major defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). Subsequent to the receipt of the responses to the 
questionnaire, follow-on interviews were conducted. As anticipated, the only evaluation 
risks considered during planning of the RTP were the risks of committing type I and type 
II statistical errors based on the outcome of the reliability demonstration event—also 
referred to as the initial operational test.  
In 2004, the NAS published findings [10] subsequent to a thorough examination 




program.  In the report [10], the NAS panel asserts that the qualitative, non-statistical 
aspects of an operational test, such as in the case of Stryker, are substantially more 
important than the statistical aspects, such as consumer and producer risks. Further, the 
NAS panel adds that this inadequacy is not particular to the Stryker program; the panel 
asserts that it is likely the case for the majority of MDAPs [10]. Unfortunately, based on 
the responses to our questionnaire and targeted interviews, the message from the NAS 
panel has not yet had the desired impact with respect to reliability test program planning. 
Therefore, in Chapter 4, we present a process that may be employed in order to 
assess the nature and severity of risks associated with reliability test program adequacy. 
Also in Chapter 4, we present several examples of potential reliability evaluation risk 
indicators along with suggested assessment rationale. In Chapter 5, we will discuss 
lessons learned through the application of the RTP evaluation risk assessment process to 
10 MDAPs. We note that continued applications of the evaluation risk assessment 
process to additional acquisition programs would certainly yield further insights 
regarding  potential evaluation risk indicator categories.  Ultimately, we could build a 
comprehensive “library” of RTP weaknesses or risk categories to share between DoD and 
industry partners.  We could further classify each evaluation risk category by the type of 
system for which we expect to potentially be affected—some categories may be 





4 EVALUATION RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS FOR RELIABILITY TEST 
PROGRAMS 
4.1  The Purpose of Reliability Test Programs 
A reliability test program (RTP) is designed to investigate and quantify the 
reliability characteristics of a given system from a mission-based perspective. More 
precisely, it provides information about the nature and recurrence rate of system failures 
that can be expected in the operational environment and evaluates this behavior against 
user-defined requirements. However, due to budget and schedule constraints, it is 
typically infeasible to conduct an exhaustive RTP. Evaluation risk is the risk that the 
reliability evaluation will be insufficient to characterize the reliability behavior of a given 
system. A system RTP must be designed carefully by assessing and mitigating evaluation 
risk. This chapter discusses the minimum requirements for an RTP, lists the associated 
evaluation risks, and presents a framework for assessing these evaluation risks in the 
context of US Army test and evaluation activities. This evaluation risk assessment 
approach can be easily applied to any type of military or commercial system. 
4.2  Review of the Minimum Requirements for Reliability Test Programs 
• Requirement 1: Evaluate the Reliability of the Field Configuration of the System 
• Requirement 2: Test all Elements of the System 
• Requirement 3: Exercise all Anticipated Unreliability Drivers 
• Requirement 4: Evaluate the Reliability of the System Correctly 




4.3  Reliability Evaluation Risk Indicators 
The reliability evaluation risks describe the ways in which an RTP plan may fail 
to meet the 5 minimum requirements listed in Section 4.2. Table 1 lists important general 
risk indicators (or risk areas) as well as the rationale for assessing the severity of each 
risk. This list can be easily tailored to the type of system under evaluation. Below, we 
elaborate on the 7 evaluation risk indicators from Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Reliability Evaluation Risk Indicators and Assessment Rationale 
 
1. Potential to surface unreliability drivers 
Through various techniques (some of which are discussed in Chapter 3), it is 
possible to identify anticipated unreliability drivers for a given system. However, such an 
identification process is conducted prior to the start of the RTP. Therefore, the initial list 
of anticipated unreliability drivers may not precisely align with those that will be 




prominent unreliability driver during the RTP, it is important to include a range of 
operational mode summary/mission profile (OMS/MP) conditions in the RTP. From a 
practical standpoint, it is unlikely that every aspect of the OMS/MP for the system will be 
included in the RTP. However, as we include more elements from the OMS/MP in the 
RTP, we reduce the risk of not observing reliability issues that will have an appreciable 
adverse impact on the reliability of the system. This risk is related to Requirement 1. 
 
2. Potential to observe impact of system reliability on mission accomplishment 
There are many aspects included in the OMS/MP for a given system—terrain, 
climate, types of missions, mission duration, etc. If the system reliability evaluator is to 
build a comprehensive characterization of the impact of the reliability of the system 
under test on mission accomplishment, it is critical to exercise the system in a mission-
based context. Operational testing events combine representative users, the operational 
environment (or a close approximation), and mission vignettes in order to collect some 
evidence of how the system will perform in a mission-based context. This risk is related 
to Requirements 3 and 5. 
 
3. Potential to document impact of system reliability on user experience 
Although user feedback is qualitative in nature, the insights gained can prove to 
be very influential at program decision milestones. For example, the Army may decide to 
buy and field 50,000 vehicles as-is. Alternately, before fielding the system, or the Army 
may require the program manager to address certain issues that degrade the user 




sufficient to improve the user experience. For a software-intensive system that tends to 
crash, perhaps the training manual for the system could be developed further to improve 
the user’s understanding of what to expect and how to handle known issues. Some use the 
term “graceful degradation” to refer to cases in which a reliability failure occurs (not 
necessarily a system abort, possibly a lesser class of failure), but the user experience is 
only modestly degraded in the process. This risk is related to Requirement 5. 
 
4. Likelihood of detecting a 25% system-to-system variation in reliability 
This risk is also related to Requirement 5. When we use the term “system-to-
system variation,” we are generally referring to one of two cases. In the first case, we 
have multiple “identical” systems, but at least one system behaves differently (say, from 
a reliability standpoint) than the others. In the second case, we have distinct variants or 
configurations within a family-of-systems. It is not uncommon to observe peculiarities 
among individual test articles in either case during the RTP. Clearly, it is a desirable 
property for a given RTP design to offer a reasonably high likelihood that practitioners 
could identify a statistically-significant variation among test articles. 
The approach that we propose (though, certainly not the only approach) is to 
stochastically simulate the failure behavior for each variant, taking into account the 
number of test articles and test time per article (may be in terms of hours, miles, cycles, 
etc.).  We set the “baseline” reliability of one of the variants, and we then set the 
reliability for the other variant lower than the first variant. Hence, we assume that, say, 
the true reliability of the first variant is 1,000 mean miles between operational mission 




10% lower than the first variant). Next, we use a statistical test recommended by Nelson 
[35] to determine whether or not there is evidence, at a specified level of significance, 
that the reliability (more precisely, the Poisson failure recurrence rate) of each variant is 
not the same. We repeat this simulation, say, 1,000 times and we calculate the proportion 
of times that the test successfully detects the difference in the true (as established for the 
simulation by the analyst) failure recurrence rate between the two variants. The result is a 
theoretical (and purely mathematical) estimate of the likelihood that we will be able to 
statistically detect a difference in the reliability of the two vehicle variants. 
The “success” proportion (number of times that the statistical comparison test 
described above successfully detects the difference in the failure recurrence rates of the 
two vehicle variants) that we obtain via stochastic simulation is not necessarily intended 
as an absolute measure; rather, it may be used to compare different test options (quantity 
of test vehicles, miles per vehicle, etc.). Applied consistently across RTPs for different 
systems (not just the vehicle from our hypothetical example here), we now have a 
standard approach for assessing the likelihood that a given RTP will enable us to detect 
system-to-system variation. 
A criticism of this approach, perhaps, is that it is purely mathematical and does 
not address, in any manner, differences in actual failure modes for each vehicle variant. 
However, it would seem reasonable to expect that, from an evaluation standpoint, we 
would be able to identify differences in the failure modes between variants (i.e., existence 
of failure modes on one variant only, or different failure recurrence rates for particular 
failure modes), provided that we plan to accumulate a sufficient amount of mileage on 




accumulate enough mileage per variant in order to have the potential to observe the 
presence of various unique failure modes.  As part of the process to develop a reliability 
growth planning curve, we explicitly consider the expected number of new failure modes 
during each test event in the RTP. Given that we already explicitly consider the capability 
to surface an adequate quantity of failure modes, we only consider the potential to detect 
differences in the failure recurrence rates among distinct variants. 
One final note for this evaluation risk indicator category—while we do 
recommend using a 25% system-to-system variation in the failure recurrence rates of the 
test articles, in practice, multiple differences should be considered (such as 10%, 25%, 
and 50%) in order to get a relative notion of the risk associated with different courses of 
action. As a general rule, the likelihood of detecting a statistically-significant variation in 
system-to-system reliability is directly related to the amount of test time per test article. 
 
5. Likelihood of detecting a 25% drop in reliability between DT and OT environments 
This risk, like the previous one, is also related to Requirement 5. Historically, we 
have observed the trend that the reliability estimates for a given system (independent of 
commodity area) are appreciably lower during operational testing (OT) than during 
developmental testing (DT). In particular, we have observed as much as an 83% drop in 
system reliability between DT and OT. For reliability evaluators (and Army decision-
makers), it is highly important to determine whether or not the observed drop is a true 
drop, or if it is instead simply an artifact of chance. Therefore, as in evaluation risk 
indicator category 4 above, we want to consider our ability to detect a drop in system-




We propose to apply the same approach that we described for gauging the 
likelihood of detecting system-to-system variation. Here, we are no longer comparing the 
two vehicle variants; instead, we are comparing DT and OT test results. Thus, our 
stochastic simulation would be constructed assuming a particular DT system-level 
reliability and an OT system-level reliability that is 25% less than that of the DT system-
level reliability. Applying the same procedure discussed for evaluation risk indicator 
category 4, we determine the proportion of time we would expect to successfully detect a 
drop (for a specified level of statistical significance) in the true reliability of the system. 
Our decision to adopt 25% as the standard drop to consider in this evaluation risk 
indicator category is somewhat arbitrary, in that even a 1% reduction in the reliability of 
the system implies that ownership costs would, potentially, be higher, and the likelihood 
of mission success would be lower. However, it makes sense to apply some standard for 
practitioners and decision-makers, and a 25% drop is easily recognizable to decision-
makers as significant. As in our discussion of system-to-system variation in reliability 
(evaluation risk indicator category 4), we could certainly consider other drops (e.g., 10% 
or 50%) along with the standard 25% drop.  In practice, decision-makers may indicate a 
particular preference. 
 
6. Planned proportion of the fielding configuration to be tested during the IOT 
The field configuration for a given system may include multiple distinct variants 
(sometimes referred to as configuration items), or may be a system-of-systems (such as 
an air defense system, including a collection of radars, ground control stations, launcher 




during the reliability demonstration test (typically referred to as the initial operational test 
[IOT]). Clearly, the system evaluation will be more robust if all components of the 
system will be exercised as intended under operational conditions during the IOT. From 
an evaluation standpoint, if not all components of the system are available, then there will 
necessarily be gaps in our knowledge and characterization of the system. This risk is 
related to Requirements 1, 2, and 5. 
In the event that certain components will not be exercised during the IOT, it may 
be possible to obtain data for those components from other events during the RTP (for 
example, a developmental test completed prior to the IOT). A Bayesian hierarchical 
approach similar to that discussed by Reese [36] could be adapted to incorporating data 
from test events other than the IOT along with the actual results from the IOT. In 
addition, it may be a viable option to represent the missing components of the system 
during the IOT through the use of real-time simulations. Such an approach will only be 
acceptable upon completion of validation, verification, and accreditation (VV&A) of 
such models. 
 
7. Planned data sources 
Test Incident Reports (TIRs):  The test center personnel capture details regarding 
notable incidents that occur during each test event. Typically, information included in a 
TIR may consist of attributes such as mileage, operating hours, location, and actions 
taken (e.g., diagnostics or repairs). TIRs serve as the basis for calculating the reliability 
tracking estimates for the system under test. During system testing, it may be necessary to 




information regarding a particular incident. In the event that this situation occurs, the 
reliability evaluator can work with the test center personnel to ensure the key data are 
captured for the remainder of the test (or during future test events). 
Instrumented Data:  Multiple options exist for capturing quantitative (objective) 
system data via on-board instrumentation. For example, attributes such as engine speed, 
road speed, throttle position, orientation (roll/pitch/yaw), ambient temperature, engine 
temperature, and message completion rate can be recorded. When the potential exists to 
incorporate instrumentation in the data collection plan, it is possible to perform in-depth 
analyses, exploring circumstances surrounding each incident. As well, if the same 
instrumentation package is used during DT and OT, we gain the potential to identify 
variations in reliability behavior due to test environment, operators, etc. 
User Surveys:  Developing reliability tracking estimates and cataloguing failure 
modes provides a rich amount of insight into the suitability of a given system, but 
feedback from actual users can be illuminating with respect to the military utility of the 
system. Along with TIRs and instrumented data user surveys offer the potential to round-
out the holistic perspective of system reliability, thus reducing the risk that the evaluation 
will be insufficient to characterize the reliability behavior of the system. This evaluation 
risk indicator category is related to Requirements 4 and 5. 
4.4  Framework for Army RTP Plan Evaluation Risk Assessment 
The evaluation risk assessment procedure is similar to a traditional Failure Mode 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA). This FMEA-like procedure yields a synopsis of identified 




reliability evaluation.  In Chapter 5, we apply this risk assessment framework in the 
examination of the RTP details for 10 systems that are Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAPs). For these 10 systems, we identified certain weaknesses—issues that 
would potentially erode the adequacy of the system-level reliability evaluation—along 
with potential alternatives to reduce evaluation risks related to these weaknesses. The 10 
systems chosen form a representative cross-section from the various types of commodity 
areas. Hence, we expect the insights, or “lessons learned,” that we document regarding 
RTPs to have wide applicability within the Army as well as the other Services within the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and industry. Although we employed this approach after 
each RTP was either in-progress or complete, the same approach could be used during 
the planning process. In fact, we assert that this approach should be practiced during the 
RTP planning process in order to assess risks and assist program managers in the 
allocation of resources in the overarching test program. 
Our approach for analyzing RTPs is designed to achieve the following four 
overarching objectives. 
• Document the RTP details. 
• Analyze the RTP details in order to identify potential weaknesses (or “failure 
modes”). 
• Assess the impact of each weakness on the outcome of the RTP. 
• Formulate corrective actions that we expect to reduce the evaluation risk. 
Resolving potential weaknesses in an RTP plan requires support from Army leadership. 
Because reliability is one of many concerns, Army leadership may be willing to accept 




Reliability Growth is continuously monitoring the outcomes from testing in order to 
determine which aspects of RTPs are working and which aspects are failing with respect 
to system reliability evaluations. 
For example, the current Army reliability test and evaluation paradigm is to 
conduct a single demonstration event (typically referred to as the IOT), employing the 
system under operationally realistic conditions with Soldiers as operators. In many cases, 
the system configuration that will be exercised during the demonstration event may not 
be precisely equivalent to the intended fielding configuration of the system. In such 
cases, stakeholders (i.e., the program management office, the user community, and the 
evaluator) must agree during the planning stage that the test configuration is sufficiently 
representative of the fielding configuration of the system (from a reliability standpoint). 
Depending on the design of the actual system, this may not be a reasonable assumption to 
make when planning the RTP, and it would constitute a weakness in the RTP plan. For 
certain types of systems, the impact of such a weakness could be a significant distortion 
of the true system reliability behavior. As a consequence, the Army may have to absorb 
increased ownership costs and adapt to higher than anticipated system down-times over 
the life of the system fleet. 
To mitigate this risk, the Army could plan to complement the IOT failure data 
with system failure data from an event other than the IOT. Such an event could 
potentially include the portion of the system that will not be available during the IOT, and 
the event may already be part of the RTP for the system. As we discussed in Chapter 3, 
pooling system-level failure data from the IOT along with failure data from another RTP 




established criteria for pooling the failure data are met, certain system failures stemming 
from integration or interaction may remain unobserved. 
4.5  Traditional FMEA Steps 
Per MIL-STD-1629A [11], a FMEA has the following 8 steps: 
a. Define the system to be analyzed. 
b. Construct block diagrams. 
c. Identify all potential item and interface failure modes and define their effect on 
the immediate function or item, on the system, and on the mission to be 
performed. 
d. Evaluate each failure mode and assign severity classification category 
(catastrophic, critical, marginal, or minor). 
e. Identify failure detection methods and compensating provisions for each failure 
mode. 
f. Identify corrective design or other actions required to eliminate the failure or 
control the risk. 
g. Identify effects of corrective actions or other system attributes. 
h. Document the analysis and summarize the problems which could not be corrected 
by design and identify the special controls which are necessary to reduce failure 
risk. 





4.6  RTP Evaluation Risk Assessment Process 
Our proposed evaluation risk assessment process has the following 7 steps, which closely 
follow the 8 steps of a FMEA: 
 
a.  Define the RTP. 
The purpose of this initial step is to clearly lay out all pertinent aspects of a given 
RTP. As the program master schedule is not driven solely by the RTP events, any RTP 
planning should include coordination with all stakeholders. At a minimum, the RTP 
should include the following information: 
• the nature/type of RTP events 
• the duration of each RTP event in terms of system operating time (hours, miles, 
cycles, rounds, etc.) and calendar time 
• the number of items on test and the configuration of each item 
• the test conditions (such as test location, Soldier involvement, and time of year) 
• the reliability growth planning curve (RGPC) for the program (see appendix 
section A.3 for additional background on RGPCs) 
It is the policy of the DoD for all of the MDAPs to develop a viable reliability growth 
plan [2]. The RGPC is a management tool used to aid stakeholders in the formulation of a 
feasible reliability growth plan, and it serves as a kind of reliability block diagram (RBD) 
for the RTP. An RBD is a graphical representation of the relationships between all 
elements of a given system.  We can scrutinize the RGPC similar to the manner in which 
we would intend to scrutinize the RBD in the traditional FMEA process. As with the 




RTP.  RGPC development is the responsibility of the acquisition program management 
office; however, the reliability evaluator is obligated to participate in the development of 
the RGPC.  For additional background on RGPCs, we refer readers to the AMSAA 
Reliability Growth Guide [5] or Military Handbook 189C [37]. 
 
b.  Identify potential weaknesses in the RTP with respect to evaluation adequacy. 
Table 1 lists reliability evaluation risk indicators that can be used to begin 
generating a list of potential weaknesses associated with a given RTP. The elements in 
Table 1 are by no means exhaustive, and the evaluators should consider other ways in 
which the RTP may fail to evaluate reliability adequately. 
 
c.  Identify monitoring/detection methods and contingency plans. 
How will we know if a given RTP weakness has led to a “failure?” For example, 
if an initial RTP planning assumption is that the reliability characteristics of two variants 
within a family-of-systems are effectively the same (sometimes referred to as the 
“commonality” assumption), we can periodically re-examine this assumption once we 
have additional failure data from system-level testing. The monitoring frequency may be 
driven by program decision points, time delays to cut-in design changes, etc. 
 
d.  Develop RTP planning alternatives that mitigate, in whole or in part, the potential 
weaknesses identified in step b. 
If we revisit the “commonality” example from step c, we could develop an RTP 




adjustment to the RTP would likely result in higher test costs and, possibly, additional 
calendar time to execute the RTP. Potentially, we could add more shifts per week in the 
test program to stay on schedule, but we may have to absorb additional costs associated 
with more test articles and test time to characterize the reliability behavior of each 
distinct variant. 
 
e. State the perceived impact associated with the implementation of planning alternatives 
developed in step d. 
As alluded to in step d, the implementation of planning alternatives may result in 
increased test costs, but the benefit would be the potential improvement to the robustness 
of the reliability evaluation, i.e., reduced uncertainty in the characterization of system 
reliability behavior. 
 
f.  Document the analysis and summarize the problems which could not be corrected by 
changing the RTP design and identify the special controls which are necessary to reduce 
failure risk. 
g.  Provide a recommendation to decision makers based on the results from steps a 
through f of the RTP evaluation risk assessment process. 
4.7  Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we presented minimum requirements for RTPs, a list of reliability 
evaluation risks, and an evaluation risk assessment process for RTPs. This approach can 




multiple RTP design alternatives for the same system. Ultimately, in a resource-
constrained atmosphere, reducing the uncertainty associated with the characterization of 
system reliability will need to be balanced with other competing evaluation priorities. In 
Chapter 5, we will discuss the findings derived from our application of the RTP 






5 FINDINGS FROM THE APPLICATION OF THE RELIABILITY TEST 
PROGRAM EVALUATION RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS TO 10 MAJOR 
DEFENSE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 
5.1  Army Evaluation of System Effectiveness, Suitability, and Survivability 
Before the decision to field an Army system can be made, the Army Test and 
Evaluation Command (ATEC), serving as the Army’s independent evaluator of materiel 
systems, plans and conducts developmental and operational testing to provide essential 
information to acquisition decision authorities. The driving force behind conducting a 
rigorous test and evaluation program is to gauge whether or not a given system will 
satisfy the essential mission capabilities required by commanders in the field. In 
particular, ATEC system evaluations focus on three major areas—effectiveness, 
suitability (which includes reliability), and survivability. From Army Regulation 73-1 
[38], we have the following definitions for each evaluation area: 
• Effectiveness: The overall degree of mission accomplishment of a system when 
used by representative personnel in the expected (or planned) environment. Some 
examples of environment are: natural, electronic, threat, and so forth for 
operational employment of the system considering organization, doctrine, tactics, 
survivability, vulnerability, and threat (including countermeasures; initial nuclear 
weapons effects; nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination threats). 
• Suitability: The degree to which a system can be satisfactorily placed in field use 
with consideration given to availability, compatibility, transportability, 




factors, manpower supportability, logistic supportability, and training 
requirements. 
• Survivability: The capability of a system and crew to avoid or withstand 
manmade hostile environments without suffering an abortive impairment of its 
ability to accomplish its designated mission. 
5.2  Evaluation Risk is Inescapable 
In a given year, more than 500 Army systems are in various phases of testing 
[39]. Given the fierce competition for resources and the urgent need to meet the Army’s 
operational requirements, it is impractical to design RTPs that will completely eliminate 
the uncertainty in characterizing a system’s behavior in the actual operational 
environment. Yet, it is possible for practitioners to assess the evaluation risks associated 
with a given RTP, and, if the evaluation risks are unacceptable, revise the RTP to 
mitigate the risks. 
In Chapter 4, we presented a process for performing an evaluation risk assessment 
of any system’s RTP. This chapter discusses the application of this evaluation risk 
assessment process to the RTPs for 10 systems that are Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAPs) and reviews the findings of this study. Performing this process 
resulted in the identification and analysis of weaknesses in the RTPs examined and 
produced ideas for mitigating the evaluation risks, or countermeasures. In the remainder 
of this chapter, the evaluation risk assessment process steps are reviewed and along with 
reliability evaluation risk indicators introduced in Chapter 4. As well, we discuss the RTP 




suggested in each case. Presenting these examples not only illustrates the usefulness of 
this evaluation risk assessment process but also provides test and evaluation practitioners 
with ideas for improving the RTPs that they design. 
5.3  Review of the RTP Evaluation Risk Assessment Process 
As stated in Chapter 4, our approach for analyzing Army RTPs is designed to 
achieve the following 4 objectives: 
• Document the RTP details. 
• Analyze the RTP details in order to identify potential weaknesses (or “failure 
modes”). 
• Assess the impact of each weakness on the outcome of the RTP. 
• Formulate corrective actions that we expect to reduce the evaluation risk. 
Resolving potential weaknesses in a RTP plan requires support from Army leadership. 
Because reliability is one of many concerns, Army leadership may be willing to accept 
greater evaluation risk due to budget and schedule constraints. The Army Center for 
Reliability Growth is continuously monitoring the outcomes from testing to determine 
which aspects of RTPs are working and which aspects are failing with respect to system 
reliability evaluations. The RTP evaluation risk assessment process has the following 7 
steps: 
a. Define the RTP. 
b. Identify potential weaknesses in the RTP with respect to evaluation adequacy. 




d. Develop RTP planning alternatives that mitigate, in whole or in part, the potential 
weaknesses identified in step b. 
e. State the perceived impact associated with the implementation of planning 
alternatives developed in step d. 
f. Document the analysis and summarize the problems which could not be corrected 
by changing the RTP design and identify the special controls which are necessary 
to reduce failure risk. 
g. Provide a recommendation to decision makers based on the results from steps a 
through f of the RTP risk assessment process. 
 
5.4 Reliability Evaluation Risk Indicators Revisited 
The potential weaknesses in a given RTP are the evaluation risks. Based on our 
experience with RTP planning and execution, we identified 7 risk indicators  in Chapter 
4—these are briefly reviewed here. Additional details regarding the underlying rationale 
for each evaluation risk indicator category can be found in Chapter 4. 
 
1. Potential to surface reliability drivers 
All of the OMS/MP conditions should be included in the RTP. The evaluation risk is 
greater if a small subset of these conditions is included. 
 
2. Potential to observe impact of system reliability on mission accomplishment 
The RTP should include robust operational testing with users and a full range of 




small number of missions are included, or representative users do not participate in 
planned TP events. 
 
3. Potential to document impact of system reliability on user experience 
The RTP should include user surveys that cover all of the system’s functions and are 
administered immediately following the missions. The evaluation risk is greater if no user 
surveys are administered. 
 
4. Likelihood of detecting system-to-system variation in reliability 
A common RTP planning assumption is that each test article (system) will have roughly 
the same reliability characteristics, given the same test exposure. The evaluation risk is 
greater if the likelihood of detecting statistically-significant differences in reliability of 
test articles is low.   
 
5. Likelihood of detecting drop in reliability between DT and OT environments 
During system IOTs, ATEC has documented as much as an 83% degradation in system-
level reliability when compared to the DT portion of a system’s RTP. The evaluation risk 
is greater for this risk indicator category if the likelihood of detecting statistically-






6. Proportion of the fielding configuration that will be tested during the IOT 
The RTP should include a full fielding configuration in the IOT. The evaluation risk is 
greater if a subset of the intended fielding configuration will be tested and the system-
level evaluation will not leverage the results from alternate events. 
 
7. Planned data sources 
The RTP should include both instrumented and non-instrumented (e.g. TIRs and surveys) 
data. The evaluation risk is greater if the only data sources are survey responses from 
system operators. 
5.5  Description of 10 Systems Examined 
In order for the findings of this chapter to be releasable to the general public, we 
have not used the actual system names here; instead, we distinguish between each by 
using the type of system. Specifically, we examined RTPs for the following 10 systems: 
 
Missile Defense System 
Designed to operate as a family-of-systems that will network, via a Joint2 
enabling network and system of systems common operating environment, existing 
systems, systems already under development, and new systems under development into a 
system-of-systems (SoS) architecture to meet the needs of the Joint forces. Unlike other 
acquisition programs that focus primarily on one system or vehicle platform, this missile 
defense program focus is on systems integration, common battle command, Joint 
                                                 
2 The term Joint is used to denote that a given acquisition program is shared by more than 




enabling network, logistics and training to ensure operational requirements—such as 
combat identification, fratricide prevention, survivability, lethality, transportability, and 
maneuverability—are achieved. 
 
Networked Communications System-of-Systems 
This system will be the integrating communications network for the Army, 
optimized for offensive and Joint operations. It will be a framework which will utilize 
common standards and protocols for Army info-spheres and interface with and/or replace 
equipment in the legacy and interim forces. This networked communications system will 
serve as the Army’s high-speed and high-capacity backbone communications network. It 
will be focused on moving information in a manner that supports commanders, staffs, 
functional units, and capabilities-based formations—all mobile, agile, lethal, sustainable, 
and deployable. This system will provide Army units with communication capability at-
the-halt as well as on-the-move. 
 
Networked System of Sensors 
 This system will serve as the next generation network-centric multiple 
intelligence enclave ground station architecture, providing broad access to ground- air- 
and space-based sensors and platforms for the Army. This system is designed to provide 
the Army with actionable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data from the 
battlefield, and it establishes the core framework for a worldwide distributed, network-
centric, system-of-systems architecture that conducts collaborative intelligence operations 




access and fusion, and dissemination of information and products. It is designed to be 
dynamically re-configurable and rapidly deployable with a reduced footprint and total 
ownership cost. 
 
Dismounted Battle-space Awareness System 
 This program integrates multiple Soldier systems and components and leverages 
emerging technologies to provide overmatching operational capabilities to all ground 
combatant Soldiers, their attachments and small units. These capabilities include 
increased command and control, situational awareness, embedded training, lethality, 
mobility, survivability, and sustainability. The objective is to meet the needs of all 
Soldiers who conduct ground close combat. This effort includes determining the optimal 
distribution of operational capabilities across teams and squads to maximize small unit 
mission performance. 
 
Tracked Combat Vehicle 
 This initiative is, effectively an upgrade to an existing tracked combat vehicle 
system from the Army’s inventory. Changes to the system are extensive and include: a 
modified engine and transmission, a re-designed hull structure, updated electronics, a 
new suspension, electronic rammer and gun drives, changes to the crew and driver’s 
compartments, and changes to the support structure of the turret. Other changes may 






Unmanned Aircraft System 
 This system is designed to provide a responsive, agile, and flexible capability to 
perform reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition as well as serve as a 
communications relay. Major subsystems of this unmanned aircraft system include: 
unmanned aircraft equipped with and electro-optical/infrared/laser designator payloads, 
ground control stations, data relays; and a satellite communication element. Additionally, 
all aircraft will be weapons capable, and the system will have sufficient mission 
equipment to support wartime operations. This system will be fully integrated into the 
combined arms air-ground team—conducting operations day and night, in adverse 
weather, in open, close, complex, and all other terrain conditions throughout the battle-
space. 
 
Wheeled Combat Vehicle #1 
 This system includes integral weapons designed to provide rapid and lethal direct 
fires to the supported assaulting infantry. The primary weapon is designed to defeat 
bunkers and create openings in reinforced concrete walls through which infantry can pass 
to accomplish their missions. It is also required to defeat armor up to that of a T-62 tank. 
 
Wheeled Combat Vehicle #2 
 This system is designed to provide stationary and on-the-move “detect to warn” 
capabilities for nuclear/radiological and chemical hazards and “detect to treat” for 
biological hazards. This is by its ability to detect, and identify chemical, biological and 




contamination, reports the location of hazards, marks areas of contamination, locates and 
marks clean bypass routes, and collects and transports samples of radiological, biological, 
and chemical material/vapors for later analysis. 
 
Wheeled Combat Vehicle #3 
 This program is intended to demonstrate the effectiveness of chassis 
modifications (vehicle structural geometries and armor recipe) to an existing wheeled 
combat vehicle family-of-systems to improve survivability. 
 
Wheeled Tactical Vehicle 
 This system is designed to provide protected, sustained, networked light tactical 
mobility to enhance the effectiveness of ground combat and supporting forces. This 
capability is required across full spectrum operations and under all weather and terrain 
conditions facing Joint Forces to enable the effects of operations at the tactical, 
operational, and strategic levels of war. The family of vehicles consists of several 
variants, including companion trailers that carry the specific variant payloads.  
5.6  Selection Criteria for the 10 Examined Systems 
Our selection of the 10 systems was based on 3 factors. First, we wanted to apply 
our evaluation risk assessment process to a broad cross-section of the types of systems 
that undergo testing and evaluation for the Army. By inspection, our list of 10 systems 
consists of a combination of manned, unmanned, air, ground, combat, combat service 




different phases of the Defense Acquisition Management System, i.e., Technology 
Development, Engineering and Manufacturing Development, Production and 
Deployment, Operations and Support [40]. Third, all 10 of the systems that we examined 
are designated as Acquisition Category (ACAT) I systems. Per Department of Defense 
(DoD) Instruction 5000.02, ACAT I systems are those for which the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has estimated the 
expenditure for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) will exceed $365 
million in fiscal year 2000 constant dollars, or will exceed $2.19 billion in fiscal year 
2000 constant dollars [40]. ACAT I systems represent the greatest level of investment by 
the DoD. 
Out of the 10 systems, only 1 is still in the RTP planning stage. One system has 
established its RTP plan and will begin the RTP in 2013. Of the 10 systems considered, 3 
are nearing completion of their respective RTPs.  The remaining 5 systems have already 
completed their RTP events. Given the various stages of RTP completion for the 10 
systems, we were not only able to analyze the RTPs using our evaluation risk assessment 
process—we were also able to examine outcomes from ongoing and/or completed RTPs. 
In order to perform the 7 steps in our evaluation risk assessment process, we 
needed to acquire key information and documents for each of the 10 systems. Thus, we 
deemed it essential to first contact each system’s reliability evaluator. We generated and 
delivered a detailed questionnaire to each evaluator consisting of 21 items (see appendix 
section A.4). We requested that they compose written responses for each item in the 
questionnaire. Once we received the responses from the evaluators for all 10 systems of 




provided. During the follow-on meetings, we also obtained key documents such as RTP 
plans, system requirements specifications, OMS/MPs, reliability growth planning curves, 
official test reports containing estimates for system reliability metrics, etc. These 
documents served as the inputs to our evaluation risk assessment process. 
5.7  Poor Design Practices Identified during the Examination of 10 DoD RTPs and 
Recommended Countermeasures 
Through our examination of the RTP details for the 10 systems in our study, we 
identified several poor design practices for RTPs—issues that could potentially erode the 
adequacy of the system-level reliability evaluation. We summarize these poor design 
practices below along with potential countermeasures to reduce evaluation risks related to 
these poor design practices. The following poor design practices, which were found in 
these 10 RTPs, increase evaluation risk. 
 
Commonality Assumption 
When the program manager assumes that all variants of a system will exhibit the 
same reliability behavior (i.e., have the same failure modes and failure recurrence rates), 
the RTP may include little or no testing of certain variants. However, if there are 
significant differences in the reliability characteristics of the variants, this assumption is 
not valid. Furthermore, if there is minimal testing of a variant planned in the RTP, we 
may not be able to develop an accurate characterization of the family of variants.  
This weakness can be detected by establishing “checkpoints” based on 
accumulation of test time. If failure modes or recurrence rates are inconsistent, the 




one or more test assets for each variant, an appropriate contingency plan would be to 
increase the testing per variant. Planners must ensure there is enough test time allocated 
to obtain estimates with the desired accuracy (and statistical power). This weakness can 
be mitigated by not assuming commonality. Instead the RTP should be designed to 
balance testing across all variants. Such an alternative may require additional test assets, 
test range time, or test personnel. 
 
Minimum Test Configuration 
For a large system-of-systems (SoS), it may be infeasible to exercise the full field 
configuration during the demonstration event (or at any point during the course of the 
RTP). In this case, some subset of the SoS will be exercised; however, this minimum test 
configuration may not behave in a manner that is comparable to the full configuration of 
the SoS. Considering only the minimum test configuration may obscure interactions due 
to scale, integration issues, and similar concerns. As well, if the success of the system 
hinges upon an assumption that redundancy works as envisioned, the test regime should 
be robust enough to confirm that this is true under operationally-realistic conditions. 
This weakness can be detected by conducting a modeling and simulation based 
validity analysis. For example, during the RTP planning stage, a computer-based model 
should be constructed to compare the actual system and the minimum test configuration. 
A range of scenarios should be included and the results compared. An appropriate 
contingency plan would require augmenting testing of the physical system with virtual 




One approach for mitigating this risk is to design the RTP so that all portions of 
the SoS will be exercised (either in a single demonstration event, or over the course of 
multiple RTP events), or the user should re-consider the testability of the system 
reliability requirement(s). The evaluation risk would be mitigated substantially if the full 
field configuration of the SoS is exercised, but this alternative may be infeasible 
depending on the type of SoS. 
 
“Bootstrap” Calculation of System-of-System (SoS) Level Reliability using only System-
Level Failure Data 
Although the term “bootstrap” has been used by the community in other contexts, 
we are referring to generating a SoS-level reliability estimate using only system-level 
failure data. As with the minimum test configuration approach, it may be impossible to 
obtain a SoS-level reliability estimate that includes failure modes due to integration 
and/or interaction of systems within the SoS. It really depends on how the system will be 
exercised. For example, will systems be tested independently, or will multiple systems 
from the SoS be tested cooperatively (and what proportion of the total number of 
permutations will be tested)? 
This potential RTP weakness can be detected by performing a periodic review of 
failure modes surfaced and their root causes. An appropriate contingency action would be 
to revise the RTP plan to include opportunities to observe integration issues (multiple 
permutations of systems from the SoS on test in each event). Planners should design the 
RTP so that full configuration will be exercised (at least during the demonstration event), 




contingency action is performed, the evaluation risk would be mitigated substantially, but 
this alternative may be infeasible—from a resource standpoint—depending on the type of 
SoS. 
 
Operational Mode Summary/Mission Profile (OMS/MP) Test Slice 
This refers to the case wherein only a subset of the operational conditions will be 
included in the RTP. For example, a vehicle may have a “worldwide” OMS/MP; yet, the 
RTP does not include cold regions testing. Another example would be the case in which 
only a subset of missions specified in the OMS/MP are included in the operational testing 
activities for the system. Such cases can lead to an inaccurate evaluation of fleet 
reliability. 
This potential weakness can be detected by consultation of the RTP plan—it 
should be clear whether or not certain missions, environments, or other aspects of the 
OMS/MP have been omitted. An appropriate contingency plan would be to augment the 
RTP with events tailored to exercise the system under remaining conditions/missions if 
deemed necessary. Alternately, it may be appropriate to develop a validated simulation to 
examine the missing aspects of the system OMS/MP. The most straightforward method 
to mitigate this weakness is to design the RTP to include full-spectrum of OMS/MP 







Insufficient Test Time to Surface Key Failure Modes 
Due to resource constraints (e.g., calendar time, facilities, and personnel), the 
planned test time per asset in the RTP is less than the time in which a key failure mode 
has been observed in the past—also known as the time to first occurrence. Hence, we 
would not expect to observe such a failure mode during the RTP (though it is possible 
that such a failure would occur), and this will increase the uncertainty associated with the 
findings of our system reliability evaluation. 
If data are available on similar systems, periodically compare observed failure 
modes to the list of those anticipated. An appropriate contingency plan would be to be 
prepared to increase system time on test. In order to gauge the amount of additional 
testing, consider anticipated (based on historical data) failure recurrence rates to gauge 
additional time needed. An alternative approach would be to size the RTP to surface 
postulated unreliability drivers. The potential benefit to this approach is an improved 
characterization of the system reliability behavior; however, such an approach may be 
cost-prohibitive. Employment of modeling and simulation tools such as hardware-in-the-
loop facilities or purely computer-based analytical methods can also reduce uncertainty. 
 
Low Likelihood of Detecting System-to-System Variation in Reliability 
One test assumption often made is that all test articles are identical. If the RTP 
does not allow for a sufficient amount of test time per test article, the likelihood of 
detecting a variation among the individual test articles may be undesirably low. This 
weakness can be detected by performing up-front analysis of planned number of test 




Mitigating this weakness can be accomplished by re-configuring the RTP to 
include an appropriate composition of test assets and test time per asset to achieve the 
desired likelihood threshold for detection, i.e., increase power of test. This approach can 
be expected to reduce risk, but random variation may still obscure the truth. In the event 
that this deficiency remains unresolved beyond the RTP planning stage and is identified 
during RTP execution, an appropriate (and premeditated) contingency plan would be to 
protect sufficient funding to augment testing of assets. It may be possible to leverage test 
articles intended exclusively for performance or survivability testing; thus, the additional 
cost and time incurred would be due to exercising the test assets and collecting the data. 
 
Low Likelihood of Detecting Drop in Reliability between DT and OT 
Typically, the time on test during the developmental portion of the RTP is 
appreciably greater than the length of the operational reliability demonstration event. 
Thus, the analysis of the test results could detect only very large differences in system 
reliability going from the developmental test environment to the operational test 
environment. However, even a 5% difference in the reliability of the system can lead to a 
significant impact to ownership costs [4]. The guidance regarding the detection, 
contingency planning, and RTP planning alternative is essentially the same as in the 
system-to-system variation case, except for the fact that we are comparing results 






Technology Moving Faster than RTP 
For certain types of systems (such as radios,  information technology systems, and 
smart phones), the technology matures faster than the acquisition program can. New 
releases of software and hardware typically occur between the end of the RTP and the 
time of fielding. Thus, testing the exact version of the system that actually makes it to the 
field is virtually impossible. 
In order to detect the presence of this issue, it is advisable to conduct a historical 
industry trend analysis for associated technology. Include requirement in contract for 
vendor to supply plans, specifications, and data for the next generation of the technology 
as soon as it becomes available. As a contingency, test the next generation (e.g., smart 
phone or radio) prior to deployment to verify reliability of new design, and monitor 
system configuration changes from test event to test event. 
An alternative approach would be to design the RTP to include a reliability 
verification event in conjunction with fielding of the first unit equipped; or conduct a 
Forward Operational Assessment (FOA) in the actual operational environment, with 
actual users. Such an approach would result in an updated indication of the reliability 
behavior of the fielded system; can inform design, quality, or production changes. 
 
No Instrumented Data Collection Activities Planned 
Without an on-board instrumentation package, the reliability evaluator will have a 
limited amount of information available from which to develop insights. For a vehicle, 
system parameters such as engine speed, road speed, orientation (roll, pitch, and yaw), 




real-time or post-test analysis. Such information can be highly valuable during failure 
mode root cause analysis. 
It is possible to detect this issue if there is an inability to answer questions 
regarding system behavior to desired level of fidelity (such as a comparison between a 
vehicle’s engine speed and the road speed at the time just prior to a failure). As well, 
there may be an inability to perform root cause analyses, and formulate effective 
corrective actions. An appropriate contingency plan would add on-board/in-the-loop 
instrumentation package to capture key system attributes and develop context for each 
failure observed during testing. An alternative approach for the RTP would be to devise a 
feasible and affordable plan to instrument all (or some representative subset) of the test 
assets to capture key system attributes. Improved capability to investigate the 
circumstances surrounding observed failures; will certainly increase T&E costs 
(instrumentation, maintenance, data harvesting, data storage, and data analysis). 
5.8  Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we discussed the application of our evaluation risk assessment 
process to RTPs for 10 Major Defense Acquisition Programs. This process is based on 
the technique of failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) and can be utilized for any 
type of system RTP, whether the system is intended for military or commercial use. 
Performing this process identified and analyzed poor design practices for the RTPs 
examined and resulted in the development of countermeasures to mitigate the evaluation 




These examples and results discussed here not only illustrate the usefulness of this 
evaluation risk assessment process but also provide test and evaluation practitioners with 
ideas for improving the RTPs that they design. This evaluation risk assessment process 
can be employed to scrutinize any system RTP plan and to compare multiple RTP 
designs for the same system. Ultimately, in a resource-constrained atmosphere, the desire 
to reduce the uncertainty associated with the characterization of system reliability must 
be balanced with other competing evaluation priorities. 
The process of evaluating these 10 RTPs and documenting the poor design 
practices contributes to the process of learning from failure in the test and evaluation 
community. It is essential to learn from failures in RTP design because, at the least, 
repeating such mistakes results in inefficiency. In more extreme cases, continuing to 
embrace poor RTP design practices may result in inadequacy—but program managers 
may not even perceive the potential threat. As Hatamura asserts in [48], overt 
acknowledgement and documentation of failures do not tend to be organizational 
practices that are embraced. However, the value of identifying the poor design practices 
for RTPs described in Section 5.7 is only truly realized at the moment these insights are 
promoted to the level of organizational knowledge and made accessible to the workforce. 
Due to the stigma associated with broadcasting failures, or poor practices, Hatamura 
argues that insights regarding failures tend to remain within the immediate group that 





Although Hatamura’s discussion in [48] explores  causes of  failure in the design 
of systems, the same logic can be applied to the design of RTPs. As Hatamura explains, 
the process of learning from failure includes the following steps: 
• description of the failure (phenomenon, cause, countermeasures 
generalization) 
• recording the details of the failure (archived and accessible) 
• transmission of the details of the failure (education, knowledge exchange) 
• learning (analysis and classification/structure) 
• experience (heightened awareness and improved readiness). 
Thus, including the insights in this dissertation regarding the poor design practices for 
RTPs associated with a diverse collection of Major Defense Acquisition Programs begins 
the learning process by describing the failures and possible countermeasures, recording 





6 PROPOSED PROCESS FOR RELIABILITY TEST PROGRAM PLANNING 
6.1  Overview 
Due to the reduction in available resources across the US Department of Defense, 
there is a renewed emphasis on operational efficiency, particularly in the conduct of 
reliability test and evaluation (T&E) programs for materiel systems. The intent is to 
identify methods to streamline T&E activities and promote innovation—not to 
compromise the adequacy of system reliability evaluations. However, it is imperative to 
recognize that there is, indeed, a tipping point at which a further reduction in T&E 
activities will preclude the capability to perform an adequate system reliability 
evaluation. 
We define adequacy as the condition achieved when the level of evaluation risk 
associated with a given T&E program plan is acceptable to the decision authority. In 
recent years, we have observed a wide range of ad hoc approaches for designing 
reliability test programs (RTPs). Many of these approaches rely heavily on previously 
established rules of thumb for which the underlying rationale is indefensible. As a 
consequence, it is difficult to assess the adequacy of such RTPs. Furthermore, it is 
equally challenging to ascertain the impact that budgetary cuts—resulting in a reduction 
in reliability T&E activities—will have on the adequacy of the RTP. 
In this chapter, we present a novel 7-step planning process for designing feasible 
RTPs that are both efficient and adequate. This planning process serves as a tool to 
systematically identify, assess, and mitigate evaluation risk subject to resource 




will be able to logically justify RTP requirements and more effectively articulate the 
nature and significance of evaluation risks associated with a particular RTP design. 
Additionally, it is a straightforward process to assess the impact of a reduction in RTP 
resources (amount of funding, time available, quantity of test assets, etc.) and determine 
whether or not there is a need to reformulate the RTP. 
6.2  Definitions 
In order to properly orient the reader, we now provide definitions for 3 key terms related 
to the reliability test program (RTP) planning process described herein. 
 
Evaluation Risk 
A measure of the residual uncertainty associated with the characterization of a given 
system’s expected behavior in its intended operational environment. 
 
Essential Evaluation Risk Area 
A designated area of concern assessed as having the potential to significantly impact the 
overall evaluation of system-level reliability. 
 
Adequacy 
The condition achieved when the evaluation risk associated with a given RTP plan is 






6.3  The Spirit of the RTP Planning Process 
As we discussed earlier, widespread variability currently exists with respect to the 
level of analytical rigor applied during the RTP design process. Concordantly, it has 
proven challenging for practitioners to assess RTP adequacy as well as defend RTP 
requirements. The spirit and intent of this planning process is to manage evaluation risk 
and support the following activities: 
• document the rationale underpinning the RTP design, 
• communicate the RTP plan to the decision authority, 
• justify all elements of a given RTP design (number and type of events, 
quantity of test assets, duration of testing, test environment, etc.), 
• assess overall RTP adequacy, and 
• determine the impact of T&E resource reductions on the adequacy of an 
established RTP plan. 
Section 6.4 describes the 7 steps of the proposed RTP planning process. This planning 
process is not intended to be unforgivingly rigid; it can be easily modified or extended.  
Furthermore, this process is suitable for military or commercial systems that will undergo 
a formal RTP. 
6.4  The 7 RTP Planning Process Steps 
Step 1: Clarify and refine the system reliability requirement(s) 
Although this step may appear to be straightforward, one must ensure that the 
interpretation of each user-specified reliability requirement matches the user’s intent. At 




requirement(s). Typically, the best approach to achieve this objective is to establish and 
maintain an ongoing dialogue with the user’s representative throughout the planning 
process.  
For an Army system, reliability requirements depend on 3 documents, namely, the 
Capability Development Document (CDD), the Operational Mode Summary/Mission 
Profile (OMS/MP), and the Failure Definitions and Scoring Criteria (FDSC). The CDD 
includes the threshold value for each reliability parameter of interest. The OMS/MP 
describes the user’s expectations regarding the types of missions for which the system 
will be employed as well as the environment within which the system will operate. In 
order to properly evaluate a given system’s capabilities in relation to the CDD 
requirements, the FDSC serves as a guide for the system evaluator to assess the impact of 
reliability-related incidents observed during testing. Taken together, the CDD, OMS/MP, 
and FDSC serve as the 3 pillars that define system reliability requirements. It is also 
worth noting that all 3 of these documents are subject to change throughout the system 
acquisition management process. 
 
Step 2: Define the field configuration of the system 
It is vital to clearly define the system configuration that the materiel developer 
intends to field. Without such information, it is impossible to design an RTP that will 
promote an accurate characterization of the actual system reliability in the field. 
However, it is necessary to first determine the level of fidelity required to sufficiently 
define the field configuration of the system. For the purpose of designing the system’s 




There are various reasons that prevent practitioners from testing the exact system 
configuration that will be fielded. By defining the field configuration of the system, it is 
possible to identify any deviations associated with the system test configuration and 
assess the potential impact to the system reliability evaluation. RTP planning process step 
4 concerns the establishment of RTP essential evaluation risk areas, and Table 2 includes 
an example related to the disparity between the test configuration and the field 
configuration of the system. The methodology utilized to evaluate system reliability 
should explicitly account for limitations relating to testing the field configuration. 
 






Step 3: Perform up-front analysis to identify anticipated system unreliability drivers 
The intent of this step is not to postulate all fathomable failure modes; rather, the 
intent is to identify the unreliability drivers that can be expected to occur under 
operationally realistic conditions, given the field configuration of the system. It is prudent 
to work with the system developer and consult the OMS/MP along with relevant 
historical data on similar systems to aid in this activity. Practitioners may wish to 
consider specific failure modes, subsystems, missions, or other elements during this step. 
A key aspect of this step is to accurately assess the expected loads and stresses in the 
operational environment. The results from this step of the RTP planning process will 
serve as input for steps 4 and 5. 
 
Step 4: Establish essential RTP evaluation risk areas 
As indicated in the definition from Section 6.2, an essential evaluation risk area 
pertains to an important aspect of the system that must be addressed in the evaluation. 
The degree to which such an aspect must be addressed is a subject to be considered 
during RTP planning process steps 5, 6, and 7. Some examples of essential evaluation 
risk areas that may be used appear above in Table 2. 
Essential evaluation risk areas are intended to serve as the building blocks of an 
RTP design. The associated risk measures simultaneously indicate the degree to which 
each issue is addressed in an RTP along with the residual uncertainty regarding each 
issue. To be useful, risk measures must be defined in such a manner as to enable 




to any types of changes in a given RTP design, the measure (and likely the essential 
evaluation risk area) is either ill-defined or of no practical value. 
 
Step 5: Design a feasible RTP that addresses all essential evaluation risk areas 
This step in the planning process is likely to be the most time-consuming as it 
requires coordination with multiple groups, including the system developer and test 
center personnel. The objective of this step is to build a complete RTP plan that is 
designed to exercise the system in such a manner as to expose all deficiencies that would 
have an adverse impact on mission capability in the field. Considerations for this step in 
the process should include the type of events, the test environment, the duration of testing 
(hours/miles/cycles/trials), and the quantity of test assets needed. Clearly, the feasibility 
of a given RTP plan will depend on the resources available to execute the RTP. In some 
cases, it may be possible to secure additional resources, depending on the level of risk 
associated with a particular RTP plan (refer to planning process step 7). 
 
Step 6: Assess the level of risk associated with each essential evaluation risk area 
Once the RTP plan exists, one must revisit the essential evaluation risk areas 
developed in step 4 to determine the extent to which each risk area is addressed. The 
methods to assess the level of risk may range from rudimentary to complex, and it is 
conceivable that the methods may result in either a qualitative or quantitative assessment. 






Step 7: If any of the evaluation risk levels are higher than desired, reformulate the RTP 
Typically, the question as to whether or not a given RTP plan is adequate arises. 
Indeed, this is a complex issue to address; however, by going through the 6 previous RTP 
planning steps, the answer to the question is appreciably easier to defend. The essential 
evaluation risk areas established in step 4 provide a convenient mechanism for assessing 
RTP adequacy. Referring back to Section 6.2, adequacy is achieved if the level of risk 
associated with each essential evaluation risk areas is below the decision authority’s 
tolerance threshold. Here, the term decision authority may refer to a high-ranking official, 
or individual stakeholders (all of whom must achieve consensus). 
6.5  Example Application of the RTP Planning Process 
For the purpose of demonstration, we will now go through the 7-step RTP 
planning process for a notional air defense system-of-systems. We intentionally limit the 
complexity of this example; however, this approach can be applied to more complex 
situations and/or other types of military and commercial systems. 
 
Step 1: Determine the system reliability requirement(s) 
• System Description:  The Air Defense SoS Battery (ADSB) is an air and missile 
defense system that consists of a control stations, launcher platforms, and radars.  A 
launcher platform consists of missiles, a common military vehicle, launch rails, 
launcher electronics, and communications components. The ADSB will provide a 
significant means to defeat aerial reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition 




• Reliability Requirement:  The probability that the ADSB will complete a 24-hour 
mission without a system abort shall be greater than or equal to 0.90. 
• Failure Definition and Scoring Criteria:  The ADSB essential functions are 
1. Network Operations 
2. Monitor Airspace and Track targets 
3. Receive and Transmit Data 
4. Process and Display data 
5. Engage Targets 
6. Move 
The reliability failures associated with the ADSB fall into 3 major categories of 
severity—system abort, essential function failure, non-essential function failure. Below 
are the definitions of each failure category that appear in the FDSC. 
1. System Abort (SA):  A system abort is a failure or malfunction causing 
unacceptable degradation or the complete loss of one or more essential functions.  
An SA generally precludes the ADSB from continuing its mission or starting a 
mission.  In other words, an SA results in a non-mission capable state for the 
system. At the SoS-level, an SA occurs if fewer than 2 out of 3 control stations, 3 
out of 5 radars, or 9 out of 12 launchers are mission capable. 
2. Essential Function Failure (EFF):  An essential function failure is a failure or 
malfunction causing degradation, or complete loss of one or more essential 
functions. However, if the failure causes only partial loss or an acceptable 




system may continue to operate under degraded conditions, usually until the 
completion of the current mission or task.  This is analogous to going from a 
“fully mission capable” state to a “mission capable” state. In order to restore full 
mission capability, repair will be performed prior to the initiation of subsequent 
missions or tasks. 
3. Non-Essential Function Failure (NEFF):  A non-essential function failure is a 
failure or malfunction that results in a loss of non-essential functions.  An NEFF 
usually requires maintenance to correct, but that maintenance can be deferred 
without negatively impacting mission capabilities. 
 
• ADSB Mission Roles 
1. Provide air and missile defense protection of critical assets (static defense) 
– The ADSB performs the air and missile defense protection of a critical assets 
at strategic locations (including geopolitical assets like population centers, 
industrial resources, and sea/air ports of debarkation).  
2. Provide air and missile defense protection of maneuver force 
– The ADSB provides air and missile defense protection of the maneuver forces 
during movement for combat/offensive operations to include periods of non-






The ADSB is designed to accomplish the 2 mission roles listed above by providing: 
– protection against a variety of air and cruise missile threats 
– a critical non-line-of-sight and beyond line-of-sight overmatch capability 
against most rapidly evolving and projected air threats 
– a means to defeat aerial reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition 
platforms beyond their effective observation employment ranges, and 
– integration of surveillance, command and control, fire direction, fire 
distribution, and engagement capabilities using an open, distributed, and 
networked architecture. 
 
• ADSB Modes 
1. Operation (assumed to be 24 hours/day when the ADSB is deployed) 
2. Initialization (performed on an as-needed basis, e.g., when crew changes occur 
after every 8 hours of continuous operation) 
3. Preventive Maintenance Checks Services (performed daily while the ADSB is in 
operation) 
4. Scheduled Maintenance (staggered to ensure that the ADSB operates 
continuously) 
5. Movement (only performed during continuous operation to establish/re-establish 
radio connectivity, otherwise, this mode occurs in order to emplace the ADSB); 
during movement, the breakdown of terrain types is assumed to be as follows: 





• ADSB’s Operational Environment 
ADSB will be capable of operations in climatic conditions, terrain, and geographic 
locations in which supported forces may be deployed.  These conditions may include 
areas with salt-laden air and spray normally encountered in littoral area, use during times 
of limited visibility (including rain, smoke or fog, or darkness), use in areas with high 
humidity, sand, and dust, and under full solar radiation or at night. 
– Temperature:  The system will be stored, transported, maintained, and 
operated in various temperature environmental conditions. Kits and 
procedures are allowed below -25º F and above 120° F. 
– Winds 
 Ground-level operation: ADSB shall meet its performance requirements 
during exposure to wind and gusts up to 35 mph without electrical or 
physical damage affecting the lifecycle expectancy or operation. 
 Ground-level non-operation: ADSB shall meet its performance 
requirements after exposure to wind to 50 mph and gusts up to 65 mph 




1. Primary threats to be countered or targeted by ADSB consist of unmanned aerial 




2. The secondary target set consists of manned aircraft, both fixed-wing and rotary-
wing. 
 
Step 2: Define the field configuration of the system  
The field configuration of the ADSB is depicted in Figure 2. The ADSB field 
configuration consists of 3 control stations, 5 radars, and 12 launchers. In order for the 
ADSB to be considered operational, at least 2 out of 3 control stations, 3 out of 5 radars, 
and 9 out of 12 launchers must be operational. All systems of a particular type are 
intended to be identical, and are considered to be configured in parallel, active 
redundancy. 
 
Figure 2. Reliability Block Diagram for the ADSB 
 
Step 3: Perform up-front analysis to identify anticipated system unreliability drivers  
Based on an examination of dominant failure modes on similar systems, the RTP 
planning team identified the following list of 11 failure modes as the anticipated 
unreliability drivers for ADSB. Although historical failure mode analysis was employed 
here, other approaches (as discussed in Chapter 3) could be applied as well. 




2. Power System Failures 
3. Loss of Data Communications Capability 
4. Computer Boot-up Failures 
5. Environmental Control Unit Failures 
6. Computer System Crashes 
7. Connector/Fastener Failures 
8. Loss of Positional (GPS) Data 
9. Radar Stops Radiating 
10. Loss of Launcher Inclination/Rotation Capability 
11. Suspension Failures on the Launcher Vehicle 
 
Step 4: Establish essential RTP evaluation risk areas  
For this example, we assume that the RTP planning team established the 
following 3 essential evaluation risk areas (EERAs). For a real RTP, planners would 
likely establish additional appropriate EERAs. 
 
1. Disparity between the System Test Configuration and the Planned System Field 
Configuration 
As discussed previously, there will almost always be a disparity between the operational 
test configuration and the field/production configuration of a given SoS. In this case, the 
risk is that evaluation of the ADSB’s reliability based on the planned ADSB operational 
test configuration will not be sufficiently representative of the behavior of the ADSB 





2. Operational Mode Summary/Mission Profile (OMS/MP) Coverage 
The intent is to examine the extent to which the assumed OMS/MP for the ADSB is 
addressed during the RTP. For example, does the RTP include opportunities to exercise 
the ADSB under all anticipated environmental conditions? Will operational scenarios be 
executed with soldiers for all types of missions? Will all of the system modes be 
examined? Note that this is EERA #4 from Table 2 in Section 6.4. 
 
3. Test Exposure Opportunity to Surface Key Failure Modes (Anticipated Unreliability 
Drivers) 
The product of planning step 3 was a list of 11 anticipated unreliability drivers for the 
ADSB. Ideally, the RTP should include events/activities to verify or refute the list of 
anticipated unreliability drivers. Historical analysis indicates that certain failure modes 
may only surface under certain conditions, e.g., a particular mission in a particular 
environment. There is a natural connection between this EERA and the above EERA 
concerning the OMS/MP coverage associated with the RTP. However, the intent here is 
to focus on updating the list of actual unreliability drivers for the ADSB based on the 
ADSB RTP events, not historical data on similar systems. Practitioners need to hedge 
against the likely dominant failure modes, while also seeking out unanticipated, 






Step 5: Design a feasible RTP that addresses all essential evaluation risk areas  
 As the intent of this example is to demonstrate how the RTP planning process can 
be applied, we will not include all programmatic considerations here. Let us assume that 
we have 36 months to conduct all RTP activities up through the reliability demonstration 
event (referred to as the initial operational test [IOT]). The standard progression of events 
in an RTP is to begin with developmental testing, conduct a limited user test (LUT), build 
production-representative assets, perform reliability qualification testing of the 
production-representative assets, and execute the IOT. The IOT is the primary source of 
information for the formal evaluation of the system’s reliability. 
Given the above constraint of 36 months, we can design an RTP that offers the 
potential to address all of the essential evaluation risk areas established in step 4. In Table 
3 below, we summarize the 5 test events that will constitute the RTP for the ADSB. 
Table 3. ADSB RTP Events 
 
The “Length” column from Table 3 indicates the planned amount of time that the ADSB 
test configuration will be exercised. The “Test Configuration” column in Table 3 
indicates the quantity of each type of system that will make up the ADSB test 
configuration. For example, 1-1-1 denotes that there will be 1 control station, 1 radar, and 




with each of the 5 test events in Table 3. Below, Figure 3 depicts the schedule of all test 
events and other supporting RTP activities. 
1. Developmental Test Phase 1 (DT1) 
The purpose of DT1 is to provide the opportunity for the first full-up SoS-level test of 
the ADSB. For this event, only 1 of each type of system will be available. Testing for 
this event will be conducted at the US Army Aberdeen Test Center (ATC) in 
Maryland. No live missile flights will occur. Opportunities to detect, track, and target 
rotary-wing aircraft will be emphasized, but no movement of the ADSB (recall one of 
the modes is “movement”) will be done during DT1. Immediately following 
completion of this test event, all equipment will be transported from ATC to White 
Sands Missile Range (WSMR) in New Mexico. Hence, there will not be time for the 
developer to implement corrective actions for observed failure modes, prior to the 
execution of DT2. 
 
2. Developmental Test Phase 2 (DT2) 
During DT2, the test location will be WSMR, thus enabling live missile flight tests 
and tactical movement of the ADSB. No change to the ADSB or its constituent 
systems will occur prior to the conclusion of DT2. The test configuration will be 
augmented from 1 of each system type to 2 of each system type (see Table 3). Hence 
more information is likely to be obtained for this design of the ADSB. Subsequent to 
DT2, a corrective action period (CAP) will be conducted. The program manager and 
system developer have agreed to budget 4 months for the CAP to implement design 




3. Limited User Test (LUT) 
The LUT will consist of live missile firings conducted at WSMR with representative 
soldier operators manning the system in a benign environment. The LUT test 
configuration of ADSB identified in Table 3 reflects an end-to-end evaluation 
(sensor-to-shooter) of the ADSB. The LUT will be conducted in the fourth quarter of 
2014 (see Figure 3). Testing will exercise the ADSB within the safety constraints of a 
WSMR live missile flight test environment. The system will be employed against 
approved surrogate threat targets. Soldier training will be conducted at WSMR prior 
to the LUT and will be limited to air and missile defense employment of the ADSB, 
which will be focused on target engagement due to time and available funds. Field 
operations will consist of two live missile firings against threat aircraft platforms, as 
defined earlier. Following the LUT, a second CAP will be conducted, lasting 
approximately 5 months. The efforts of the CAP will be applied to the production-
representative assets generated for the RQT and IOT (see below). 
 
4. Reliability Qualification Test (RQT) 
The RQT will be conducted at the SoS-level on the low rate initial production (LRIP) 
assets to confirm that the LRIP design meets the ADSB reliability requirement. As 
well, an assessment of the effectiveness of vendor corrective actions to mitigate 
observed failure modes will be performed. The operators will be engineers and 






5. Initial Operational Test (IOT) 
The IOT will be the reliability demonstration event for the ADSB. Testing will 
include soldier operators and maintainers previously trained and tested during the 
LUT. The objective of the IOT is to assess the capabilities of the ADSB to provide 
the mission functions discussed earlier. The IOT will be conducted in 3 phases: Field 
Sustained Operations, Hardware-in-the-Loop (HWIL), and Missile Flight Test. The 
ADSB test configuration for the IOT is listed in Table 3. 
 Phase I Field Sustained Operations:  Phase I will present the ADSB system 
employed in support of air and missile defense operations in a field environment 
under simulated combat conditions. Testing will include the system defending against 
live aircraft (approved threat surrogates) while operating under the ADSB operational 
Mission Summary/Mission Profile (OMS/MP). Testing will be completed in both 
active and benign electronic counter-measures (ECM) environments. 
 Phase II HWIL:  Phase II will be a HWIL test designed to exercise ADSB system 
performance against approved simulated threat scenarios. Computer-based, virtual 
stimulators will present aircraft scenarios representing a common air picture from 
external communications links. If simulation-based tools available at the time of IOT 
cannot be accredited for this application, then an additional number of live aircraft 
passes will be required during IOT Phase I testing. 










Step 6: Assess the level of risk associated with each essential evaluation risk area  
In step 4, we established 3 essential evaluation risk areas (EERAs) for this RTP. We will 
now comment on the risk assessment for each EERA. 
 
1. Disparity between the System Test Configuration and the Planned System Field 
Configuration 
Using a novel simulation-based approach discussed in Chapter 7, we consider the 
potential error in our estimate of ADSB reliability. Essentially, the accuracy in our 
evaluation of ADSB reliability is driven by (i) how close the test configuration is to the 
field configuration, and (ii) the length of the test event. Since DT1 is understood to be the 
first full-up SoS-level test event, it is likely that the SoS-level reliability will be fairly 
low. We assume that the true (but unknown) SoS-level reliability for ADSB at DT1is 
approximately 0.35.  
Since no CAP is scheduled between DT1 and DT2, the true SoS-level reliability 
of ADSB does not change. Therefore, we continue to assume that the ADSB reliability is 
0.35 for DT2. Between DT2 and the LUT, a 4-month CAP is scheduled, thus we expect 
the reliability of the ADSB to increase. In our example, we assume that the SoS-level 
reliability by the LUT is approximately 0.85. Again, a CAP is scheduled to occur 
following the LUT, and the findings will be leveraged in the design associated with the 
production-representative assets that will be available during the RQT and IOT. Just as 
we assumed improvement in SoS-level reliability as a result of the first CAP, we assume 
that the second CAP drives ADSB’s reliability up to approximately 0.90. The “Relative 




𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 =  




where the true SoS reliability is the value listed in the “ADSB Reliability” column of 
Table 4, and the experimental SoS reliability is obtained via a stochastic simulation that 
emulates the outcome of testing based on the test configurations and test lengths listed in 
Table 4. The experimental SoS reliability values for each case are not shown in Table 4; 
however, an extensive treatment of this topic appears in Chapter 7. By inspection of 
Table 4, the important observation to make is that the anticipated relative absolute error 
associated with the ADSB reliability evaluation is decreasing as we progress through the 
RTP, with a reasonably low relative absolute error linked to the IOT—the most important 
event in the RTP when it comes to the evaluation of the ADSB’s reliability. 
 
Table 4. Anticipated Relative Error based on ADSB Test Configuration 
 
 
2. Operational Mode Summary/Mission Profile (OMS/MP) Coverage 
Based on the plans for the 5 test events in Tables 3 and 4, there are opportunities 
to observe the reliability behavior of the various ADSB test configurations across all 
mission capabilities and operational modes defined earlier. DT1 is the least representative 




exercised from DT2 through the IOT. All operational testing (LUT and IOT) is planned 
to be conducted in accordance with the ADSB OMS/MP. Hence, the OMS/MP coverage 
should be adequate, and the risk of failing to capture issues associated with particular 
mission capabilities or modes is assessed to be low for this RTP. 
 
3. Test Exposure Opportunity to Surface Key Failure Modes (Anticipated Unreliability 
Drivers) 
As discussed earlier, it is important to determine if the historical observations 
regarding unreliability drivers for similar systems will hold true for the ADSB. Given the 
list of 11 anticipated unreliability drivers generated during planning step 3, we want to 
assess whether or not we should expect to surface these failure modes—if they are 
“present” in the ADSB. One approach that can be employed is to examine the time until 
the first failure of its kind was observed in prior RTPs for similar systems.  Further, it is 
worth noting whether or not the failure ever manifested itself during developmental 
testing, or only during operational testing (such as in a LUT or IOT). In Table 5, we 
include the time to first failure for each of the 11 anticipated unreliability drivers as well 





Table 5. Historical Information for Anticipated Unreliability Drivers 
 
 In Table 5, note that all 11 failure modes were previously observed in operational 
testing (OT); however, 5 out of 11 failure modes were not previously observed during 
developmental testing (DT). Of the 5 failure modes that were only observed in OT, the 
time to first failure for 4 out of the 5 failure modes was 160 hours or greater. Yet, the 
time to first failure for each failure mode in Table 5 is based on test time accumulated 
during DT and OT. It is valuable to know that the amount of time during OT associated 
with the observation of the first failure of each type ranged from 20 to 30 hours. Hence, 
although the failure modes were not surfaced in DT, it did not take very long to surface 
the failure modes during OT. 
 Based on the favorable assessment of the planned OMS/MP coverage across DT2, 
the LUT, and the IOT, and taking into account that all of these RTP events are planned to 
run longer than 100 hours, we conclude that there is low risk associated with not 
sufficiently exercising the ADSB to verify, refute, or augment the list of anticipated 




unreliability drivers based on the planned RTP will be representative of the dominant 
failure modes in the field. 
 
Step 7: If any of the evaluation risk levels are higher than desired, reformulate the RTP  
 In this example, the risks associated with each of the 3 established EERAs are 
considered to be acceptable. However, should assumptions regarding the conduct of any 
of the test events change—such as a reduction in resources that precludes the execution 
of certain events, or activities within events—it will be necessary to re-evaluate the level 
of risk associated with each EERA as well as the overall assessment of RTP adequacy. 
6.6  Reducing Evaluation Risk by Using the RTP Planning Process 
 In the previous section, we performed each of the 7 RTP planning process steps 
for a notional system to briefly demonstrate how the complete process can be 
implemented. In this section, we present 2 examples to illustrate how the proposed RTP 
planning process defined in Section 6.4 can be used to create RTPs with lower risk than 
existing RTPs without increasing RTP costs. For each of the examples in this section, we 
discuss how the decisions made regarding the existing RTPs resulted in certain evaluation 
risks. By conducting the RTP planning process steps 1 through 3 from Section 6.4, such 
concerns would have been established as essential evaluation risk areas (EERAs) during 
planning step 4. Based on these EERAs, a different RTP design would have been 
formulated (during planning step 5) to consciously address each EERA, thus reducing the 
level of risk associated with each EERA (assessed during planning step 6). Consequently, 




favorable outcome.  The following two examples (based on actual RTPs) discuss the 
differences that the proposed RTP planning process can make. 
 
Example 1: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle System 
This system is 1 of the 10 that we examined using the RTP evaluation risk 
assessment process presented in Chapter 4. This Major Defense Acquisition Program 
consists of 2 vehicle variants with unique characteristics (equipment, weight, geometries, 
etc.).  This tactical wheeled vehicle system (including both variants) is designed to be 
used to perform 5 types of missions.  The system is expected to operate in 3 types of 
environments—nominal, tropical, and cold.  Finally, this system is intended to negotiate 
3 types of terrain, specifically, primary roads, secondary roads, and cross-
country/unimproved surfaces.  Based on the fielding plan for the fleet of vehicles, it is 
anticipated that 80% of the fleet will operate in the nominal environment, 10% will 
operate in the tropical environment, and 10% will operate in the cold environment.  It is 
intended that the system can employed to execute of all of the 5 types of missions in any 
of the 3 environments. 
The existing RTP plan is to conduct 4 out of 5 types of missions during the 
operational test. The reason that 1 mission type that will not be performed during the 
operational test event is because that mission type involves conditions that are unsafe for 
human subjects. Each of the 4 planned types of missions will be executed 7 times (trials). 
Since the test event is planned to be held at a single location, the missions will be 
conducted only in the nominal environment. All 3 terrain types are present at the 




system have identical reliability characteristics. Based on this assumption, the existing 
RTP includes testing of 6 assets of only one system variant during the developmental 
portion of the RTP.  During the course of developmental testing, the existing plan is to 
accumulate a total of 120,000 test miles.  For the operational test event, the plan is to 
accumulate a total of 40,000 vehicle test miles. 
Using the proposed RTP planning process generates a significantly different and 
better RTP.  First, based on the information gathered during RTP planning steps 1 
through 3, 3 EERAs can be identified: 
1. The OMS/MP coverage during the operational test event (reliability 
demonstration event), 
2. The likelihood of detecting a 25% variation in system-to-system reliability during 
the developmental test portion of the RTP, and 
3. The likelihood of detecting a 25% difference in reliability between developmental 
testing and the operational test event. 
The proposed RTP planning process mitigates these risks.  The resulting RTP includes 
testing at 3 distinct locations that represent the 3 environments.  For each of the 4 
missions that can be tested, 3 trials will be conducted in the first environment, 2 trials in 
second environment, and 2 trials in third environment.  Instead of assuming 
commonality, 3 of each system variant will be tested during developmental testing.  The 
allocation of test miles will be 100,000 miles across developmental testing and 60,000 
miles during the operational test. 
Relative to the existing RTP, the new RTP increases the variety of the tests but 




vehicles are tested, and the total miles are the same.  The total time required is the same.  
As the following paragraphs discuss, however, the risks associated with the new RTP are 
lower than the risk associated with the existing RTP. 
 
1. OMS/MP coverage during the operational test event 
The existing RTP had 80% coverage of mission types in the environment in 
which 80% of the fleet is expected to operate once fielded. Thus, the planned OMS/MP 
coverage during the operational test event is 64%.  Because the new RTP, with the 
distributed operational test event, has tests that represent all 3 environments in which the 
fleet is expected to operate, the OMS/MP coverage is now 80%. 
 
2. The likelihood of detecting a 25% variation in system-to-system reliability during the 
developmental test portion of the RTP 
Because the existing RTP does not include testing of any assets of the second 
system variant, there is absolutely no chance of detecting a difference in the reliability 
between the 2 distinct variants.  The new RTP tests both system variants, however.  
Section 4.3 outlined a method for approximating the likelihood of detecting a 25% 
difference in reliability between 2 distinct system variants.  Using this method, we 
calculated the likelihood of detecting a 25% difference in reliability between the 2 
vehicle variants to be approximately 45%, which represents a significant reduction in risk 






3. The likelihood of detecting a 25% difference in reliability between developmental 
testing and the operational test event 
For the existing RTP, using the method from Section 4.3, we calculated the 
likelihood of detecting a 25% difference in system reliability between developmental 
testing and the operational test event to be approximately 29.4%.  For the new RTP, 
which allocates the test miles differently, this likelihood improves to approximately 
32.9%.  Theoretically, this improvement is possible; however, planners must ensure that 
this is feasible and that the change will not increase overall test execution costs for the 
program manager. The new RTP is also superior because the information acquired during 
the operational test is considered to be of the greatest value in the overall evaluation of 
system reliability. 
 
Example 2: Air Defense System of Systems (SoS) 
 Similar to the notional Air Defense SoS Battery (ADSB) discussed in Section 6.5, 
the SoS for this example is comprised of 3 types of systems—control stations, radars, and 
launchers. In this case, the full field configuration of the system includes 4 control 
stations, 3 radars, and 12 launchers. In order for this SoS to be considered operational, a 
minimum of 2 out of 4 control stations, 2 out of 3 radars, and 9 out of 12 launchers must 
be operational. 
 There are 5 essential functions defined for this SoS, namely: track targets, 
communicate (receive/transmit data), display target track information, engage targets 
(i.e., launch missile(s) with the intention of destroying the target), and move. The last of 
the 5 essential functions listed is expected to be executed only when this SoS is being 




OMS/MP document for this SoS, movement is anticipated to account for 30% of the 
operational use of the SoS.  
 The existing RTP has the following elements: The operational test will exercise 2 
control stations and 4 launchers during the course of 13 24-hour missions (i.e., 312 
operating hours). Radar subsystems will be used to pass simulated target data to the 
control stations and launchers; however, no actual radars will be available during the 
operational test. (Note that this situation violates minimum requirement #2 for RTPs: test 
all elements of the system.)  The operational test event does not include any activities that 
will exercise the movement function.  The RTP assumes that all system-level assets of a 
particular type behave identically. 
Using the proposed RTP planning process generates a significantly different and 
better RTP.  First, based on the information gathered during RTP planning steps 1 
through 3, 3 EERAs can be identified: 
1. The OMS/MP coverage during the operational test event (reliability 
demonstration event), 
2. The likelihood of detecting a 25% variation in system-to-system reliability during 
the operational test event, and 
3. The evaluation adequacy of the SoS operational test configuration. 
The proposed RTP planning process mitigates these risks.  This RTP will include 2 
control stations, 2 launchers, and 2 radars.  It will maintain the planned operational test 
duration of 312 hours but allocate a portion of that time to movement of the SoS.  Per the 
official OMS/MP for this SoS, it is anticipated that each movement will be for 30 miles, 




roads (at a speed of 30 miles per hour), and 2 miles cross-country (at a speed of 10 miles 
per hour); the total time will therefore be 1 hour.  The RTP operational test plan will 
allocate 24 hours to conduct movement of the SoS, however, and the 24 hours will be 
distributed so that movement is conducted prior the start of a mission and/or after the 
completion of a mission cycle.  The total planned SoS operating time to perform the other 
4 essential SoS functions (i.e., exercise the control stations, radars, and launchers) will be 
288 hours. 
Relative to the existing RTP, the new RTP adds additional tests but does not 
increase costs because the costs to produce the radars and the launchers are equivalent.  
The total time required is the same.  As the following paragraphs discuss, however, the 
risks associated with the new RTP are lower than the risk associated with the existing 
RTP. 
 
1. OMS/MP coverage during the operational test event 
 Although the 4 functions that are planned to be exercised during the operational 
test constitute the bulk of the anticipated operational use, it is still imperative for the 
movement function to be characterized prior to fielding. After all, if the SoS cannot be 
emplaced at a fixed site because it cannot make the journey, the other 4 functions are 
irrelevant.  Including 24 hours to conduct movement and conducting the moves before 
the start of a mission and after the completion of a mission cycle improves operational 
realism, improving the value of the information captured during the operational test 
event. Consequently, the operational test event in the improved RTP will provide full 




2. The likelihood of detecting a 25% variation in system-to-system reliability during the 
operational test event 
 The accuracy in the estimate of SoS-level reliability is driven by the accuracy in 
the estimate of system-level reliability. For this RTP, the approach to estimating system-
level reliability hinges upon the assumption that all system-level assets of a particular 
type behave identically. However, if this assumption is not valid for 1 or more types of 
the systems that constitute the SoS, the estimate of system-level reliability will be less 
accurate. Since the accuracy of the SoS-level reliability is sensitive to the accuracy of the 
system-level estimates, it is important to have the capability to detect variation in system-
to-system reliability. The knowledge that variation exists in the reliability among systems 
of a particular type can be used to inform sensitivity analyses in support of the overall 
evaluation of SoS-level reliability. 
 Since there are 3 distinct types of systems that constitute the SoS in this example, 
we will assess the likelihood of detecting a 25% (hereafter referred to as L25) difference 
in system reliability for each of the 3 types of systems using the method presented in 
Section 4.3. Since no radars will be available during the operational test, there is no 
chance of detecting system-to-system variation in reliability among the radars. The L25 
difference in the reliability between the 2 control stations is approximately 26%. For the 
4 launchers, the L25 difference is approximately 24%. 
For the new RTP, which includes control stations, launchers, and radars, the 
resulting L25 differences for the launchers and the radars are 22% and 21%, respectively. 
The L25 difference for the control stations remains to be 26% since there is no change to 




launchers decreased from 24% to 22%, improving the L25 difference for the radars from 
0% to 21% is a considerable return on the investment. 
 
3. The evaluation adequacy of the SoS operational test configuration 
 As discussed in Section 2.5—from the standpoint of evaluation adequacy—an 
operational test configuration that does not include all unique elements of the system to 
be evaluated is clearly deficient. Because the new RTP will exercise all elements of the 
SoS during the operational test, we can now assess the level of adequacy associated with 
the improved SoS operational test configuration including 2 of each type of system. 
Hereafter, we will use the shorthand notation 2-2-2 to represent the SoS operational test 
configuration. 
In Section 6.5, we briefly referred to a general method for assessing the adequacy 
of a given SoS operational test configuration. The details underpinning this method are 
presented in Chapter 7. In essence, the method from Chapter 7 estimates the error 
between the actual (but unknown) SoS-level reliability and the SoS-level reliability 
estimate based on operational test data. Here, we apply this method for the revised 
operational test configuration. Given the preceding information, the estimated relative 
absolute error associated with exercising the 2-2-2 configuration during the operational 
test for 288 hours is 13%. When compared to the planned, inadequate operational test 
configuration of the SoS, this anticipated, approximate result would be considered 





6.7  Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, we presented a structured process for designing RTPs with an 
emphasis on evaluation adequacy. The process described herein can be modified and 
applied to other areas (such as system performance test program planning). In practice, it 
may be the case that resource constraints preclude the execution of an adequate RTP. 
However, by identifying, quantifying, and communicating the potential risks associated 
with the system reliability evaluation to all stakeholders, it may be possible to motivate 
the allocation of additional resources to conduct the RTP. On the other hand, there may 
be cases in which an established, adequate RTP plan becomes infeasible due to a 
reduction in available resources. It is important for all stakeholders to realize that an RTP 
can be deemed as “efficient” only if the RTP is—first and foremost—adequate because 
efficiency implies that all evaluation requirements are satisfied using the minimum 
amount of resources. This RTP planning process systematically establishes the essential 
elements for a given RTP along with the maximum acceptable levels of risk associated 
with each element. To ensure adequacy, there can be no reduction in the scale or scope of 





7 A SIMULATION-BASED RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY TO 
DETERMINE THE EVALUATION ADEQUACY OF SYSTEM-OF-SYSTEMS 
OPERATIONAL TEST CONFIGURATIONS 
7.1  Background 
  Per the Defense Acquisition Guidebook [46], a system-of-systems (SoS) is 
defined as “a set or arrangement of systems that results from independent systems 
integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities.” In step 4 of the 
reliability test program (RTP) planning process presented Chapter 6, we introduced the 
concept of an essential evaluation risk area (EERA). One of the EERAs from Table 2 in 
Section 6.4 concerns the disparity that may exist between the field/production 
configuration of an SoS and the operational test configuration of  the SoS. Given 
practical RTP resource constraints, it is rare that the full field configuration of an SoS can 
be exercised during an operational test event.  However, as we consider various potential 
operational test configurations for a given SoS during the RTP planning process, it is 
critical to acknowledge that there is a point at which a further reduction in the scale and 
scope of the test configuration will yield results that are not representative of how the 
field configuration will behave.  
  The intent of step 6 of the RTP planning process is to assess of the level of risk 
associated with each EERA. Hence, it is during step 6 that an assessment of the level of 
risk associated with the disparity between the field configuration and planned test 
configuration of the SoS must be performed. If the level of risk is deemed to be 
unacceptable, this indicates that the planned SoS test configuration is inadequate and an 




test configuration is not sufficiently representative of the SoS field configuration. Since 
the purpose of the RTP is to enable the evaluation of the field configuration of the SoS, 
an attempt must be made to characterize and control the error in the estimate of SoS 
reliability. 
7.2  Problem Statement and Proposed Solution 
  Given that an EERA concerning the adequacy of the SoS operational test 
configuration has been established during step 4 of the RTP planning process, reliability 
evaluators require a quantitative method that can be employed during RTP planning 
process step 6 to assess the adequacy of the planned SoS operational test configuration. 
Conceptually, adequacy—in this context—is achieved if the information obtained by 
exercising a given SoS configuration during the operational test (also known as the SoS 
reliability demonstration event) can be expected to enable a representative evaluation of 
the reliability of the actual field configuration of the SoS.  
  As discussed previously, in a real-world RTP, te SoS operational test 
configuration will most likely be some subset of the full SoS field configuration. During 
the course of the operational test event, reliability failures are recorded in a database. 
Each failure is scrutinized—the severity of the failure is assessed and the failure is 
charged to a particular component or subsystem.  In the case of an SoS, the next lower 
level of indenture beneath the SoS is the system-level. Thus, every failure is mapped to a 
particular system within the SoS operational test configuration.  
  Taking into account (1) the quantity of each type of system employed as a part of 




system, and (3) the cumulative operating time across systems of a particular type, the 
reliability of each system type is estimated. In most cases, an exponential model is 
determined to reasonably describe the underlying distribution of the inter-arrival times 
between system-level failures. Having established a validated SoS-level reliability 
model—usually in the form of a reliability block diagram (RBD)—prior to the 
operational test, the system data is used in the SoS-level model to evaluate the SoS 
reliability. This is accomplished through the execution of a stochastic time-to-failure 
(TTF) simulation for the full field configuration of the SoS. 
  The stochastic SoS simulation yields an empirical distribution of SoS TTF. 
Subsequently, goodness of fit with respect to various parametric statistical distributions is 
explored. Once an appropriate distribution is selected, the reliability of the full field 
configuration of the SoS is estimated. The overall evaluation of the operational suitability 
of the SoS for fielding is largely influenced by the results from this process. 
  To assess the evaluation adequacy of a given SoS operational test configuration, 
the solution that we propose in this chapter is a simulation-based method that can be 
applied to any military or commercial SoS. It is assumed that steps 1 through 5 of the 
RTP planning process described in Section 6.4 have already been completed, and this 
method for assessing the adequacy of a planned SoS operational test configuration is 
performed in partial fulfillment of step 6 (since this activity assesses the risk of only 1 of 
the EERAs established during RTP planning process step 4). Below, we list the steps in 
the method. In Section 7.3, we will present an example to illustrate how this general 
method can be applied. This method enables direct comparisons between specified SoS 





1. Individual systems are assumed to fail independently (all system states are 
independent). 
2. Failures at the system-level occur according to a homogeneous Poisson process. 
Hence, the time between failures for each individual system in the SoS is assumed to 
follow an exponential distribution. 
3. Individual systems within each k-out-of-n (KN) structure, i.e., of the same type, are 
identical and they share the same underlying constant Poisson failure rate. 
4. Each individual system in the SoS is assumed to be “as good as new” at the start of 
each simulation run; concordantly, the SoS is assumed to be “as good as new” at the 
start of each simulation run. 
5. For the SoS, if an individual system fails during operation, no repair is attempted (i.e., 
the SoS will operate continuously until an SoS-level abort occurs). 
 
MODEL FORMULATION: 
• Let L be the number of distinct types of systems in the SoS.   
• For each system type i, i = 1, …, L, let ni be the number of systems of each type in the 
field configuration of the SoS, and let ki be the number of such systems that must be 
operational for the SoS to be operational. 
• Let 𝑁 = ∑ 𝑛𝑖𝐿1  be the total number of systems (of all types) in the field configuration 
of the SoS. 
• Let λi be the common Poisson failure rate for each system of type i. 




  𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑒−𝜆𝑖𝑡. 
• For a given time t, let 𝑅𝐾𝑁𝑖(𝑡) be the reliability of the i
th KN structure in the SoS at 
time t. 







• For a given time t, let RSoS(t) be the reliability of the SoS at time t. 
• In the field configuration of the SoS,  
  𝑅𝑆𝑜𝑆(𝑡) = ∏ 𝑅𝐾𝑁𝑖(𝑡)
𝐿
𝑖=1 . 
• Let mi represent the number of systems of type i that will be in the operational test 
configuration of the SoS. 
• Let T represent the length of the operational event during which the SoS test 
configuration will be exercised. 
• Let T0 represent the time at which the SoS reliability will calculated. 
• Let Tij represent the actual operating time accumulated by the jth system of type i 
during the operational test. 
• Let Q represent the desired number of simulation trials. 








1. For i = 1, …, L, identify à priori values of the λi. 
2. Calculate the à priori value for the SoS reliability 𝑅𝑆𝑜𝑆(𝑇0). 
For δ = 1, …, Q, perform steps 3 to 5 (this constitutes a trial): 
3. Simulate an operational test of duration T, exercising the planned SoS operational test 
configuration to obtain system-level reliability data as follows: 
a. For i = 1, …, L, and j = 1, …, mi, draw a random number of failures Fij for 
each individual system from the Poisson distribution with mean λiTij. 
b. For i = 1, …, L, calculate point estimates of the mean time between failure 








4. Build an empirical time-to-failure distribution for the full SoS field configuration that 
is characterized by the system-level behaviors obtained in step 3.b. For p = 1, …, P, 
perform steps a to c to generate P SoS times-to-failure. 
a. For i = 1, …, L, and j = 1, …, ni, generate the time to failure TTFij for each 
individual system of the SoS field configuration by conducting a random draw 
from an exponential distribution with mean 𝜃�𝑖. 
b. For i = 1, …, L, sort the times-to-failure TTFij in descending order and let 
STTFi equal the 𝑘𝑖𝑡ℎ largest time. This represents the first time at which fewer 
than ki systems of type i will be operational. 
c. Let SoSTTF = min {STTF1, STTF2, …, STTFL}.  This represents the time at 





5. Estimate SoS-level reliability as follows: 
a. Based on the shape of the empirical distribution of SoS times-to-failure 
obtained in step 4, formulate a hypothesis regarding an appropriate parametric 
statistical distribution for the SoS times-to-failure. 
b. Calculate maximum likelihood estimates for the parameter(s) of the 
hypothesized distribution. 
c. Assess goodness-of-fit. If the hypothesized distribution does not provide a 
good fit, consider an alternative parametric distribution (as appropriate). 
d. Compute Rest(T0), the estimated SoS reliability (the probability that the SoS 
time-to-failure will exceed T0) using the fitted parametric statistical 
distribution. If no parametric distribution provided an acceptable fit, use the 
empirical distribution obtained in step 4.  Determine the relative absolute error 
for this trial | Rsos(T0) – Rest(T0) | / Rsos(T0). 
6. Calculate the mean relative absolute error associated with this SoS test configuration 
across all Q trials. 
 
  In practice, various methods can be used to identify values for the system-level 
failure rates in step 1 of the algorithm; however, the values selected should be vetted by 
subject matter experts (e.g., system engineers, testers, evaluators) to ensure validity of the 
simulation results. Furthermore, as it is impossible to know à priori what the true SoS 
reliability will be during the operational test, it is recommended to perform the above 
algorithm using a range of values for the system-level failure rates, resulting in a range of 




applications, if the overarching results of this method are sensitive to the actual reliability 
of the SoS. 
7.3  Illustration of the Simulation-Based Method to Assess the Adequacy of an SoS 
Operational Test Configuration 
7.3.1  Overview 
  The simulation-based approach presented in this chapter mirrors the above 
process by which reliability of the SoS field configuration is evaluated. In contrast to the 
real-world case, we obtain failure data for the SoS operational test configuration via 
simulation. Based on the data from the simulated operational test, system-level point 
estimates for mean time between failure (MTBF) are calculated. Just as in the real-world 
case, these system-level MTBF point estimates are used in an SoS TTF simulation to 
evaluate SoS reliability. In Section 7.3.2, we outline the various scenarios for which this 
approach is exercised. 
  For the purpose of illustration, we will revisit the notional air defense SoS from 
Section 6.5, but we will consider 3 design variations for this SoS (see Section 7.3.5). To 
assess the accuracy of our simulation of the full SoS field configuration, we obtain the 
true SoS reliability values using the RBD logic method. For each SoS design that we 
consider in this study, we establish the corresponding SoS RBD (for example, see Figure 
4 below) and we calculate the SoS reliability for the specified mission duration of 24 
hours. In Section 7.3.6, we will discuss our approach for deriving and allocating the true 







Figure 4. Reliability Block Diagram for SoS Design 3-5-12 
 
7.3.2  Simulation Control Variables 
– True SoS-level Reliability 
 0.90, 0.85, and 0.35 (approximate values for each case—see Table 6 in 
Section 7.3.5 for actual values used) 
– Number of k-out-of-n (KN) Structures within the SoS 
 3 or 4 
– ki and ni for each KN Structure 
 various choices for ki and ni 
 ki ranges from 1 to 9, depending on ni 
 ni ranges from 2 to 12 
– Operational Test Length 





7.3.3  Metrics 
  The primary metric that we consider for ranking each SoS test configuration is the 
relative absolute error between the true SoS reliability and the experimental SoS 
reliability, calculated as: 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐴𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 =  
| 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑆𝑜𝑆 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑜𝑆 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 |
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑆𝑜𝑆 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
For all of the scenarios we consider in this chapter, we define SoS reliability as the 
probability that the SoS will complete a 24-hour mission without incurring a SoS-level 
abort (reliability failure). The SoS reliability requirement is assumed to be 90%, i.e., 
P(T>24 hours) ≥ 0.90. For Army air defense systems, the reliability requirement is almost 
always 90%, although, the specified mission duration may not be 24 hours (72 hours is 
another commonly specified mission duration). 
  For each simulation case, the secondary metric that we examine is the proportion 
of trials that result in a correct answer to the question “is P(T>24 hours) ≥ 0.90 for the 
SoS.”  This metric is simply intended as ancillary information since proximity of the 
estimate of SoS reliability—obtained via a test and evaluation program—to the true SoS 
reliability in the field is of the utmost importance. In practice, the operational test is not a 
pass or fail situation. 
 
7.3.4  Simulation Assumptions 





2. Failures at the system-level occur according to a homogeneous Poisson process. 
Hence, the time between failure for each individual system in the SoS is assumed 
to follow an exponential distribution. 
3. Individual systems within each k-out-of-n (KN) structure, i.e., of the same type, 
are identical and they share the same underlying constant failure rate. 
4. Each individual system in the SoS is assumed to be “as good as new” at the start 
of each simulation run; concordantly, the SoS is assumed to be “as good as new” 
at the start of each simulation run. 
5. The availability of a given test asset (system) during each simulated operational 
test/run is based on a random draw from U(0.6,0.9).  This is based on the 
demonstrated availability of similar systems during actual government operational 
testing. 
6. For the SoS-level simulation (see Section 7.3.6), if an individual system fails 
during the mission, no repair is attempted (i.e., the SoS will operate continuously 
until an SoS-level abort occurs).  This aligns with the manner in which SoS-level 






7.3.5  Simulation Run Matrices 
  In this section, we provide the various run matrices used for our simulation cases. 
Table 6 includes—for each SoS design—the values for the true SoS reliability along with 
the true system-level failure rates (λi). 
Table 6. SoS Reliability by Design 
 
For convenience, we have decomposed the primary simulation run matrix into Tables 7 
through 9, which depict the 12 test configuration cases for each pairing of SoS design and 
SoS-level reliability from Table 6. Note that there are 3 SoS designs, 3 SoS-level 
reliability values, and 12 test configuration cases, for a total of 108 combinations. We 
conduct 20 trials for each of the 108 combinations, resulting in 2160 total simulation 





Table 7. Test Configuration Run 
Matrix for SoS 2-3-4 
 
Table 8. Test Configuration Run 
Matrix for SoS 3-5-12 
 
 
Table 9. Test Configuration Run 
Matrix for SoS 3-5-4-12 
 
 






7.3.6  Simulation Activities 
For this study, we conducted several activities via simulation using MATLAB 
(R2009b).  As well, we performed additional activities using Mathematica (release 8) and 
MATLAB outside of the simulation in order to facilitate the overarching simulation-
based activities. In this section, we will describe all of these activities. All of the source 
code is contained in the Appendix (Sections A.1 and A.2). 
 
Establishing System-Level Failure Rates (Pre-Simulation Activity) 
As we discussed in Section 7.3.2, we considered 3 levels of SoS reliability in our 
study—0.90, 0.85, and 0.35. In order to obtain the system-level failure rates (λi) in Table 
6 that support the 3 levels of SoS reliability, we created a short routine in MATLAB. 
Given that each SoS design we consider is a series of either 3 or 4 KN structures, we 
calculate the nth root of the desired reliability for the SoS (where n = {3,4}, depending on 
the number of KN structures in the SoS design). This yields the KN-level reliability for 
the given SoS design. For example, if the desired SoS-level reliability is 0.90 and there 
are 3 KN structures in the SoS, the KN-level reliability target would be 0.91/3 = 0.9655. 
Given values for k, n, λ, and t, we calculate the reliability of the KN structure, RKN(t) 
using RBD logic as follows: 







The rationale governing the expression for RKN(t) above is that we have n identical 
systems configured in active parallel redundancy, and we need at least k of the systems to 
be operational for the associated KN structure to be operational. As stated in Section 




be exponential, hence the appearance of the 𝑒−𝜆𝑡 term representing the reliability of an 
individual system at time t. 
In order to obtain values of the failure rates (λi) for the individual (and identical) 
systems within each KN structure, we use the KN-level reliability value as our target 
(say, 0.9655). We set the system-level failure rates equal to 1 as a starting point, and we 
calculate the reliability of the KN structure using RBD logic as discussed. If the 
calculated value of reliability for the KN structure is less than the target, we decrement 
the system-level failure rate (by a user-defined fraction) until the calculated KN 
reliability value is greater than or equal to the KN reliability target. In Table 11, we 
include an example progression of various choices for the system-level failure rate. 
Table 11. Example Search Progression for the System-Level Failure Rate of a 
System in a KN Structure (k=2, n=3, t=24, target RKN(t)=0.9655) 
 
To reduce the number of iterations to display in Table 11, we used a start value for λ of 
0.01 instead of 1. Note that in Table 11, for the ith iteration (i ≥ 2) λi = 0.95λi-1 because we 
specified a decrement value of 0.95.  For the 15th iteration of the MATLAB routine, the 




specifying decrement values for λ closer to 1, it is possible to obtain a value of λ that 
yields a value of RKN(t) that is as arbitrarily close to the target—0.9655, in this case. In 
turn, this will ensure that the resulting SoS-level reliability is as close to our desired value 






Execution of Simulation Cases 
In accordance with our discussion in section 7.3.5, we will use the terms “test 
configuration case” (or, simply case) and “trial” for our simulation. Figure 5 depicts the 
hierarchy of terms in our simulation construct. 
 
Figure 5. SoS Simulation Hierarchical Structure 
 
As suggested by Figure 5, each trial requires the specification of the SoS design, SoS-
level reliability, and the test configuration. In Table 12, we highlight the major simulation 




12 depicts the information required for the associated simulation process, and the 
product(s) of the simulation process are noted in the “Output” column. 
Table 12. Summary of Simulation Processes for each Trial 
 
Simulation Process 1 
The first major step in the simulation flow is to generate system-level “operational 
test data,” i.e., MTBF point estimates for each type of system within the SoS. During 
actual operational testing, we exercise systems in accordance with how they are expected 
to be employed in the field, and we obtain system-level point estimates for MTBF. This 
process is designed to represent how we estimate system-level reliability in practice. Just 
as in our simulation, in real SoS reliability test and evaluation programs, we must use 






Simulation Process 2 
The second major step in the simulation flow is to take the system-level point 
estimates for MTBF, and use them in our SoS-level TTF simulation module. Given the 
SoS design and the vector of system-level MTBF point estimates, we simulate running 
the SoS until failure.  We repeat this 1000 times in order to build an empirical 
distribution of 1000 SoS TTF. 
 
Simulation Process 3 
Having obtained the empirical SoS TTF distribution, we calculate the maximum 
likelihood estimates (MLEs) for the two-parameter gamma distribution, namely α and β. 
Based on a visual inspection of empirical TTF distributions for various SoS designs and 
levels of SoS reliability, we postulated that the two-parameter gamma distribution would 
serve as an appropriate distribution to represent the SoS TTF distribution. As well, we 
generated probability plots such as in Figure 7 and calculated Cramér-von Mises statistics 
to investigate goodness of fit.  In all cases, there was extremely close agreement between 
the expected and observed values.  Hence, we automated the process to calculate MLEs 
for α and β for all trials. We performed this automated process in Mathematica; although, 
it is quite easily done in MATLAB as well using the built-in gamfit function. 
 
Simulation Process 4 
The final major step to complete for each simulation trial is to calculate our 2 key 




SoS TTF will exceed 24 hours) based on the fitted gamma distribution from simulation 
process 3 and (2) the relative error in P(T>24) between the experimental and true values. 
Thus, a simulation trial consists of these 4 major processes.  In this overarching study, we 
performed 20 such trials for each test configuration case. For each batch of 20 trials, we 
calculated the proportion of trials for which the answer to “Is P(T>24 hours) ≥ 0.90 for 
the SoS?” is correct. Lastly, we calculated the (arithmetic) mean relative absolute error 
across all 20 trials (results appear in Tables 14 through 22 in Section 7.3.7). 
 
7.3.7  Simulation Results 
Approximate Distribution for SoS-Level Time to Failure (TTF) 
In section 7.3.6, we briefly indicated that the SoS-level simulation includes fitting 
a 2-parameter gamma distribution to each empirical SoS TTF distribution. Prior to 
conducting this study, our initial hypothesis was that the SoS TTF distribution would 
follow, approximately, a two-parameter gamma distribution. We expected this to be a 
reasonable starting point, conceptually, as the gamma distribution represents (in the 
physical world) a system that can handle n “shocks” prior to a catastrophic failure. 
Further discussion on this physical connection appears in [41] and [44] . By analyzing the 
data from the SoS-level simulation cases, we find that the SoS TTF distributions are well-
characterized by the two-parameter gamma distribution. Figure 6 is a plot of the 
empirical TTF distribution for the SoS design 3-5-12 with true reliability of 0.35.  The 
fitted gamma(3.851,5.567) probability density function is overlaid on top of the relative 





Figure 6. Empirical TTF Distribution for SoS Design 3-5-12 
with Fitted Gamma Distribution Overlaid 
 
 
Figure 7. Probability Plot for Empirical and Fitted TTF 
Distributions for SoS Design 3-5-12 
 
By inspection of the probability plot in Figure 7 above, there is extremely good 
agreement (in the goodness-of-fit sense) between the data and the theoretical distribution, 
i.e., gamma(3.851, 5.567). We also determined that the results for the SoS TTF are stable 
by 1000 replications. In Figure 8, this is visually confirmed, without loss of generality, 
for SoS design 3-5-12 by noting that the there is a nearly imperceptible difference 
between the fitted distributions as we increase the sample from 500 replications (light 





Figure 8. Plot of Fitted TTF Distribution for SoS Design 3-5-12 based on 100, 200, 500, 
and 1000 SoS TTF Simulation Replications 
 
Mean Relative Absolute Error 
Although the Army specifies its system reliability requirements a single threshold 
value that must be demonstrated during an operational test event, historically, the 
majority of Army systems fail to achieve this target. In practice, if a given system’s 
demonstrated reliability falls short of its threshold requirement, the Army may still decide 
to field the system. The decision to field a system that does not demonstrate its 
operational reliability requirement is based on the assessed marginal impact of lower 
reliability to mission capability. Thus, it is critical for the Army’s system reliability 
evaluators to obtain and present the most accurate system-level reliability estimate, 
subject to resource constraints. As we mentioned earlier, the notion of the anticipated 
relative error associated with a given test configuration is useful from an RTP planning 
standpoint as a means to assess RTP evaluation adequacy. 
In this study, we calculate the relative absolute error in SoS-level reliability, i.e., 
P(T > 24 hours) for each simulation trial. As there are 20 trials for each simulation case, 




that—irrespective of the SoS design or level of true SoS reliability—the mean relative 
absolute error decreases as either the operational test duration increases or the test 
configuration approaches the full field configuration of the SoS. This is not a surprising 
result, but it is important that this simulation-based methodology yields such a result. 
 
Table 13. SoS Simulation Results using Actual System Failure Rates 
 
 
Table 14. Simulation Results for SoS 
Design 2-3-4 with SoS-Level 
Reliability 0.90 
 
Table 15. Simulation Results for SoS 







Table 16. Simulation Results for SoS 




Table 18. Simulation Results for SoS 




Table 17. Simulation Results for SoS 




Table 19. Simulation Results for SoS 







Table 20. Simulation Results for SoS 
Design 3-5-4-12 with SoS-Level 
Reliability 0.90 
 
Table 21. Simulation Results for SoS 




Table 22. Simulation Results for SoS 






As we would expect from real-world testing, by exercising more distinct test 
assets for longer periods of time, the accuracy of our system-level reliability estimates 
should improve. In our simulation, the primary reason that the we observe mean relative 
absolute error decreasing as (1) the SoS test configuration approaches the SoS field 
configuration and/or (2) as the operational test length increases is because the aggregate 
accuracy our system-level MTBF point estimates (PE) is improving. 
It is difficult to get a good sense of this phenomenon simply from examination of 
values for the minimum, maximum, median, or mean, system-level MTBF PE across 20 
trials. However, this phenomenon is easier to observe by visual inspection of box and 
whisker plots for the system-level MTBF PE such as appear in Figures 9 through 12 for 
our SoS design 3-5-4-12 (90% reliability). Each figure consists of box and whisker plots 
for each of the 12 test configuration cases by system type (recall that there are 4 types of 
systems in our SoS design 3-5-4-12). In each figure, the black dashed line represents the 
true system-level MTBF for that type of system. Without loss of generality, the trends 
that we note are (1) that the median MTBF values approach the true value for each 
system type and (2) that the interquartile range decreases as the quantity of test assets 
increases and the operational test duration (i.e., operating hours per test asset) increases. 
In other words, more of the system-level MTBF PE are closer to the true values, which 




Figure 9. MTBF PE for SoS 3-5-4-12 (90% 




Figure 10. MTBF PE for SoS 3-5-4-12 (90% 
reliability) for System Type 3 Only 
 
 
Figure 11. MTBF PE for SoS 3-5-4-12 (90% 
reliability) for System Type 2 Only 
 
 
Figure 12. MTBF PE for SoS 3-5-4-12 (90% 
reliability) for System Type 4 Only 
 
 
As we discussed in section 7.3.1, the relative absolute error calculations compare 
the experimental SoS-level reliability obtained via simulation to the true SoS-level 
reliability as calculated using each SoS RBD. As an excursion, we also performed 1000 
simulation replications for each pairing of SoS design and SoS reliability using the true 
system-level MTBF values (instead of obtaining MTBF point estimates via simulated 
operational tests, as described in section 7.3.6). In essence, we removed the additional 
error associated with estimating the system-level MTBF values. Table 13 contains the 
SoS-level simulation reliability results (using the true system-level MTBF values), along 
with the parameter maximum likelihood estimates for α and β (recall that the TTF 































The relative absolute error for 7 of the 9 cases was between 0.001 and 0.019, with the 
other 2 cases resulting in relative errors of 0.035 and 0.060. All of the relative absolute 
errors for a given pairing of SoS design and SoS reliability from Table 13 are less than 
any case from Tables 14 through 22 associated with the same pairing.  This is an 
encouraging result since we expected to observe less relative error when using the true 
system-level MTBF values in the SoS-level TTF simulation. 
During RTP planning, the emphasis should not be placed on the particular relative 
absolute error values obtained for each trial via simulation; rather, practitioners should 
consider the marginal improvement  that may be realized by increasing the operational 
test duration and/or augmenting the SoS test configuration. The sensitivity of relative 
absolute error to the test configuration and operational test duration is a tool to rank 
distinct options, ideally, while concurrently considering the cost to execute each option. 
In addition, using this approach during the RTP planning stage will enable documentation 
of the rationale for selecting a particular option and promote effective communication of 
that rationale to leadership. 
 
Proportion of Trials where P(T>24) ≥ 0.90 
Given that we considered SoS-level reliability values of (approximately) 0.90, 
0.85, and 0.35, we expected to see the highest proportion of trials where P(T>24) ≥ 0.90 
for cases in which the true SoS-level reliability was 0.90. We expected to see a lower 
proportion of trials where P(T>24) ≥ 0.90 for cases in which the true SoS-level reliability 




the true SoS-level was 0.35. By inspection of Tables 23 through 25 below, we see that 
this is, indeed, the trend. 
  For all cases in which the true SoS-level reliability was 0.35, there were no trials 
where P(T>24) ≥ 0.90. For cases in which the true SoS-level reliability was 0.85, the 
proportion of trials where P(T>24) ≥ 0.90 ranged from 0 to 0.35. Interestingly, for cases 
in which the true SoS-level reliability was 0.90, the highest proportion of trials where 
P(T>24) ≥ 0.90 was 0.60.  For cases in which the test configuration consisted of just a 
single test asset of each system type (this is always case 1 in Tables 23 through 25), there 
were no trials where P(T>24) ≥ 0.90. 
  Since the 12 trials for a given pairing of SoS design and SoS reliability are 
essentially organized in groups of 3 (the operational test length is constant for each group 
of 3 trials, e.g., trials 1-3 or trials 9-12), we notice that the proportions demonstrate a 
group-oriented behavior.  In general, the difference in the proportions within a group of 3 
cases is not statistically significant (using the Fisher exact method for comparing 2 
proportions, given “small” samples). As we transition from one group of 3 cases to the 
next group of 3 cases, the difference in the proportion may be statistically significantly 
different, but this is not always true of the results.  Thus, it is fair to assert that—for the 
0.90 and 0.85 SoS reliability levels—the trend with the proportion is that it increases as 
the operational test duration increases. There is not statistical evidence that the proportion 





Table 23. Proportion of Trials where P(T>24)>=0.90 for SoS Design 2-3-4 
 
Table 24. Proportion of Trials where P(T>24)>=0.90 for SoS Design 3-5-12 
 






Simulation Running Time 
As we expect that practitioners who may wish to implement the simulation-based 
approach described herein will be interested in the temporal commitment involved, in 
Table 26, we include the running times for each pairing of SoS design and SoS reliability. 
Each time listed in Table 26 represents the time required to execute 240 simulation trials. 
Recall that each trial involves 1000 replications of the SoS TTF procedure described in 
section 7.3.6. Therefore, it takes less than 10  minutes to complete 240,000 simulation 
replications. The cumulative running time to complete all 2,160,000 simulation 
replications was approximately 86 minutes.  Our simulation platform was a Dell Latitude 
Laptop Model E6510 running Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise (64-bit) with dual Intel 
2.4 GHz i5 Core processors and 4 GB of RAM. 
 
Table 26. SoS Simulation Running Times 






7.3.8  Application Extension: The Iron Triangle of Cost, Schedule, and Accuracy 
  In order to demonstrate how practitioners can use the results from the simulation-
based approach described herein to adopt a particular course of action, we will now 
provide an example application. Our system will be the SoS 3-5-12 with inherent 
reliability approximately equal to 90%. We want to make a recommendation regarding 
the size of the test configuration and the duration of the operational test.  We will use 
results for mean relative absolute error from Table 17. 
  In our example, we will limit our planning considerations to (1) the cost to 
produce test assets for use during the operational test and (2) the cost to conduct the 
operational test. The values that we use are notional, although, they are representative of 
the costs that the program management office for the SoS can expect to incur. The costs 
(in millions of dollars) to produce each type of system for use during the operational test 
appear in Table 27, and the costs associated with test execution are summarized in Table 
28. In Table 29, we indicate the number of test weeks required to complete the 
operational test. 
 






Table 28. Operational Test Work Schedule Options and Associated Costs 
 
 
Table 29. Number of Test Weeks Required for each Work Schedule Option 
 
 
  In practice, it is generally possible to schedule two 8-hour shifts per day during 
the operational test. Typically, it is preferred to plan for a 5-day test week; however, 
adding a sixth day to the test week may be a feasible option. Now, we would expect to 
have to pay overtime rates for the 2 shifts on the sixth test day each week. For our 
example, we assume that the overtime rate is 50% higher than the regular labor rate (see 
Table 28), but this may be different in practice for different types of personnel 
participating in the execution of the test. Depending on the level of operational realism, 
the actual daily work schedules may vary if, say, the goal is to execute 72-hour 
continuous operations (missions) followed by a 24-hour pause. Such a sequence may be 
repeated 10 or more times for an operational test. It is a straightforward process to modify 
the cost estimation procedures and scheduling of labor accordingly. 
  Given the costs summarized in Tables 27 and 28, we are able to determine the 




SoS 3-5-12. We summarize the costs associated with each of the 12 operational test cases 
in Table 30. Now, let us momentarily assume that practitioners do not wish to 
recommend a particular operational test plan where the mean relative error is expected to 
exceed 10%. In Table 30, we highlighted in yellow the 2 rows in which the mean relative 
absolute error (obtained via simulation) is 10%. As well, we have highlighted in yellow 
the total cost associated with each operational test configuration case (for each of the 2 
work schedule options. i.e., 5-day or 6-day test weeks). 
 




  Naturally, it is preferable to recommend the option for which the estimated total 
cost is the lowest, relatively speaking. In Table 30, we note that (for a mean relative 
absolute error of 10%), the least costly option is the case in which we have 1 of each type 
of system in the SoS test configuration (case 4) and we plan to conduct a 300-hour 
operational test, following a 5-day test week work schedule. The cost for this option is 
estimated as $15.75 million.  Based on Table 30, we anticipate that it will take just under 




schedule would not be justifiable since we would still expect to take over 3 weeks to 
complete the operational test (see Table 29) and it would increase the total cost from 
$15.75 million to $19.81 million. 
  On the other hand, let us say that we wish to identify the best option for which the 
mean relative error does not exceed 6%. By inspection of Table 30, we note that there are 
4 cases (highlighted in green) in which the mean relative absolute error is 6%. The lowest 
cost ($24.5 million) is associated with case 10, i.e., 1 of each type of system in the SoS 
operational test configuration and an operational test duration of 1000 hours. As in the 
previous scenario, this cost estimate is based on a 5-day work schedule. Adopting a 6-day 
work schedule would reduce the expected number of test weeks from 12.5 to 10.42 (see 
Table 29); however, the cost would increase from $24.5 million to $38.04 million 
(approximately a 55% increase in total cost).  It is unlikely that the program manager 
would consider this to be a good investment. 
  In the two scenarios that we considered, we determined that the least costly 
options that satisfied our requirements (threshold tolerance for mean relative absolute 
error) were both associated with an operational test configuration including just 1 of each 
type of system. Generally speaking, we would prefer not to base our reliability evaluation 
on this minimalist SoS operational test configuration (as there is no guarantee that the 
observed behavior of the individual systems will necessarily be representative of the 
population). Although we included such SoS operational test configurations in Table 30 
for the purpose of this example, practitioners will likely elect to exclude such an option 
from consideration at the beginning since it would generally be desirable to observe 




revisit the second scenario that we considered (mean relative absolute error not to exceed 
6%). The best remaining option in Table 30 is the case in which we have 2 of each type 
of system and the operational test duration is 500 hours (instead of 1000 hours). The 
associated cost is approximately $30.25 million for this option. 
  Another important consideration is the amount of calendar time (i.e., the number 
of test weeks) necessary to complete the operational test. Depending on the work 
schedule adopted, Table 29 indicates that it should be expected to take between 10.42 and 
12.5 weeks to complete a 1000-hour operational test. An implicit assumption is that the 
test will remain on schedule, and there will be no delays. In reality, there are many 
factors that have an impact on the test schedule that cannot be controlled such as weather 
and excessive system down-time due to reliability failures. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
expect that we cannot, in practice, manage to accumulate the desired SoS-level operating 
time. Furthermore, as Army operational tests require the participation of Soldiers, it is 
almost certainly infeasible to plan a single operational test event that may last for a period 
of 10 to 13 consecutive weeks. Hence, test planning options associated with the 
accumulation of 500 hours or less during the operational test would be more appropriate 
courses of action. 
  By establishing the maximum acceptable threshold for the mean relative absolute 
error associated with P(T>24) for the SoS, practitioners are certifying that any SoS test 
configuration for which the mean relative absolute error exceeds that threshold—from a 
reliability evaluation standpoint—is inadequate. In other words, the empirical results 
obtained during an operational test employing an inadequate SoS test configuration 




configuration. Without going through this process, or at least a variant of this process, 
practitioners struggle to effectively articulate this to information to program managers. 
Concordantly, program managers are less likely to allocate the necessary resources to 
conduct an adequate operational test for a complex SoS. 
  Although not addressed in our example application, the decision concerning the 
maximum acceptable level of relative error associated with the SoS operational test 
configuration is a complex task. The reason that the accuracy in the evaluation of SoS 
reliability is of paramount importance to decision authorities is because even modest 
errors in the characterization of reliability can result in significant operational impacts. It 
is recommended that RTP planners consider the types of missions that the SoS is 
intended to support as a means to assess the impact of such errors. 
  For example, let us say that the maximum allowable mean relative absolute error 
is set to 5%, and there exists an SoS test configuration that satisfies this requirement. 
Without loss of generality, let us assume for the moment that our estimate for SoS 
reliability (based on exercising the pre-determined SoS test configuration during an 
operational test event) turns out to be 90%. If the relative error associated with this 
experimental estimate (versus the true but unknown SoS reliability) is 5%, the actual SoS 
reliability could be as low as 85.5%. However, program managers build logistical support 
campaigns based on the 90% estimate, not the 85.5% estimate. As well, unit commanders 
expect to maintain a certain level of operational readiness based on the 90% estimate of 
SoS reliability. Furthermore, long-term budget planning to sustain the system for 20 to 30 
years in the field based on the 90% level of reliability would prove insufficient, and there 




  From a mission capability standpoint—depending on the type of system—the 
lower level of reliability means that it will be less likely for the unit employing the 
system to detect enemy forces, target enemy assets, counter/evade enemy attacks, reduce 
the risk of fratricide, or evacuate friendly casualties (where wounded Soldiers become 
fatalities). Unfortunately, it is impossible to know the magnitude of the error in the 
evaluation of SoS reliability that is fueled by the results obtained through exercising the 
selected SoS operational test configuration. Yet, during the planning stage, practitioners 
should consider the marginal impact of lower-than-estimated SoS reliability to mission 
capability and sustainment. By exploring the marginal impact to mission capability and 
sustainment via force-on-force combat simulations, it should be possible to identify cases 
when the SoS would cease to be suitable and/or affordable. Arguably, this is a more 
practical and meaningful method to assess RTP adequacy compared to the focusing on 
traditional consumer and producer risks. 
7.4  Consideration of SoS Emergent Behavior 
Coined by the English philosopher G.H. Lewes in 1875, the term emergence has 
been defined and re-defined over the years [49]. A definition of emergence offered by 
Goldstein in [50] is “the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and properties 
during the process of self-organization in complex systems.” Goldstein extends his 
discussion, asserting that—regardless of the origin—emergent behaviors exhibit 5 
common characteristics: 
1. radical novelty, 




3. a global or macro level, 
4. dynamical, and 
5. ostensive. 
In the context of SoS reliability, emergence pertains to the potential for the 
manifestation of unpredictable behaviors due to the interaction among the constituent 
parts of the SoS. The method presented in this chapter for assessing the adequacy of a 
given SoS operational test configuration is not designed to account for potential emergent 
behaviors of the SoS. Instead, step 4 of the RTP planning process should consider the 
implications of behaviors that cannot be modeled or logically derived à priori to decide 
whether or not an EERA should be established to explicitly address this phenomenon. 
Arguably, if EERAs are established for (1) OMS/MP coverage and (2) SoS operational 
test configuration adequacy, these would likely handle the potential for emergent SoS 
behaviors reasonably well. Otherwise, it may be desirable to establish a separate EERA 
to reduce the risk of not characterizing such potential behavior. 
7.5  Concluding Remarks 
  The novel simulation-based approach described herein is an appropriate technique 
to analytically assess the evaluation adequacy of a given SoS test configuration. This 
methodology provides insight into the relative absolute error sensitivity trends associated 
with various operational test lengths and SoS test configurations. Given existing data on 
the systems that constitute the SoS (or similar systems, based on subject matter 
expertise/professional engineering judgment), this methodology is easy to apply. This 




although, further investigation is necessary to determine how the methodology will 





8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1  Summary of Major Dissertation Contributions 
1. Reliability Test Program Evaluation Risk Assessment Process (Chapter 4) 
We devised a novel process to assess evaluation risks associated with reliability 
test programs (RTPs) to systematically examine poor design practices in observed in 
RTPs for military systems. This process, which was adapted from the traditional FMEA 
process, can be applied to any RTP, irrespective of the manner in which the plan was 
formulated. 
 
2. Identification of Poor Design Practices for RTPs and Countermeasures (Chapter 5) 
We applied the evaluation risk assessment process from Chapter 4 to RTPs for 10 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs. This application led to the identification of several 
poor design practices for RTPs as well countermeasures to mitigate the level of risk 
associated with these practices. 
 
3. Adaptive Reliability Test Program Planning Process (Chapter 6) 
Using key considerations from the evaluation risk assessment process along with 
the insights regarding the poor design practices for RTPs, we formulated a novel, 
tailorable planning process designed to identify, assess, communicate, and mitigate 
evaluation risk in RTPs. This intuitive planning process can be applied to any type of 





4. Simulation-Based Risk Assessment Methodology to Assess the Evaluation Adequacy 
of a System-of-Systems (SoS) Operational Test Configuration (Chapter 7) 
A general method was established to assess the adequacy of a given operational 
test configuration for any type of commercial or military SoS. This method is designed to 
support the risk assessment step in the RTP planning process. 
8.2  Research Findings 
Reliability Test Program Evaluation Risk Assessment Process 
A reliability test program is designed to investigate and quantify the reliability 
characteristics of a given system, from a mission-based perspective. However, due to 
budget and schedule constraints, it is typically infeasible to conduct an exhaustive 
reliability test program. In Chapter 4, we proposed the following minimum requirements 
for reliability test programs (additional details can be found in Chapter 4): 
• Requirement 1: Evaluate the Reliability of the Field Configuration of the System 
• Requirement 2: Test all Elements of the System 
• Requirement 3: Exercise all Anticipated Unreliability Drivers 
• Requirement 4: Evaluate the Reliability of the System Correctly 
• Requirement 5: Identify and Manage the Evaluation Risks of the RTP 
Based on experience working in the area of reliability test and evaluation, we have noted 
that it is atypical for all of the 5 requirements listed above to be satisfied for a given 
reliability test program. This revelation served as the impetus to examine a cross-section 
of reliability test programs for 10 Major Defense Acquisitions Programs (documented in 




In order to examine each of the programs in a consistent, scientific manner, we 
developed an evaluation risk assessment process for reliability test programs. The 
evaluation risk assessment process that we defined in Chapter 4 is similar to a traditional 
failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). This FMEA-like procedure yields a synopsis 
of identified reliability test program weaknesses along with the potential impact of each 
weakness with respect to the reliability evaluation. Below, we list the 7 steps in our 
evaluation risk assessment process. 
a. Define the RTP. 
b. Identify potential weaknesses in the RTP with respect to evaluation adequacy. 
c. Identify monitoring/detection methods and contingency plans. 
d. Develop RTP planning alternatives that mitigate, in whole or in part, the potential 
weaknesses identified in step b. 
e. State the perceived impact associated with the implementation of planning 
alternatives developed in step d. 
f. Document the analysis and summarize the problems which could not be corrected 
by changing the RTP design and identify the special controls which are necessary 
to reduce failure risk. 
g. Provide a recommendation to decision makers based on the results from steps a 
through f of the RTP risk assessment process. 
This evaluation risk assessment process can be employed to scrutinize any military or 
commercial system reliability test program plan and may be employed by practitioners to 
compare multiple reliability test program design alternatives for the same system. 




with the characterization of system reliability will need to be balanced with other 
competing evaluation priorities. 
 
Poor RTP Design Practices Identified during the Application of the RTP Evaluation Risk 
Assessment Process to 10 Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
 Through our examination of the RTP details for 10 systems that are Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs, we identified certain weaknesses—issues that could 
potentially erode the adequacy of the system-level reliability evaluation. The following 
practices, which were found in these 10 RTPs, increase evaluation risk. 
• Commonality Assumption:  To reduce the overall test program, the program 
manager assumes that all system variants will exhibit the same reliability behavior 
(i.e., have the same failure modes and failure recurrence rates). The associated 
RTP may include little or no testing of certain system variants, which may 
preclude the identification of important differences among the variants. 
• Minimum Test Configuration:  For a large system-of-systems (SoS), it may be 
infeasible to exercise the full field configuration during the reliability 
demonstration event. The SoS “minimum test configuration” that is exercised 
may not yield representative information regarding the reliability behavior of the 
actual field configuration of the SoS. Flaws in assumed SoS redundant 
capabilities, interactions due to scale, integration issues, and similar concerns may 
be obscured. 
• “Bootstrap” Calculation of SoS Reliability:  Although the term “bootstrap” has 
been used by the community in other contexts, we are referring to generating a 




the minimum test configuration approach, it may be impossible to construct an 
SoS-level reliability characterization that includes important failure modes due to 
integration and/or interaction of systems within the SoS. 
• Operational Mode Summary/Mission Profile (OMS/MP) Test Slice:  This refers to 
the case wherein only a subset of the operational conditions (e.g., missions and 
environmental conditions) will be included in the RTP. Such cases can lead to an 
inaccurate evaluation of fleet reliability. 
• Insufficient Test Time to Surface Key Failure Modes (FM): Due to resource 
constraints such as the calendar time leading up to a major program milestone 
decision, availability of facilities, and availability of personnel, the planned test 
time per asset in the RTP may be less than the time in which key failure modes 
have previously been observed for similar systems. This is considerable risk to the 
establishment of an effective logistical support plan after fielding the system, e.g., 
the number and type of spares, the number and qualifications of maintenance 
personnel, and the training materials for system operators. 
• Low Likelihood of Detecting System-to-System Variation in Reliability:  One test 
assumption often made is that all test articles are identical. If the RTP does not 
allow for a sufficient amount of test time per test article, the likelihood of 
detecting a variation among the individual test articles may be undesirably low. 
• Low Likelihood of Detecting Drop in System Reliability between DT and OT:  
Typically, the total test time accumulated during the developmental test (DT) 
portion of the RTP is appreciably greater than the length of the operational test 




demonstrated reliability tends to be lower. As even a 5% difference in the 
reliability of the system can lead to a significant impact to ownership costs, it is 
important to determine if this observed drop in reliability is real, or simply an 
artifact of chance. Hence, it is desirable to design the system RTP such that it will 
be possible to detect statistically-significant differences between DT and OT 
reliability. 
• Technology Moving Faster than RTP:  For certain types of systems (such as 
radios, IT equipment, and smart phones), the technology matures faster than the 
acquisition program can. New releases of software and hardware typically occur 
between the end of the RTP and the time of fielding. Thus, testing the exact 
version of the system that actually makes it to the field is impossible. 
• No Instrumented Data Collection Activities Planned:  Without an on-board 
instrumentation package, the reliability evaluator will have a limited amount of 
available information from which to develop insights. Furthermore, the accuracy 
of the system reliability evaluation will depend solely on the coverage and 
diligence of human data collectors. Instrumented data (e.g., system states and 
environmental conditions) can provide objective contextual information regarding 
reliability incidents and improve the accuracy and timeliness of failure mode root 







Reliability Test Program Planning Process 
As we discussed in Chapters 2, 4, and 6 of this dissertation, widespread variability 
currently exists with respect to the level of analytical rigor applied during the reliability 
test program design process. Concordantly, it has proven challenging for practitioners to 
assess reliability test program adequacy as well as defend reliability test program 
activities. The spirit and intent of the reliability test program planning process that was 
presented in Chapter 6 is to manage evaluation risk and support the following activities: 
• document the rationale underpinning the reliability test program design, 
• communicate the reliability test program plan to the decision authority, 
• justify all elements of a given reliability test program design (number and type of 
events, quantity of test assets, duration of testing, test environment, etc.), 
• assess overall reliability test program adequacy, and 
• determine the impact of T&E resource reductions on the adequacy of an 
established reliability test program plan. 
Chapter 6 presented the reliability test program (RTP) planning process, which consists 
of the following 7 steps:  
1. Determine the system reliability requirement(s). 
2. Define the field configuration of the system. 
3. Perform up-front analysis to identify anticipated system unreliability drivers.  
4. Establish essential RTP evaluation risk areas.  
5. Design a feasible RTP that addresses all essential evaluation risk areas.  
6. Assess the level of risk associated with each essential evaluation risk area.  




This planning process is not intended to be unforgivingly rigid; it can be easily modified 
or extended as desired. Hence, this planning process can be employed to design an 
adequate and feasible reliability test program for any type of system.  
 Although the 7 steps in our proposed planning process for reliability test programs 
may appear to be intuitive and fairly straightforward, in practice these steps—if 
attempted—have proven to be challenging to perform. For example, effective 
identification of anticipated system unreliability drivers (planning process step 3) prior to 
conducting system-level testing requires such activities as  
• characterization of the operational loads and stresses on the system, 
• component and subsystem testing, 
• system-level modeling via simulation, and 
• study of historical failure mode data (from developmental and operational testing 
as well as the field) on earlier configurations and/or similar systems. 
Again, the objective of this step in the planning process is not to postulate all fathomable 
failure modes; rather, the intent is to identify the dominant operationally-relevant system 
failure modes. The reason that this step is explicitly included in our proposed planning 
process is because identifying the (anticipated) important system failure modes promotes 
wise selection of test activities to confirm or refute such assertions regarding the system.  
Since the primary purpose of a reliability test program is to characterize how a 
system can be expected to behave in its intended operational environment, understanding 
the true unreliability drivers enables a more accurate characterization of system 
reliability. Furthermore, by understanding the dominant failure modes, program managers 




(e.g., number and type of spares, number and type of maintainers, and requisite training 
for maintainers). 
 Another  vital observation for practitioners involved in the planning of reliability 
test programs is that too great of an emphasis is placed on the so-called consumer and 
producer risks associated with the reliability demonstration event. For planning purposes, 
the null hypothesis is that the system under test does not meet the reliability requirement 
specified by the Army, and the alternative hypothesis is that the system does, in fact, 
meet the Army’s requirement. Hence, the consumer risk is the probability of committing 
a type I statistical error, and the producer risk is the probability of committing a type II 
statistical error. 
 Consumer risk is driven by the planned length of the reliability demonstration 
event (operational test), and it includes an associated failure budget for the event.  On the 
other hand, producer risk depends on the planned duration of the reliability demonstration 
event, the maximum number of allowable failures (associated with the pre-established 
level of acceptable consumer risk), and the assumed true system reliability achieved by 
the system developer by the time of the demonstration event. These are mathematical 
contrivances that are not based in evidence. In particular, the level of producer risk is 
driven largely by the strong assumption regarding what the achieved true (but unknown) 
system reliability will be.  Based on practical resource constraints, the relatively short 
reliability demonstration event length necessitates the assumption that the developer will 
achieve a system-level reliability (say, mean time between system abort) that is 2-3 times 
higher than the Army requirement. Otherwise, the probability of “passing” the reliability 




 By allowing consumer and producer risks to serve as the foundation of the 
reliability test program plan, we ignore many other important risk areas that are 
acknowledged to exist and have more practical significance. Indeed, it is certainly 
possible to devise an overarching reliability test program that culminates with a reliability 
demonstration event that, theoretically, manages both consumer and producer risks. 
However, as we stated above, the common driver in the calculation of both consumer and 
producer risks is the length of the demonstration event. In no manner does either of these 
risks account for the operational realism of the demonstration event. 
Clearly, the evaluation of a given system’s operational reliability should be based 
on observed performance under operationally-realistic conditions. According to a paper 
by Hall et al. [32] from the Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, 
such conditions include, but are by no means limited to 
• who the system operators are (e.g., Soldiers, contractors, or government testers),  
• who the maintainers are (e.g., Soldiers, Field Support Representatives, 
government maintainers, or a combination thereof), 
• what the environmental conditions of the tests may be (e.g., blowing dust, 
blowing sand, solar loading, rain, dense fog, snow, ambient temperature, relative 
humidity, day/night, etc.), and 
• what operational aspects that the tests may or may not include (e.g., operational 
tempo, force-on-force missions with a credible opposing force, mission durations, 
mission types to be executed, electronic warfare, information assurance, threat 




In 2004, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) published findings [10] subsequent to 
a thorough examination of  the planned initial operational test for Stryker, a wheeled 
combat vehicle program.  In the report, the NAS panel asserts that the qualitative, non-
statistical aspects of an operational test, such as in the case of Stryker, are substantially 
more important than the statistical aspects, such as consumer and producer risks. 
Unfortunately, the message has not yet had the desired impact with respect to reliability 
test program planning. 
 Thus, our proposed reliability test program planning process includes a step for 
establishing what we refer to as essential evaluation risk areas. The essential evaluation 
risk areas serve as the building blocks of a given system’s reliability test program—they 
represent the key considerations that must be addressed. Now, the essential evaluation 
risk areas should be tailored to suit each system, but there are likely many categories of 
evaluation risk that are appropriate for most types of systems.  In Chapter 6, we included 
the 7 examples of evaluation risk areas summarized below (refer to Chapter 6 for 
additional details and rationale): 
1. Probability of Committing a Type I Statistical Error 
2. Probability of Committing a Type II Statistical Error 
3. Disparity between the System Test Configuration and the Planned System Field 
Configuration 
4. Operational Mode Summary/Mission Profile Coverage (OMS/MP) 
5. Test Exposure Opportunity to Surface Key Failure Modes (Anticipated 
Unreliability Drivers) 




7. Accuracy of System Reliability Evaluation Methodology 
In practice, stakeholders from the Army operational test activity, the program 
management office, and the Army user community should work together to establish 
appropriate evaluation risk areas for each reliability test program. 
 The extent to which each essential evaluation risk area is addressed within the 
reliability test program is, of course, a matter of vital concern. Therefore, our proposed 
planning process includes an assessment of the level of risk associated with each essential 
evaluation risk area. Risk assessment is a non-trivial task that may demand the execution 
of several supporting analytical activities. Furthermore, although it is possible to establish 
thresholds for acceptable levels of risk using rational criteria, such criteria are subjective. 
Despite the inherently subjective nature of the establishment of acceptable evaluation risk 
thresholds, the cognitive process involved promotes an important dialogue between 
stakeholders. The outcome of such a process is not simply intended to be the acceptable 
thresholds for the essential evaluation risk areas—the higher purpose is to think critically 
about the objectives of the reliability test program, and the manner in which those 
objectives can be achieved. 
 
Simulation-Based Risk Assessment Methodology for SoS Evaluation Adequacy 
For the purpose of demonstration, in Chapter 7, we devised a general method to 
assess the level of risk associated with a particular essential evaluation risk area, namely, 
the disparity between the operational test configuration of the SoS and the 
field/production configuration of the SoS. This is a key reliability test program planning 
consideration because—given practical reliability test program resource constraints—it is 




event. However, as we consider various operational test configurations for an SoS, it is 
critical to acknowledge that there is a point at which a further reduction in the scale and 
scope of the test configuration will yield results that are not representative of how the 
field configuration will behave. In other words, the level of accuracy associated with our 
evaluation of SoS reliability depends on the adequacy of the SoS test configuration. 
The novel simulation-based approach described in Chapter 7 is a technique to 
analytically assess the evaluation adequacy of a range of distinct SoS operational test 
configurations and rank the courses of action accordingly. This methodology can quantify 
how the SoS operational test configuration and the duration of the operational test can 
have an impact on the accuracy associated with the SoS reliability evaluation. This 
approach can be applied to a wide range of commercial and military SoS. 
In Section 7.3, we presented an illustrative application of the simulation-based 
risk assessment method. Specifically, we considered 3 SoS designs with k-out-of-n 
structures, 3 SoS-level reliability values (0.90, 085, and 0.35), and 12 test configuration 
cases (varying sizes of the SoS test configuration and operational test length), for a total 
of 108 combinations. We conducted 20 trials for each of the 108 combinations, resulting 
in 2,160 total simulation trials (refer to Chapter 7 for complete details). We note that—
irrespective of the SoS design or level of true SoS reliability—the mean relative error 
decreases as either the operational test duration increases or the test configuration 
approaches the full field configuration of the SoS. This is not a surprising result, but it is 
important that this simulation-based methodology yields such a result. 
In order to demonstrate how practitioners can use the results from the simulation-




recommendation regarding the size of the test configuration and the duration of the 
operational test), an example application is included. In our example, we restricted our 
planning considerations to (1) the cost to produce test assets for use during the 
operational test and (2) the cost to conduct the operational test. Additional planning 
considerations can easily be incorporated as desired. 
For each pairing of SoS operational test configuration and operational test length, 
we calculated the total cost associated with each pairing. Given a particular maximum 
acceptable threshold for the mean relative error associated with SoS reliability, we can 
identify the option(s) that do not exceed that threshold. If there are multiple options that 
do not exceed the threshold, the option with the lowest associated cost will likely be 
adopted.  However, it is important to first decide if there are operational test 
configuration options that should not be considered (such as those that do not offer the 
potential to surface emergent behaviors of the SoS) before adopting a particular option. 
By establishing the maximum acceptable threshold for the mean relative error 
associated with SoS reliability for the SoS, practitioners are certifying that any SoS test 
configuration for which the mean relative error exceeds that threshold—from a reliability 
evaluation standpoint—is inadequate. In other words, the empirical results obtained 
during an operational test employing an inadequate SoS test configuration should not be 
expected to be representative of the true behavior of the SoS field configuration. Without 
going through this process, or at least a variant of this process, practitioners struggle to 
effectively articulate this to information to program managers. Concordantly, program 




operational test for a complex SoS. This is what is referred to as the Iron Triangle—in 
this context, the 3 vertices of the triangle are cost, schedule, and evaluation accuracy. 
8.3  Future Work 
Extension of the Simulation-Based Risk Assessment Methodology for SoS Evaluation 
Adequacy 
 The implementation of the technique discussed in Chapter 7 for assessing the 
evaluation adequacy of an SoS operational test configuration is designed to be used under 
the following conditions: 
1. The SoS reliability requirement stipulates that no system-level repairs may be 
performed during the course of a 24-hour mission. 
2. The time between failures for each system within the SoS follows an exponential 
distribution (i.e., the system-level failure recurrence rates are constant). 
3. When a failed systems is repaired, it is assumed to be restored to “as good as 
new” condition—hence, the SoS is assumed to be “as good as new.” 
4. The SoS is comprised of multiple k-out-of-n structures arranged in series. Each k-
out-of-n structure consists of n identical systems in configured in parallel active 
redundancy. 
Condition 1 is explicitly specified in the definition of the SoS reliability requirement. 
Conditions 2 and 3 are standard assumptions made by practitioners, and they tend to be 
reasonable, given the inspection period for the systems that comprise the SoS. Condition 
4 is driven by the actual SoS design—the majority of air defense systems are some 




 It would be worthwhile to adapt this approach to accommodate a wider range of 
potential SoS designs with different characteristics and/or assumptions. For example, 
although reliability requirements for air defense SoS are based on the assumption of no 
repair during the course of a mission (see condition 1 above), there may be certain 
system-level failures that could be repaired in the field. This has recently been a subject 
of much debate between the user community (authors of SoS reliability requirements) 
and the program management community (system developers). Assuming no repair 
during missions simplifies the evaluation of SoS reliability; however, if repair during the 
mission is allowed, the probability of completing a 24-hour mission without an SoS-level 
abort would be higher. Since we may see a paradigm shift with respect to how SoS 
reliability requirements are written in the near future, this would be a useful extension to 
the technique described in Chapter 7. 
 
Risk Assessment Methods for RTP Essential Evaluation Risk Areas 
 The technique in Chapter 7 is a technique to assess the level of risk associated 
with a particular evaluation risk area, namely, the disparity between the test configuration 
and the field/production configuration of the system. In Chapter 6, we proposed  other 
examples of evaluation risk areas having to do with  
• reliability test program coverage of the system operational mode 
summary/mission profile (OMS/MP),  
• the power to detect statistically-significant differences (such as system-to-system 
variation, effectiveness of vendor corrective actions, or degradation/improvement 




• test exposure opportunity to surface key failure modes, and 
• accuracy of the system reliability evaluation methodology. 
Additional investigation could be performed in any of the above areas to devise 
appropriate methods and/or activities to assess the level of risk in each of these areas. 
Furthermore, there are potentially innumerable evaluation risk areas, and one could 
certainly strive to postulate other meaningful evaluation risk areas and develop associated 






A.1  MATLAB Code 
 In this section, we include all MATLAB code developed and applied in the 
conduct of this dissertation research. Before inserting the MATLAB code, i.e., function 
and script m-files, we will provide a brief description of the purpose of each m-file. 
• ultraDriver.m:  This script m-file is the main engine that is used to execute all 
simulation cases, and it relies upon the following 3 m-files 
– ultracase.m:  For each simulation case, this function m-file simulates a 
single operational test, obtains system-level MTBF point estimates, uses 
the system-level MTBF point estimates in the SoS-level reliability 
simulation (see ultraSoS.m immediately below) to obtain a vector of 1,000 
SoS-level times to failure (TTF), and writes the TTF vector to an output 
file specified by the user. 
– ultraSoS.m:  Given a particular SoS design and system-level MTBF point 
estimates, this function m-file performs a user-specified number of 
replications of a TTF simulation for the specified SoS, and it returns a 
vector of SoS TTF (to ultracase.m). 
– getUltraMTBF.m:  This function returns a vector of MTBF point 
estimates. The MTBF point estimates are based on a single simulated 
operational test.  The length of the operational test as well as the actual 
quantity of each type of system "present" during the OT are inputs 
specified by the user. 
• ultraTrue.m:  Script m-file to run SoS-level TTF (ultraSoS.m) simulation using 
actual system-level failure rates. 
• ultraResults.m:  Script m-File to calculate mean relative error in P(T>24) across 
20 simulation trials as well as calculate the proportion of trials for which P(T>24) 
≥ 0.90.  The results are written to a user-specified file. 
• knrel.m:  This function m-file calculates the reliability for a k-out-of-n structure, 
given any value of k an n.  This function is used by sosDesign234.m, 
sosDesign3512.m, and sosDesign35412.m (see below). 
• sosDesign234.m:  This function m-file finds system-level failure rates that result 
in an SoS-level reliability that is approximately equal to a user-specified target. In 
this case, the SoS has 3 KN structures in series.  The ki are {1,2,2} and the ni are 
{2,3,4}. The user specifies a fraction that is used to obtain system-level failure 




specified target. The function returns a vector of 3 system-level failure rates and 
the calculated SoS-level reliability. 
• sosDesign3512.m:  This function m-file finds system-level failure rates that result 
in an SoS-level reliability that is approximately equal to a user-specified target. In 
this case, the SoS has 3 KN structures in series.  The ki are {2,3,9} and the ni are 
{3,5,12}. The user specifies a fraction that is used to obtain system-level failure 
rates that produce an SoS-level reliability that is arbitrarily close to the user-
specified target. The function returns a vector of 3 system-level failure rates and 
the calculated SoS-level reliability. 
• sosDesign35412.m:  This function m-file finds system-level failure rates that 
result in an SoS-level reliability that is approximately equal to a user-specified 
target. In this case, the SoS has 4 KN structures in series.  The ki are {2,3,2,9} and 
the ni are {3,5,4,12}. The user specifies a fraction that is used to obtain system-
level failure rates that produce an SoS-level reliability that is arbitrarily close to 
the user-specified target. The function returns a vector of 4 system-level failure 
rates and the calculated SoS-level reliability. 
• mtbfBoxPlotter.m:  Script m-File to generate side-by-side box and whisker plots 
for system-level MTBF point estimates over 20 trials for a given SoS design and 
SoS reliability. 
• runMTBFplotter.m:  Script m-file to plot several comparisons of system-level 
MTBF point estimates; uses plotMTBFscatter.m. 
– plotMTBFscatter.m:  Given 2 sets of system-level MTBF point estimates 
(each set is based on 20 simulation trials), generate a scatter plot with both 
data sets (set 1 in blue, set 2 in red) along with a black dashed horizontal 
line representing the true system-level MTBF. 
• fisherPropTest.m:  Function m-File to calculate 2-sided p-value for equality of 2 
proportions (i.e., the null hypothesis assumes equality).  This is the Fisher exact 







function mtbf = getUltraMTBF(sosDesign, lambda) 
% This function returns a vector of MTBF point estimates. 
% The MTBF point estimates are based on a single simulated operational 
% test.  The length of the operational test as well as the actual 
% quantity of each type of system "present" during the OT are inputs 
% specified by the user. 
  
% The expected format of the sosDesign vector is as follows: 
% The length of the vector will be 6. 
% sosDesign(1) is the number of distinct system types in the SoS  
% (either 3 or 4, depending on the scenario considered--can be modified 
% to handle other SoS designs) 
% sosDesign(2) is the operational test length for the current case 
% sosDesign(3) through sosDesign(6) represent the quantity of each type  
% of system that will be exercised during the operational test 
  
  
% Determine the length of the MTBF vector and pre-allocate storage. 
mtbf = zeros(1,sosDesign(1)); 
  
% Generate individual system availability values. 
% Note: In actual OT, the availability (up-time) of each system will  
% vary based on the nature of reliability failures that occur.  Hence,  
% we do not wish to assume the amount of operating time accumulated by 
% all of a single type of system during the OT is equal to  
% (num systems)*OT_length.  We use a uniform distribution U(0.6,0.9) 
% based on operational availability demonstrated during previous OT 
% events for a range of system types. 
     
avail = zeros(sosDesign(1),max(sosDesign(3:6))); 
  
for i = 1:sosDesign(1) 
    for j = 1:sosDesign(i+2) 
        avail(i,j) = 0.6 + 0.3.*rand(); 
    end 
end 
  
% Calculate system operating times for the OT based on availability 
% Note that these are vectors with operating times for multiple systems 
% of each type.  The operating times will vary based on the random 
% sample from above. 
  
optime = zeros(size(avail)); 
  
for i = 1:sosDesign(1) 
    for j = 1:sosDesign(i+2) 
        optime(i,j) = sosDesign(2)*avail(i,j); 
    end 
end 
  
% Generate number of system failures. 




% Process, and we use the true system-level MTBF values as the 
% parameter to randomly generate the number of failures for each 
% individual system during each replication. 
  
fails = zeros(size(avail)); 
  
for i = 1:sosDesign(1) 
    for j = 1:sosDesign(i+2) 
        fails(i,j) = poissrnd(optime(i,j)*lambda(i)); 
    end 
end 
  
% Calculate point estimates for the MTBF for each system type. 
  
for i = 1:sosDesign(1) 
    % If no failures occur, use the 50% lower confidence bound for  
    % MTBF. 
    if (sum(fails(i,:)) == 0) 
        mtbf(i) = 2*sum(optime(i,:))/chi2inv(0.5,2); 
    % If at least 1 failure occurs, calculate the MTBF point estimate 
    % assuming that the times between failure follow an exponential  
    % distribution (i.e., optime/failures). 
    else 
        mtbf(i) = sum(optime(i,:))/sum(fails(i,:)); 










function TTF = ultraSoS(numreps,sosDesign,mtbf) 
  
TTF = zeros(numreps,1); 
  
for ctr = 1:numreps 
     
% Create status matrix for all systems. 
% Initially,elements are set to 1 to denote that the system is not 
% in a failed state.  An initial value of zero denotes that the 
% corresponding matrix element is only a placeholder, i.e., the 
% element does not correspond to a system.  This is because the 
% number of columns in the matrix is driven by the largest number 
% of systems for a given KN structure (structure 3, in this case). 
  
% Get number of system types 
numTypes = sosDesign(1); 
% Load K vector 
K = [sosDesign(7) sosDesign(9) sosDesign(11) sosDesign(13)]; 
% Load N vector 
N = [sosDesign(8) sosDesign(10) sosDesign(12) sosDesign(14)]; 
% Get max quantity of systems within a given KN structure of the SoS 
maxKN = max(N); 
  
KN = zeros(numTypes,maxKN); 
for i = 1:numTypes 
    KN(i,1:N(i)) = ones(1,N(i)); 
end 
  
% For each simulation replication, perform random draws from the 
% exponential distribution for the time-to-failure (TTF) for each  
% system. We are using TTF because it is assumed that there will be no 
% repair during a mission. 
  
TTF1 = exprnd(mtbf(1),1,N(1)); 
TTF2 = exprnd(mtbf(2),1,N(2)); 
TTF3 = exprnd(mtbf(3),1,N(3)); 
if (numTypes == 4) 
    TTF4 = exprnd(mtbf(4),1,N(4)); 
end 
  
% Create a vector of all TTF from previous section. 
if (numTypes == 3) 
    TTFmaster = [TTF1 TTF2 TTF3]; 
else 







% Create an index vector to associate TTF with each particular system. 
if (numTypes == 3) 
    TTFmaster_index = [ones(1,N(1)) 2*ones(1,N(2)) 3*ones(1,N(3)); ... 
        1:N(1) 1:N(2) 1:N(3)]; 
else 
    TTFmaster_index = [ones(1,N(1)) 2*ones(1,N(2)) 3*ones(1,N(3)) ... 
        4*ones(1,N(4)); 1:N(1) 1:N(2) 1:N(3) 1:N(4)]; 
end 
  
% Create ordered list of TTF (eventList) and the transition vector 
% (eIX) to keep track of the original position in TTF123. 
[eventList eIX] = sort(TTFmaster); 
  
% Pre-allocate matrix to identify the failed systems (in order). 
failedSystems = zeros(2,length(TTFmaster)); 
  
% Populate the matrix with the systems in the order of failure. 
for i = 1:length(TTFmaster) 
    failedSystems(:,i) = TTFmaster_index(:,eIX(i)); 
end 
  
% Set SA (as in system abort for the complete SoS) to be false 
% since the SoS is operational at time = 0. 
SA = false; 
  
% Initialize loop counter for while loop below. 
SA_index = 0; 
  
while (SA == false) 
    SA_index = SA_index + 1; 
    % Update system state matrix KN as systems fail. 
    KN(failedSystems(1,SA_index),failedSystems(2,SA_index)) = 0; 
     
    for j = 1:numTypes 
        % Check to see if there are >= k out of n systems that are 
        % still operational for each KN structure. 
        if ( sum(KN(j,:)) < K(j) ) 
            SA = true; 
        end 
    end 
end 
  
TTF(ctr) = eventList(SA_index); 
  










function ultracase(inFile, caseRange, lambdaRange, outFile) 
  
% Retrieve simulation case inputs 
sosDesign = xlsread(inFile,'TC Run Matrix',caseRange); 
lambda = xlsread(inFile,'Reliability Run Matrix',lambdaRange); 
  
sosDesignSize = size(sosDesign); 
numCases = sosDesignSize(1); 
  
% For each simulation case:  simulate a single operational test, obtain 
% system-level MTBF point estimates, use the system-level MTBF point  
% estimates in the SoS-level reliability simulation to obtain a vector 
% of 1000 SoS-level times to failure (TTF), and write the TTF vector to 
% outFile specified by the user.  Repeat 20 times for each simulation  
% case. 
for i = 1:numCases 
    % Extract single case from the matrix of cases. 
    currentCase = sosDesign(i,:); 
    for j = 1:20 
        % Obtain system-level MTBF point estimates. 
        mtbf = getUltraMTBF(currentCase,lambda); 
        % Use system-level point estimates in SoS-level reliability 
        % model to generate TTF distribution. 
        TTF = ultraSoS(1000,sosDesign(i,:),mtbf); 
        % Write the TTF vector to the outFile specified by the user. 
        xlswrite(outFile,TTF,strcat('Sheet',num2str(i)), ... 
            strcat(char(64+j),'1')); 
    end 











% Script M-File to execute all SoS study cases; written on 09/08/13. 
  
% Create timekeeping file name 
timeFile = 'SoS Time Log.xls'; 
% Create input file name 
inFile = 'SoS Ultra Simulation Run Matrix.xls'; 
  
%********************************************************************** 
% 1 SoS Design {2,3,4} 
%********************************************************************** 
disp(sprintf('\nBeginning SoS Part 1 of 3.')) 
  
caseRange = 'B2:O13'; 
  
% 1.1 SoS Reliability 0.90 
outFile = 'SoS 2-3-4 90.xls'; 
lambdaRange = 'C2:E2'; 
  
tStart = tic; 
  
ultracase(inFile, caseRange, lambdaRange, outFile); 
  
tElapsed = toc(tStart); 
xlswrite(timeFile,1290,'Sheet1','A1'); 
xlswrite(timeFile,tElapsed,'Sheet1','B1'); 
disp(sprintf('\nPart 1.1 complete.')) 
  
% 1.2 SoS Reliability 0.85 
outFile = 'SoS 2-3-4 85.xls'; 
lambdaRange = 'C3:E3'; 
  
tStart = tic; 
  
ultracase(inFile, caseRange, lambdaRange, outFile); 
  
tElapsed = toc(tStart); 
xlswrite(timeFile,1285,'Sheet1','A2'); 
xlswrite(timeFile,tElapsed,'Sheet1','B2'); 
disp(sprintf('\nPart 1.2 complete.')) 
  
% 1.3 SoS Reliability 0.35 
outFile = 'SoS 2-3-4 35.xls'; 
lambdaRange = 'C4:E4'; 
  
tStart = tic; 
  
ultracase(inFile, caseRange, lambdaRange, outFile); 
  






disp(sprintf('\nPart 1.3 complete.')) 
 
%********************************************************************** 
% 2 SoS Design {3,5,12} 
%********************************************************************** 
disp(sprintf('\nSoS Part 1 complete. Beginning SoS Part 2 of 3.')) 
  
caseRange = 'B14:O25'; 
  
% 2.1 SoS Reliability 0.90 
outFile = 'SoS 3-5-12 90.xls'; 
lambdaRange = 'C5:E5'; 
  
tStart = tic; 
  
ultracase(inFile, caseRange, lambdaRange, outFile); 
  
tElapsed = toc(tStart); 
xlswrite(timeFile,2490,'Sheet1','A4'); 
xlswrite(timeFile,tElapsed,'Sheet1','B4'); 
disp(sprintf('\nPart 2.1 complete.')) 
  
% 2.2 SoS Reliability 0.85 
outFile = 'SoS 3-5-12 85.xls'; 
lambdaRange = 'C6:E6'; 
  
tStart = tic; 
  
ultracase(inFile, caseRange, lambdaRange, outFile); 
  
tElapsed = toc(tStart); 
xlswrite(timeFile,2485,'Sheet1','A5'); 
xlswrite(timeFile,tElapsed,'Sheet1','B5'); 
disp(sprintf('\nPart 2.2 complete.')) 
  
% 2.3 SoS Reliability 0.35 
outFile = 'SoS 3-5-12 35.xls'; 
lambdaRange = 'C7:E7'; 
  
tStart = tic; 
  
ultracase(inFile, caseRange, lambdaRange, outFile); 
  
tElapsed = toc(tStart); 
xlswrite(timeFile,2435,'Sheet1','A6'); 
xlswrite(timeFile,tElapsed,'Sheet1','B6'); 
disp(sprintf('\nPart 2.3 complete.')) 
  
%********************************************************************** 
% 3 SoS Design {3,5,4,12} 
%********************************************************************** 





caseRange = 'B26:O37'; 
  
 
% 3.1 SoS Reliability 0.90 
outFile = 'SoS 3-5-4-12 90.xls'; 
lambdaRange = 'C8:F8'; 
  
tStart = tic; 
  
ultracase(inFile, caseRange, lambdaRange, outFile); 
  
tElapsed = toc(tStart); 
xlswrite(timeFile,3690,'Sheet1','A7'); 
xlswrite(timeFile,tElapsed,'Sheet1','B7'); 
disp(sprintf('\nPart 3.1 complete.')) 
  
% 3.2 SoS Reliability 0.85 
outFile = 'SoS 3-5-4-12 85.xls'; 
lambdaRange = 'C9:F9'; 
  
tStart = tic; 
  
ultracase(inFile, caseRange, lambdaRange, outFile); 
  
tElapsed = toc(tStart); 
xlswrite(timeFile,3685,'Sheet1','A8'); 
xlswrite(timeFile,tElapsed,'Sheet1','B8'); 
disp(sprintf('\nPart 3.2 complete.')) 
  
% 3.3 SoS Reliability 0.35 
outFile = 'SoS 3-5-4-12 35.xls'; 
lambdaRange = 'C10:F10'; 
  
tStart = tic; 
  
ultracase(inFile, caseRange, lambdaRange, outFile); 
  
tElapsed = toc(tStart); 
xlswrite(timeFile,3635,'Sheet1','A9'); 
xlswrite(timeFile,tElapsed,'Sheet1','B9'); 
disp(sprintf('\nPart 3.3 complete.')) 
  
%********************************************************************** 








% Script M-File to analyze the SoS simulation results; created 09/09/13 
tStart = tic; 
  
inFile = 'SoS Ultra Simulation Run Matrix.xls'; 
relTab = 'Reliability Run Matrix'; 
relRange ='B2:B10'; 
sosRel = xlsread(inFile,relTab,relRange); 
outFile = 'SoS Ultra Simulation Results Summary.xls'; 
  
%********************************************************************** 
% 1 SoS Design {2,3,4} 
%********************************************************************** 
  
% 1.1 90% SoS Reliability 
trials01 = xlsread('ultra SoS calcs 2-3-4 90.xls','Sheet1','F2:F241'); 
trialCtr = 1; 
relError01 = zeros(1,240); 
meanRelError01 = zeros(1,12); 
prop01 = zeros(1,12); 
for i = 1:12 
    for j = 1:20 
        if( trials01(trialCtr) >= 0.9 ) 
            prop01(i) = prop01(i) + 1; 
        end 
        relError01(trialCtr) =  
            abs(trials01(trialCtr)-sosRel(1))/sosRel(1); 
        trialCtr = trialCtr + 1; 
    end 
    meanRelError01(i) = mean(relError01(20*(i-1)+1:trialCtr-1)); 
end 
  
prop01 = prop01./20; 
  









% 1.2 85% SoS Reliability 
trials02 = xlsread('ultra SoS calcs 2-3-4 85.xls','Sheet1','F2:F241'); 
trialCtr = 1; 
relError02 = zeros(1,240); 
meanRelError02 = zeros(1,12); 
prop02 = zeros(1,12); 
for i = 1:12 
    for j = 1:20 
        if( trials02(trialCtr) >= 0.9 ) 
            prop02(i) = prop02(i) + 1; 
        end 
        relError02(trialCtr) = 
            abs(trials02(trialCtr)-sosRel(2))/sosRel(2); 
        trialCtr = trialCtr + 1; 
    end 
    meanRelError02(i) = mean(relError02(20*(i-1)+1:trialCtr-1)); 
end 
  
prop02 = prop02./20; 
  





% 1.3 35% SoS Reliability 
trials03 = xlsread('ultra SoS calcs 2-3-4 35.xls','Sheet1','F2:F241'); 
trialCtr = 1; 
relError03 = zeros(1,240); 
meanRelError03 = zeros(1,12); 
prop03 = zeros(1,12); 
for i = 1:12 
    for j = 1:20 
        if( trials03(trialCtr) >= 0.9 ) 
            prop03(i) = prop03(i) + 1; 
        end 
        relError03(trialCtr) =  
            abs(trials03(trialCtr)-sosRel(3))/sosRel(3); 
        trialCtr = trialCtr + 1; 
    end 
    meanRelError03(i) = mean(relError03(20*(i-1)+1:trialCtr-1)); 
end 
  
prop03 = prop03./20; 
  










% 2 SoS Design {3,5,12} 
%********************************************************************** 
  
% 2.1 90% SoS Reliability 
trials04 = xlsread('ultra SoS calcs 3-5-12 90.xls','Sheet1','F2:F241'); 
trialCtr = 1; 
relError04 = zeros(1,240); 
meanRelError04 = zeros(1,12); 
prop04 = zeros(1,12); 
for i = 1:12 
    for j = 1:20 
        if( trials04(trialCtr) >= 0.9 ) 
            prop04(i) = prop04(i) + 1; 
        end 
        relError04(trialCtr) =  
            abs(trials04(trialCtr)-sosRel(1))/sosRel(1); 
        trialCtr = trialCtr + 1; 
    end 
    meanRelError04(i) = mean(relError04(20*(i-1)+1:trialCtr-1)); 
end 
  
prop04 = prop04./20; 
  





% 2.2 85% SoS Reliability 
trials05 = xlsread('ultra SoS calcs 3-5-12 85.xls','Sheet1','F2:F241'); 
trialCtr = 1; 
relError05 = zeros(1,240); 
meanRelError05 = zeros(1,12); 
prop05 = zeros(1,12); 
for i = 1:12 
    for j = 1:20 
        if( trials05(trialCtr) >= 0.9 ) 
            prop05(i) = prop05(i) + 1; 
        end 
        relError05(trialCtr) =  
            abs(trials05(trialCtr)-sosRel(2))/sosRel(2); 
        trialCtr = trialCtr + 1; 
    end 
    meanRelError05(i) = mean(relError05(20*(i-1)+1:trialCtr-1)); 
end 
  
prop05 = prop05./20; 
  









% 2.3 35% SoS Reliability 
trials06 = xlsread('ultra SoS calcs 3-5-12 35.xls','Sheet1','F2:F241'); 
trialCtr = 1; 
relError06 = zeros(1,240); 
meanRelError06 = zeros(1,12); 
prop06 = zeros(1,12); 
for i = 1:12 
    for j = 1:20 
        if( trials06(trialCtr) >= 0.9 ) 
            prop06(i) = prop06(i) + 1; 
        end 
        relError06(trialCtr) =  
            abs(trials06(trialCtr)-sosRel(3))/sosRel(3); 
        trialCtr = trialCtr + 1; 
    end 
    meanRelError06(i) = mean(relError06(20*(i-1)+1:trialCtr-1)); 
end 
  
prop06 = prop06./20; 
  






% 3 SoS Design {3,5,4,12} 
%********************************************************************** 
  
% 3.1 90% SoS Reliability 
trials07 = xlsread('ultra SoS calcs 3-5-4-12 
90.xls','Sheet1','F2:F241'); 
trialCtr = 1; 
relError07 = zeros(1,240); 
meanRelError07 = zeros(1,12); 
prop07 = zeros(1,12); 
for i = 1:12 
    for j = 1:20 
        if( trials07(trialCtr) >= 0.9 ) 
            prop07(i) = prop07(i) + 1; 
        end 
        relError07(trialCtr) =  
            abs(trials07(trialCtr)-sosRel(1))/sosRel(1); 
        trialCtr = trialCtr + 1; 
    end 
    meanRelError07(i) = mean(relError07(20*(i-1)+1:trialCtr-1)); 
end 
  
prop07 = prop07./20; 
  








% 3.2 85% SoS Reliability 
trials08 = xlsread('ultra SoS calcs 3-5-4-12 
85.xls','Sheet1','F2:F241'); 
trialCtr = 1; 
relError08 = zeros(1,240); 
meanRelError08 = zeros(1,12); 
prop08 = zeros(1,12); 
for i = 1:12 
    for j = 1:20 
        if( trials08(trialCtr) >= 0.9 ) 
            prop08(i) = prop08(i) + 1; 
        end 
        relError08(trialCtr) =  
            abs(trials08(trialCtr)-sosRel(2))/sosRel(2); 
        trialCtr = trialCtr + 1; 
    end 
    meanRelError08(i) = mean(relError08(20*(i-1)+1:trialCtr-1)); 
end 
  
prop08 = prop08./20; 
  





% 3.3 35% SoS Reliability 
trials09 = xlsread('ultra SoS calcs 3-5-4-12 
35.xls','Sheet1','F2:F241'); 
trialCtr = 1; 
relError09 = zeros(1,240); 
meanRelError09 = zeros(1,12); 
prop09 = zeros(1,12); 
for i = 1:12 
    for j = 1:20 
        if( trials09(trialCtr) >= 0.9 ) 
            prop09(i) = prop09(i) + 1; 
        end 
        relError09(trialCtr) =  
            abs(trials09(trialCtr)-sosRel(3))/sosRel(3); 
        trialCtr = trialCtr + 1; 
    end 
    meanRelError09(i) = mean(relError09(20*(i-1)+1:trialCtr-1)); 
end 
  
prop09 = prop09./20; 
  




tElapsed = toc(tStart); 








% Script M-file to run SoS-level TTF simulation using actual system- 
% level failure rates.  The results will be used for comparison  
% purposes. Created: 09/14/13 
  
% Create input file name 
inFile = 'SoS Ultra Simulation Run Matrix.xls'; 
outFile = 'SoS Ultra Results True MTBF.xls'; 
  
%********************************************************************** 
% 1 SoS Design {2,3,4} 
%********************************************************************** 
disp(sprintf('\nBeginning SoS Part 1 of 3.')) 
caseRange = 'B2:O2'; 
  
% 1.1 SoS Reliability 0.90 
lambdaRange = 'C2:E2'; 
sosDesign = xlsread(inFile,'TC Run Matrix',caseRange); 
lambda = xlsread(inFile,'Reliability Run Matrix',lambdaRange); 
TTF = ultraSoS(1000,sosDesign,1./lambda); 
[params,ci]=gamfit(TTF); 
P90 = 1-gamcdf(24,params(1),params(2)); 
xlswrite(outFile,[params P90],'Sheet1','A2'); 
xlswrite(outFile,ci,'Sheet1','A3'); 
disp(sprintf('\nPart 1.1 complete.')) 
  
% 1.2 SoS Reliability 0.85 
lambdaRange = 'C3:E3'; 
sosDesign = xlsread(inFile,'TC Run Matrix',caseRange); 
lambda = xlsread(inFile,'Reliability Run Matrix',lambdaRange); 
TTF = ultraSoS(1000,sosDesign,1./lambda); 
[params,ci]=gamfit(TTF); 
P90 = 1-gamcdf(24,params(1),params(2)); 
xlswrite(outFile,[params P90],'Sheet1','A5'); 
xlswrite(outFile,ci,'Sheet1','A6'); 
disp(sprintf('\nPart 1.2 complete.')) 
  
% 1.3 SoS Reliability 0.35 
lambdaRange = 'C4:E4'; 
sosDesign = xlsread(inFile,'TC Run Matrix',caseRange); 
lambda = xlsread(inFile,'Reliability Run Matrix',lambdaRange); 
TTF = ultraSoS(1000,sosDesign,1./lambda); 
[params,ci]=gamfit(TTF); 
P90 = 1-gamcdf(24,params(1),params(2)); 
xlswrite(outFile,[params P90],'Sheet1','A8'); 
xlswrite(outFile,ci,'Sheet1','A9'); 







% 2 SoS Design {3,5,12} 
%********************************************************************** 
disp(sprintf('\nSoS Part 1 complete. Beginning SoS Part 2 of 3.')) 
caseRange = 'B14:O14'; 
  
% 2.1 SoS Reliability 0.90 
lambdaRange = 'C5:E5'; 
sosDesign = xlsread(inFile,'TC Run Matrix',caseRange); 
lambda = xlsread(inFile,'Reliability Run Matrix',lambdaRange); 
TTF = ultraSoS(1000,sosDesign,1./lambda); 
[params,ci]=gamfit(TTF); 
P90 = 1-gamcdf(24,params(1),params(2)); 
xlswrite(outFile,[params P90],'Sheet1','A11'); 
xlswrite(outFile,ci,'Sheet1','A12'); 
disp(sprintf('\nPart 2.1 complete.')) 
  
% 2.2 SoS Reliability 0.85 
lambdaRange = 'C6:E6'; 
sosDesign = xlsread(inFile,'TC Run Matrix',caseRange); 
lambda = xlsread(inFile,'Reliability Run Matrix',lambdaRange); 
TTF = ultraSoS(1000,sosDesign,1./lambda); 
[params,ci]=gamfit(TTF); 
P90 = 1-gamcdf(24,params(1),params(2)); 
xlswrite(outFile,[params P90],'Sheet1','A14'); 
xlswrite(outFile,ci,'Sheet1','A15'); 
disp(sprintf('\nPart 2.2 complete.')) 
  
% 2.3 SoS Reliability 0.35 
lambdaRange = 'C7:E7'; 
sosDesign = xlsread(inFile,'TC Run Matrix',caseRange); 
lambda = xlsread(inFile,'Reliability Run Matrix',lambdaRange); 
TTF = ultraSoS(1000,sosDesign,1./lambda); 
[params,ci]=gamfit(TTF); 
P90 = 1-gamcdf(24,params(1),params(2)); 
xlswrite(outFile,[params P90],'Sheet1','A17'); 
xlswrite(outFile,ci,'Sheet1','A18'); 
disp(sprintf('\nPart 2.3 complete.')) 
  
%********************************************************************** 
% 3 SoS Design {3,5,4,12} 
%********************************************************************** 
disp(sprintf('\nSoS Part 2 complete. Beginning SoS Part 3 of 3.')) 
caseRange = 'B26:O26'; 
  
% 3.1 SoS Reliability 0.90 
lambdaRange = 'C8:F8'; 
sosDesign = xlsread(inFile,'TC Run Matrix',caseRange); 
lambda = xlsread(inFile,'Reliability Run Matrix',lambdaRange); 
TTF = ultraSoS(1000,sosDesign,1./lambda); 
[params,ci]=gamfit(TTF); 
P90 = 1-gamcdf(24,params(1),params(2)); 
xlswrite(outFile,[params P90],'Sheet1','A20'); 
xlswrite(outFile,ci,'Sheet1','A21'); 





% 3.2 SoS Reliability 0.85 
lambdaRange = 'C9:F9'; 
sosDesign = xlsread(inFile,'TC Run Matrix',caseRange); 
lambda = xlsread(inFile,'Reliability Run Matrix',lambdaRange); 
TTF = ultraSoS(1000,sosDesign,1./lambda); 
[params,ci]=gamfit(TTF); 
P90 = 1-gamcdf(24,params(1),params(2)); 
xlswrite(outFile,[params P90],'Sheet1','A23'); 
xlswrite(outFile,ci,'Sheet1','A24'); 
disp(sprintf('\nPart 3.2 complete.')) 
  
% 3.3 SoS Reliability 0.35 
lambdaRange = 'C10:F10'; 
sosDesign = xlsread(inFile,'TC Run Matrix',caseRange); 
lambda = xlsread(inFile,'Reliability Run Matrix',lambdaRange); 
TTF = ultraSoS(1000,sosDesign,1./lambda); 
[params,ci]=gamfit(TTF); 
P90 = 1-gamcdf(24,params(1),params(2)); 
xlswrite(outFile,[params P90],'Sheet1','A26'); 
xlswrite(outFile,ci,'Sheet1','A27'); 
disp(sprintf('\nPart 3.3 complete.')) 
  
%********************************************************************** 







function rel = knrel(k,n,lambda,t) 
  
rel = 0; 
  
for i = k:n 
    rel =  











function [sysrel, lambda] = sosDesign234(sysrel_tgt,dec) 
  
lambda = ones(1,3); 
KNR = zeros(1,3); 
KNrel_tgt = sysrel_tgt^(1/3); 
  
% Step 1: Obtain value for lambda(1) 
lambdaFound = false; 
while (lambdaFound == false)  
    KNR(1) = knrel(1,2,lambda(1),24); 
     
    if (KNR(1) >= KNrel_tgt) 
        lambdaFound = true; 
    else 
        lambda(1) = dec*lambda(1); 
    end  
end 
  
% Step 2: Obtain value for lambda(2) 
lambdaFound = false; 
while (lambdaFound == false)  
    KNR(2) = knrel(2,3,lambda(2),24); 
     
    if (KNR(2) >= KNrel_tgt) 
        lambdaFound = true; 
    else 
        lambda(2) = dec*lambda(2); 
    end  
end 
  
% Step 3: Obtain value for lambda(3) 
lambdaFound = false; 
while (lambdaFound == false)  
    KNR(3) = knrel(2,4,lambda(3),24); 
     
    if (KNR(3) >= KNrel_tgt) 
        lambdaFound = true; 
    else 
        lambda(3) = dec*lambda(3); 
    end  
end 
  










function [sysrel, lambda] = sosDesign3512(sysrel_tgt,dec) 
  
lambda = ones(1,3); 
KNR = zeros(1,3); 
KNrel_tgt = sysrel_tgt^(1/3); 
  
% Step 1: Obtain value for lambda(1) 
lambdaFound = false; 
while (lambdaFound == false)  
    KNR(1) = knrel(2,3,lambda(1),24); 
     
    if (KNR(1) >= KNrel_tgt) 
        lambdaFound = true; 
    else 
        lambda(1) = dec*lambda(1); 
    end  
end 
  
% Step 2: Obtain value for lambda(2) 
lambdaFound = false; 
while (lambdaFound == false)  
    KNR(2) = knrel(3,5,lambda(2),24); 
     
    if (KNR(2) >= KNrel_tgt) 
        lambdaFound = true; 
    else 
        lambda(2) = dec*lambda(2); 
    end  
end 
  
% Step 3: Obtain value for lambda(3) 
lambdaFound = false; 
while (lambdaFound == false)  
    KNR(3) = knrel(9,12,lambda(3),24); 
     
    if (KNR(3) >= KNrel_tgt) 
        lambdaFound = true; 
    else 
        lambda(3) = dec*lambda(3); 
    end  
end 
  
sysrel = KNR(1)*KNR(2)*KNR(3); 
  
end 






function [sysrel, lambda] = sosDesign35412(sysrel_tgt,dec) 
  
lambda = ones(1,4); 
KNR = zeros(1,4); 
KNrel_tgt = sysrel_tgt^(1/4); 
  
% Step 1: Obtain value for lambda(1) 
lambdaFound = false; 
while (lambdaFound == false)  
    KNR(1) = knrel(2,3,lambda(1),24); 
     
    if (KNR(1) >= KNrel_tgt) 
        lambdaFound = true; 
    else 
        lambda(1) = dec*lambda(1); 
    end  
end 
  
% Step 2: Obtain value for lambda(2) 
lambdaFound = false; 
while (lambdaFound == false)  
    KNR(2) = knrel(3,5,lambda(2),24); 
     
    if (KNR(2) >= KNrel_tgt) 
        lambdaFound = true; 
    else 
        lambda(2) = dec*lambda(2); 
    end  
end 
  
% Step 3: Obtain value for lambda(3) 
lambdaFound = false; 
while (lambdaFound == false)  
    KNR(3) = knrel(2,4,lambda(3),24); 
     
    if (KNR(3) >= KNrel_tgt) 
        lambdaFound = true; 
    else 
        lambda(3) = dec*lambda(3); 
    end  
end 
  
% Step 4: Obtain value for lambda(4) 
lambdaFound = false; 
while (lambdaFound == false)  
    KNR(4) = knrel(9,12,lambda(4),24); 
     
    if (KNR(4) >= KNrel_tgt) 
        lambdaFound = true; 
    else 
        lambda(4) = dec*lambda(4); 















% Script M-File to generate side-by-side box and whisker plots for 
% system-level MTBF point estimates over 20 trials for a given SoS  




inFile = 'SoS 3-5-4-12 90 MTBF.xls'; 
  
m1true = 243.90; 
m2true = 151.51; 
m3true = 112.36; 
m4true = 227.27; 
  
m1pe = zeros(20,12); 
m2pe = zeros(20,12); 
m3pe = zeros(20,12); 
m4pe = zeros(20,12); 
tv = 0:13; 
  
for i = 1:12 
    m1pe(:,i) = xlsread(inFile,strcat('Sheet',num2str(i)),'A1:A20'); 
end 
  
boxplot([m1pe(:,1) m1pe(:,2) m1pe(:,3) m1pe(:,4) m1pe(:,5) ... 
    m1pe(:,6) m1pe(:,7) m1pe(:,8) m1pe(:,9) m1pe(:,10) ... 
    m1pe(:,11) m1pe(:,12)]); 
hold on; 





for i = 1:12 
    m2pe(:,i) = xlsread(inFile,strcat('Sheet',num2str(i)),'B1:B20'); 
end 
  
boxplot([m2pe(:,1) m2pe(:,2) m2pe(:,3) m2pe(:,4) m2pe(:,5) ... 
    m2pe(:,6) m2pe(:,7) m2pe(:,8) m2pe(:,9) m2pe(:,10) ... 
    m2pe(:,11) m2pe(:,12)]); 
hold on; 





for i = 1:12 
    m3pe(:,i) = xlsread(inFile,strcat('Sheet',num2str(i)),'C1:C20'); 
end 
  
boxplot([m3pe(:,1) m3pe(:,2) m3pe(:,3) m3pe(:,4) m3pe(:,5) ... 
    m3pe(:,6) m3pe(:,7) m3pe(:,8) m3pe(:,9) m3pe(:,10) ... 










for i = 1:12 
    m4pe(:,i) = xlsread(inFile,strcat('Sheet',num2str(i)),'D1:D20'); 
end 
  
boxplot([m4pe(:,1) m4pe(:,2) m4pe(:,3) m4pe(:,4) m4pe(:,5) ... 
    m4pe(:,6) m4pe(:,7) m4pe(:,8) m4pe(:,9) m4pe(:,10) ... 
    m4pe(:,11) m4pe(:,12)]); 
hold on; 










numtrials = 1:length(d1); 
numtrials = numtrials'; 
  









ylabel('MTBF Point Estimate'); 










% Script M-file to plot several comparisons of system-level MTBF point 




inFile = 'SoS 2-3-4 90 MTBF.xls'; 
  
% Compare {1,1,1}*100 to {2,2,3}*100 
d1 = xlsread(inFile,'Sheet1','A1:A20'); 




% Compare {1,1,1}*100 to {1,1,1}*300 




% Compare {1,1,1}*100 to {1,1,1}*500 




% Compare {1,1,1}*100 to {1,1,1}*1000 




% Compare {1,1,1}*100 to {2,2,3}*1000 









function [PV2, PL, PU] = fisherPropTest(prop1,prop2,n1,n2) 
% Function M-File to calculate 2-sided p-value for equality of 2 
% proportions.  This is the Fisher exact method, and it is appropriate 
% for small samples.  Written: 09/15/13. 
  
% Get parameters for the MATLAB implementation of the hypergeometric 
% distribution, i.e., {X,M,K,N}. 
  
K = n1; 
M = n1 + n2; 
X = prop1*n1; 
Y = prop2*n2; 
N = X + Y; 
  
% Calculate lower one-sided p-value, PL. 
  
PL = 0; 
for i = max(0,N-M+K):X 
    PL = PL + hygepdf(i,M,K,N); 
end 
  
% Calculate upper one-sided p-value, PU. 
  
PU = 0; 
for i = X:min(K,N) 
    PU = PU + hygepdf(i,M,K,N); 
end 
  
% Calculate 2-sided p-value, PV2. 
  







A.2  Mathematica Code 
Build a list of input file names that store results from the MATLAB SoS time-to-failure 
(TTF) simulation. 
 
fn = {"SoS 2-3-4 90.xls","SoS 2-3-4 85.xls","SoS 2-3-4 35.xls", "SoS 3-
5-12 90.xls", "SoS 3-5-12 85.xls", "SoS 3-5-12 35.xls", "SoS 3-5-4-12 




SoS 2-3-4 90.xls 
SoS 2-3-4 85.xls 
SoS 2-3-4 35.xls 
SoS 3-5-12 90.xls 
SoS 3-5-12 85.xls 
SoS 3-5-12 35.xls 
SoS 3-5-4-12 90.xls 
SoS 3-5-4-12 85.xls 
SoS 3-5-4-12 35.xls 
 
 
Create a table element to store calculated values. 
extable = Table[0,{241},{6}]; 
 
Make the first row in the table a header row. 
extable[[1]]={"Case","Trial","�","�","1st Moment","P(T>24)"}; 
 
For all 12 cases in each input file: 
1. calculate MLEs for α and β for the two-parameter gamma distribution 
2. write the case number (1-12), trial number (1-20), α, β, the first central moment, 
and P(T>24) to each row in the table “extable” 
 
For[j = 3; rowctr = 2, j<13,j++, For[k = 1, k<21, k++; rowctr++, 





Export["UMD/SoS Adequacy/ultra SoS calcs 2-3-4 90.xls",extable]; 
 






The following loop can be used to take the empirical TTF data for n cases (16 cases in 
this example) to: 
 (1) generate a relative frequency histogram of the empirical TTF data 
 (2) calculate MLEs α and β for the two-parameter gamma distribution 
 (3) plot the PDF of the fitted gamma(α, β) distribution 
 (4) calculate the first central moment of the gamma(α, β) 
 (5) calculate P(T>24 hours), using the gamma(α, β) CDF 
 (6) create a probability plot to visually assess goodness of fit 
 (7) create box & whisker plot of the empirical TTF data 










Print[SoSedist2];Print["First Moment: ",Moment[SoSedist2,1]]; 
Print["P(T>tmission) = " ,1-CDF[SoSedist2,24]]; 
ProbabilityPlot[sosData,SoSedist2]//Print] 
 











First Moment: 22.9863 




Given empirical TTF data, the following loop will: 
1. generate a relative frequency histogram of the empirical TTF data 
2. calculate MLEs α and β for the two-parameter gamma distribution 
3. plot the PDF of the fitted gamma(α, β) distribution 
4. plot the PDF associated with another underlying TTF distribution (e.g., the true 
TTF distribution) 
5. calculate the first central moment of the gamma(α, β) 
6. plot two TTD CDFs on the same axes along with a dashed black vertical line at T 
= 24 hours 






sosData = Import[fnxls[[i]],{"Data",1,Range[1,1000],1}]; 






Print["First Moment: ",Moment[SoSedist2,1]]; 
Plot[{CDF[SoSedist2,x],CDF[GammaDistribution[3.851,5.567],x]},{x,0,70},
PlotStyle{Thick,Thick}, AxesLabel{"Time to Failure","P(T<t)"}, 
Epilog{Dashed,Thick,Line[{{24,0},{24,1}}]}]//Print; 
Print["P(T>tmission) = " ,1-CDF[SoSedist2,24]]] 
 







First Moment: 22.9863 
 
 
P(T>tmission) = 0.400536 
  











A.3  Overview of Reliability Growth Planning Curves (RGPC) 
Per DoD [2] and Army [3] policy, all acquisition programs with reliability 
requirements that are under DoD oversight must develop a RGPC. The RGPC is intended 
as a management tool for devising a structured approach to exposing design weaknesses 
(i.e., failure modes), applying corrective actions, and growing system-level reliability. 
The latest Army policy [3] signed by the Army Acquisition Executive on 26 June 2011, 
mandates the use of the U.S. Army Materiel Analysis Activity (AMSAA) Planning 
Model based on Projection Methodology (PM2). The theoretical underpinnings of PM2 
may be found in AMSAA Technical Report 652: AMSAA Reliability Growth Guide [5], 
the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) Implementation Guide for U.S. Army 
Reliability Policy [42], and Military Handbook 189 C: Reliability Growth Management 
[37]. 
The idealized growth curve is the theoretical MTBF that would be achieved if all 
expected failures were found and corrected instantly at any given point in test time. The 
steepness of the curve is an important factor. Steep curves require rapid growth in a very 
short period of time—which might be infeasible for some programs. The curve also 
allows the IPT to work backwards from the reliability needed at the end of the test 
program to find the reliability needed at the beginning of the test program. In Figure 13, 






Figure 13.  Notional System Reliability Growth Planning Curve 
 
Key inputs into the RGPC development process include: 
• The reliability requirement (MR), established by the user 
− Per Department of the Army Pamphlets 70-3 [7]and 73-1 [8], system 
reliability requirements must be demonstrated with high statistical 
confidence (typically 80% or higher, depending on the type of system). 
• The length of the reliability demonstration test (length of the Initial Operational 
Test (IOT)) 
• The reliability design goal (MG)  
− Using standard Operating Characteristic (OC) curve analysis procedures, 
MG is set in order to balance the consumer and producer risks. Since the 




high statistical confidence, the target for MG must be sufficiently higher 
than MR. As well, we typically anticipate a drop in system-level reliability 
as we transition from a developmental test environment to an operational 
test environment. This drop may occur for various reasons, such as: more 
stressful test conditions, employment by representative operators, etc. 
• The Management Strategy (MS) 
− The fraction of the initial failure intensity that will be addressed via 
corrective action. 
• The planned average Fix Effectiveness Factor (μ) 
− As corrective actions are implemented, each has a degree of effectiveness. 
The symbol μ represents the average across all corrective actions to be 
implemented. 
• The initial reliability (Mi) for the reliability test program 
− Mi is frequently estimated using contractor test data. If the initial 
reliability is too low, it may be infeasible for a program to ever “get on the 
curve.” By implementing design-for-reliability (DfR) best practices, it is 
possible to identify the majority of system failure modes, and implement 
corrective actions prior to the start of the government reliability growth 
program. 
• The reliability growth potential (MGP) 






.  This represents the theoretical limit to 





RGPC Risk Assessment 
For every RGPC, the system reliability evaluator should conduct a risk 
assessment. Table 31 summarizes the risks associated with 10 categories related to 
RGPCs. Notice that all categories are medium risk for our notional RGPC. The guidance 
for the risk levels was developed by AMSAA and appears in the Army Center for 
Reliability Growth (CRG) Short Course on Reliability [43]. 
 






A.4  RTP Questionnaire for Army Reliability Evaluators 
The following questions were posed to the reliability evaluators for major acquisition 
programs of interest, and the responses have been archived: 
1. Does the IOT test configuration of the system match the intended fielding 
configuration of the system? 
– If differences exist between the IOT test configuration of the system and 
the intended fielding configuration of the system, describe the extent of 
the differences. 
– In addition to a description of the differences between the IOT test 
configuration and the fielding configuration, include the reason(s) behind 
the differences. 
 For example, assets were not available because there was not 
enough money in the PM’s T&E budget. 
2. Did the vendor attempt to identify unreliability drivers (i.e., portions of the system 
expected to contribute the failure modes constituting the majority of the initial 
failure intensity) prior to the start of the reliability test program? 
– If the vendor did conduct activities intended to identify unreliability 
drivers: 
 Which activities did the vendor elect to conduct (e.g., PoF 
analyses, HALT/ALT, shakedown testing, bench testing)? 
 Why did the vendor select each activity (historical success with the 
technique, etc.)? 
 Which activities were successful in enabling the identification of 
failure modes? 
 Which failure modes were surfaced by each of the DfR activities? 
3. If the IOT test configuration of the system does not match the fielding 
configuration of the system: 
– Was the test configuration chosen based solely on availability of assets? 
– Was the availability of assets in support of the chosen test configuration 
driven by which portions of the system were anticipated to be linked to 
key failure modes (i.e., failure modes that contribute to the majority of the 




– If the test configuration was not expected to include portions of the system 
that were anticipated to heavily influence the overall reliability of the 
system, what actions (if any) were taken to communicate the deficiency to 
the RAM sub-IPT or the AST? 
4. What approach was taken to communicate risk to stakeholders and leadership? 
– What was the consumer risk? 
– What was the producer risk? 
– What was the risk to the evaluation, i.e., the risk that the test configuration 
would not enable us to adequately characterize the reliability behavior of 
the system?  If this risk was not explicitly considered in the planning 
stages, then consider the question given what is currently known. 
5. Was there a tentative plan to leverage late DT data along with IOT data in support 
of the reliability evaluation? 
– Did the RAM sub-IPT coordinate with DOT&E during the development of 
the reliability test program? 
– What were the conditions/criteria (if any) that DOT&E established for it to 
be acceptable to combine the reliability results from late DT along with 
the IOT reliability results? 
– If the IOT has occurred and there was a tentative plan in place to 
potentially combine the results from late DT along with the results from 
the IOT, were the conditions satisfied so that the data could be pooled?  In 
other words, were the failure modes and their respective recurrence rates 
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